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R v Derby Magistrates’ Court, ex parte B represents a pivotal point of 20th-
century cases on legal professional privilege. This thesis argues that in that case, 
Lord Taylor misapplied the principles with respect to the absoluteness of the 
privilege. This decision, made at the highest level of the English judicial system, 
contradicted Benthamic and Wigmorean teachings by placing the nature of legal 
professional privilege beyond doubt. Through an exploration of the works of 
Jeremy Bentham and John Henry Wigmore, this thesis analyses the extent to 
which legal professional privilege evolved as a result of their perspectives and 
argues that Derby’s sweeping pronouncement ultimately diverged from their 
philosophies.  
 
In attempting to limit the breadth of the privilege, or, in the alternative, abolish it 
altogether, Bentham and Wigmore sought to promote justice over concealment 
and instituted a dialogue about the parameters in which the privilege does, or 
should, operate. Both scholars shared similar sentiments about the privilege and 
assigned the highest priority to reaching the correct decision in court 
proceedings. This common thread winds its way through the commentaries of 
Bentham and Wigmore. The continuing significance of these scholars lies in the 
fact that they, unlike their predecessors, adopted a broad view of the subject of 
evidence. Their incisive arguments, in which each advanced rationalist utilitarian 
theories, culminated in agreement that ‘the man [was] more important than the 
rule’.  
 
Espousing a polished wisdom in their individual intellectual enterprises, 
Bentham’s Rationale of Judicial Evidence: Specially Applied to English Practice 
and Wigmore’s A Treatise on the Systems of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, 
came to be linked, with the pair belonging to the mainstream rationalist tradition 
of evidentiary scholarship. Bentham’s successor, Wigmore, went so far as to 
label his predecessor the greatest opponent of all the privileges. While 
sympathetic to Bentham’s premise that the main objective in adjudication was 
rectitude of decision,with the Benthamic philosophy seemeingly irresistible, 
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Wigmore defended legal professional privilege against the Benthamic attack by 
pointing out that if it were abolished, the incidence of criminal defendants 
having recourse to legal advice would not reduce. He stated that no one aside 
from Bentham had ‘taken such an uncompromising stance against all types of 
rigid formality and regulation in adjudications’. Wigmore recognised the validity 
of Bentham’s argument and conceded that legal professional privilege was 
misused and abused, leading to intolerable obstruction of truth finding. 
 
In challenging the immutability of legal professional privilege, this thesis argues 
that the measures applied by Lord Taylor in Derby have unnecessarily enlarged 
the application of the doctrine. In critiquing the factors that influenced his 
reasoning, this thesis examines relevant earlier judgments over which Lord 
Taylor presided. These rulings are contrasted against his dicta in Derby to reveal 
that Lord Taylor swung from advocating a narrow scope for the rule to enlarging 
its application beyond what was necessary to facilitate the administration of 
justice. According to traditional doctrine, the rationale for this standard is that it 
promotes the representation of clients by legal advisers and ensures that all 
relevant material is available to courts when deciding cases. Through utilising 
Bentham and Wigmore as a vehicle to critique Lord Taylor’s decision in Derby, 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis critically analyses the historical and recent authoritative statements 
surrounding the absolute nature of legal professional privilege as articulated in R 
v Derby Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte B.1 Derby forms the focal point of this 
thesis because this proceeding sought to prevent the continuing evolutionary 
development of legal professional privilege according to common law principles. 
This thesis assesses whether the rule has remained faithful to the jurisprudential 
teachings of Jeremy Bentham and John Henry Wigmore. In mapping the 
progression of legal professional privilege together with Lord Taylor of 
Gosforth’s judicial rulings on the subject, a close textual analysis has been applied 
to an extensive range of English common law. While emphasising its Roman 
origins, the thesis focuses on 16th century Elizabethan England through to the 19th 
and 20th centuries. A chronological examination is presented in order to 
demonstrate the fragmented trajectory of the privilege at pivotal points in its 
history.  
 
Legal professional privilege is defined as a single privilege consisting of two 
limbs with corresponding qualities; namely, legal advice privilege2 and litigation 
privilege. It originated as a mechanism for the protection of individuals who were 
unfamiliar with, and vulnerable in the face of overwhelming legal complexities.3 
The notion of ‘privilege’ essentially bound lawyer and client in a special 
contractual relationship.4 ‘Characterised as a sacred trust that touch[ed] the very 
soul of lawyering’,5 legal professional privilege allowed lawyers to defend their 
status by appealing to the public’s need for their services and unique area of 
                                               
1 [1996] AC 487.   
2 Lord Taylor noted that the foundation for the ‘legal advice test’ was laid in Smith-Bird v Blower 
[1939] 2 All ER 406 and Conlon v Conlons Ltd [1952] 2 All ER 462. 
3 ‘Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications’ (1985) 98 Harvard Law Review 1450, 
1502. 
4 John Gergacz, Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege, (Thomson Reuters, 3rd ed, 2000) § 1.04, 1-
5; John Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law (John T. McNaughton, 1961) § 2290, 543. 




expertise. This enabled them to morph into important exemplars of order in 
society.6 The value attached to Elizabethan lawyers culminated in the expansion 
of legal business such that they exerted a far greater influence in the conduct of 
proceedings. During this time, the rule regarding legal professional privilege was 
the subject of judicial uncertainty, leading judges to concede that doubt and 
inconsistency obscured its application. 
 
The effectiveness of interrogating the doctrine through the lenses of Bentham and 
Wigmore is twofold. These scholars have been selected primarily because each 
was prominent in his views about the dangers associated with the application of 
the privilege. In particular, each foresaw the harm that could arise from invoking 
the rule and stifling justice. Bentham recognised that precedents were not a frozen 
monolithic body of precedent, nor of absolute authority. Judicial pronouncements 
made in one era were disregarded in another.7 Neither he, nor Wigmore advocated 
Derby’s ‘absoluteness’ rationale.  
 
Legal professional privilege bore the undeniable stamp of Bentham and 
Wigmore’s influences. Their thinking was instrumental to the way in which the 
rule developed in England.8 Throughout this thesis, the Bentham/Wigmore 
dichotomy is used to illustrate and contrast the core philosophical underpinnings 
                                               
6 The author notes, per Richard Helmholz, The Ius Commune in England: Four Studies (Oxford 
University Press, 2001) 191, that while ecclesiastical privilege has been thoroughly documented 
in the Middle Ages, little to no attention has been devoted to the civil aspect of ‘privilege’, with 
Blackstone and Maitland concentrating on the clergy’s privileged jurisdictional status.  
7 Ibid 48. 
8 English law discerns two limbs of legal professional privilege. Firstly, the dissemination of legal 
advice in a professional capacity is classed as ‘legal advice privilege’. This includes all 
communications passing for giving or receiving legal advice between solicitor and client. 
Secondly, the term ‘litigation privilege’ applies to communications made in anticipation of 
adversarial proceedings. It encompasses communications made only when litigation is anticipated 
or pending. Legal professional privilege, therefore, is a single privilege, whose sub-headings are 
legal advice privilege and litigation privilege; the latter of which has been historically limited to 
the curial setting, with any extension beyond the field of litigation carefully restricted. See Three 
Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6) [2004] UKHL 
48, 88 (Lord Carswell). 
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of the rule. The Bentham/Wigmore dichotomy arises because Bentham despised 
the rule for its ability to conceal injustice. Where he advocated for its abrogation, 
Wigmore noted the value of legal professional privilege in promoting client-
counsel communications. He did however accept that it could be manipulated and 
abused. For this reason, Wigmore predicated its existence on a four-tiered 
paradigm and resolved that the privilege could be invoked only if it met these 
criteria.9 As a precursor to the review of Derby, this thesis explores the 
congruence of Bentham and Wigmore’s philosophies and resolves that, 
ultimately, little separates the pair.   
 
The influence of Bentham and Wigmore on judicial opinion is also canvassed, 
with an emphasis on common law culminating in an assessment of how the 
present English position as enunciated in R v Derby Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte 
B10 relates back to the origins and justifications identified by Bentham and 
Wigmore. This analysis produces the conclusion that Derby represented a 
dramatic and unwarranted departure from their jurisprudential teachings. This 
thesis ultimately concludes that the privilege is flawed, with much contemporary 
thinking misapprehending the rationales espoused by Bentham and Wigmore.   
  
                                               
9 The Wigmorean Paradigm morphed into the contemporary cornerstone of the twentieth 
century incarnation of legal professional privilege; firmly embedded in jurisprudence. Its 
existence was predicated on the following conditions: (1) The communications must 
originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed; (2) This element of confidentiality 
must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties;  
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously 
fostered; (4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the 
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of 
litigation. See John Wigmore, Evidence, above n 4, § 2285. 





I  SIGNIFICANCE AND LIMITS OF THIS STUDY 
 
This thesis presents an in-depth analytical study utilising the Benthamic and 
Wigmorean approaches to critique the pronouncement of Lord Taylor CJ in R v 
Derby Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte B11 in order to establish whether the privilege 
was settled once and for all in the 16th century, has been consistently applied 
across the board, and is unqualified and absolute in every circumstance and 
setting. Although legal professional privilege has drawn a high level of scholarly 
attention, its primary focus has been on justifying an expansion of the perimeter 
of the rule so as to encompass within its ambit a wider range of 
communications.12 Where the privilege could once be claimed only if it pertained 
to legal advice or litigation, its revised scope enabled any legitimate 
communication to achieve protected status, save for the recognised waiver and 
crime-fraud exceptions.  
 
The scholarly literature focuses on reinforcing the existence of legal professional 
privilege because of its ability to free clients from any apprehension that their 
innermost confidences will be revealed.13 It is commonly contended that this 
                                               
11 Ibid. 
12 This proposition is dealt with in the body of the thesis. 
13 Scholars including John Henry Wigmore, Christopher de Courcy Ryder, Richard Helmholz, JA 
Coutts, Lord Taylor and Donaldson and Parker LJJ were among those to justify the existence of 
legal professional privilege by its ability to promote full and frank disclosure. By contrast, Edward 
Imwinkelried and Charles Hollander advocated a more measured approach, in which the rule must 
adapt. According to Imwinkelried, the privilege must cede in exceptional circumstances … [with 
a] discretionary jurisdiction offer[ing] a better solution’. Hollander similarly stated that 
‘absolutism may be subject to challenge under relevant human rights guarantees because the right 
to a fair trial is an obvious right which is hampered when information that can prove innocence or 
aid in a defence of an accused is omitted from evidence’. See Edward Imwinkelried, ‘Questioning 
the Behavioral Assumption Underlying Wigmorean Absolutism in the Law of Evidentiary 
Privileges’ (2004) 65 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 145, 175.  See Charles Hollander, 
Documentary Evidence (Sweet & Maxwell, 7th ed, 2000) [9]–[15]; Charles Hollander, ‘The Legal 
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facilitates the administration of justice because clients gain optimal legal 
representation. Bentham, however, challenged this theory on the basis that it 
could lead to injustice by keeping critical information out of the courtroom. Legal 
professional privilege prevents confidential client-counsel communications being 
revealed in court. This is an absolute, inviolable right. What remains untested at 
an academic level is whether the privilege, by safeguarding communications, 
disadvantages third parties or plays an active role in miscarriages of justice. These 
should not be viewed as isolated or novel occurrences and it is important to 
address such points in order to determine whether an absoluteness rationale can 
be sustained when innocence is on the line, or whether a further discretionary or 
mandatory exception is warranted.  This thesis will utilise a combination of 
judicial comment and case law to demonstrate that legal professional privilege has 
the capacity to produce injustice.  
 
This dilemma was central to Derby, wherein the Court declined to balance the 
interests of the criminal defendant against a third party, despite the defendant’s 
interest in not being wrongfully convicted being of paramount importance. This 
thesis culminates in an examination of the privilege in the Derby era, where the 
House of Lords unconvincingly pronounced that the rule was absolute. By 
freezing it at this particular point in history, Derby attempted to proscribe courts 
from continuing the evolutionary development of legal professional privilege 
according to common law principles or in light of reason and experience. 
 
This thesis concludes that Derby does not justify an unqualified privilege and the 
rule should be applied only where necessary to achieve the purpose for which it 
was designed.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                
Spotlight: A Question of Privilege’ in Legal Week Intelligence, Funding in Focus Content Series: 
Report 1 (2015) 10, 26.  
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II  METHODOLOGY  
 
This thesis evaluates the ‘absolutist’ rationale applied in the judgment of Lord 
Taylor of Gosforth CJ in R v Derby Magistrates’ Court; ex parte B14 against the 
Benthamic and Wigmorean philosophies. The thesis argues that the absolutism of 
legal professional privilege is a legal fiction. Given that the applicability of the 
rule bears daily importance and significance in the lives of lawyers and clients, 
this thesis challenges Lord Taylor’s premise that ‘… If a balancing exercise was 
ever required in the case of legal professional privilege, it was performed once 
and for all in the 16th century, and since then has applied across the board in every 
case, irrespective of the client’s individual merits’.15   
 
This thesis employs a normative and historical analysis to determine how Lord 
Taylor reached this premise. Bentham and Wigmore influenced the reasoning of 
Lord Taylor and the development of legal professional privilege. Bentham and 
Wigmore both sought to reconcile the application of the rule with the truth-
finding process. This ‘clash in values’ forms a central theme throughout the 
thesis, whereby Wigmore’s attempts to resolve the privilege are contrasted with 
Bentham’s ideology of rectitude of decision. Lord Taylor, it is argued, 
encountered a similar struggle in discerning the appropriate scope of the rule, 
frequently referring to one or both of these scholars in his dicta. In instances 
where it is not evident that he directly referenced them, Lord Taylor’s stance is 
analysed to determine whether he favoured a Benthamic or Wigmorean approach. 
 
This thesis notes that there has been a movement away from older scholarship in 
which a Benthamic approach has ceded to the Wigmorean vision; one embraced 
by contemporary scholarship. This enables the current implications of legal 
professional privilege in England to be drawn out. The research builds upon each 
of Lord Taylor’s judgments by undertaking a review of his decisions on legal 
professional privilege to expose flaws in the rule. It postulates that legal 
professional privilege does, in a practical sense, impact civil and criminal 
                                               
14 [1996] AC 487. 
15 Ibid 508E (Lord Taylor). 
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litigants, including the criminal defendant in Derby.  Accordingly, this thesis 
proposes exceptions to the rule in exceptional circumstances, particularly when 
exculpatory information could prove the innocence of a defendant or prevent 
wrongful conviction.   
 
III  STRUCTURE 
 
Chapter II frames the history of legal professional privilege through an 
examination of Lord Taylor’s pronouncement that the rule was settled once and 
for all in the 16th century. The works of Bentham and Wigmore inform the 
argument that an ancient Roman construct informed its existence rather than a 
status-based exception rooted in 16th century England. Chapter II concludes that 
Wigmore’s erroneous view of the history came to be absorbed into judicial 
thinking and reproduced by Lord Taylor in Derby. 
 
Chapter III considers whether the privilege has ‘applied across the board in every 
case’16 by examining the scope and breadth of the rule as expressed by Lord Taylor 
in some of the earlier judgments over which he presided. In particular, his ruling 
in Balabel v Air India17 is contrasted against his dicta in Derby to reveal that 
where Lord Taylor advocated a narrow scope of the rule in Balabel, he reversed 
his position in Derby. The rationales of Bentham and Wigmore are also 
considered in assessing whether Lord Taylor aligned himself with a particular 
vision. Bentham adopted an abolitionist view that legal professional privilege 
functioned as a shield behind which guilty parties could hide. Wigmore also noted 
the potential for concealment of pertinent client–counsel communications and 
devised a four-tiered paradigm in which legal professional privilege was narrowly 
construed. In Balabel, Lord Taylor accorded a narrow 19th century scope to the 
rule and recognised that this rationale elevated the client-counsel relationship 
above other professional relations. This leads into a discussion of whether Lord 
Taylor concurred with Bentham and Wigmore in limiting the classes of people 
                                               
16 [1996] AC 487, 508E (Lord Taylor). 
17 [1988] Ch 317. 
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who could assert a claim of privilege. His ruling in R v Umoh Mfongbong18 is 
relevant in this regard because it reveals Lord Taylor’s thinking that legal 
professional privilege should be strictly confined to communications passing 
between clients and their lawyers.  
 
Chapter IV assesses whether Lord Taylor applied legal professional privilege 
‘irrespective of the client’s individual merits’.19 Particular attention is paid to his 
enunciated exclusions and limitations to the rule in Goldman v Hesper20 and 
Tanap v Tozer.21 This leads into a discussion of relevant case law, allowing an 
assessment of whether the privileged nature of communications can be reasserted 
once surrendered. Bentham and Wigmore posited that if confidential 
communications were partially or fully disclosed this sufficed to waive privilege 
over the entire communication. Lord Taylor diverged from Bentham and 
Wigmore on this point. As illustrated in Goldman, he restored the privilege over a 
waived communication. This conflicted with his subsequent judgment in Tanap.  
 
In Tanap, Lord Taylor promulgated the notion that fairness underpinned the 
reason for waiver because it would be unfair to allow a party to use a selection of 
information which was most advantageous and not permit an adversary or judge 
to view the remainder of material which may be to his detriment. It is argued that 
these rulings contradict; demonstrating that Lord Taylor applied legal professional 
privilege on a case-by-case basis. 
 
In Derby, the criminal defendant sought access to privileged communications in 
order to support his claim of innocence. Chapter V examines whether legal 
professional privilege applies differently in civil and criminal litigation and 
considers whether the justification for its existence directly translates from one 
legal context to the other. A secondary focus of this chapter is whether Bentham’s 
rhetoric has been explicitly employed by some members of the judiciary in an 
                                               
18 (1987) 84 Cr App R 138. 
19 [1996] AC 487, 508E (Lord Taylor). 
20 [1988] 1 WLR 1238. 
21 [1991] WL 839041. 
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attempt to promote an independently existing opposition to the privilege. The 
most prominent argument advanced in this regard is that the rule cannot be 
maintained when innocence is on the line. This proposition is attractive because it 
assigns a priority to one fundamental right over another: the right that no one 
should be wrongfully convicted, with its ancillary right of access to evidence to 
establish innocence, prevailing over the right to invoke a claim of privilege. 
 
Bentham and Wigmore were hesitant to adopt a one-size-fits-all policy with 
respect to the rule. Lord Taylor disagreed with the notion that legal professional 
privilege should have distinct applications in civil and criminal settings. Although 
he previously held in R v Keane22 that ‘if the disputed material may prove the 
defendant’s innocence or avoid a miscarriage of justice, then the balance comes 
down resoundingly in favour of disclosure’,23 his ruling in Derby proved the 
opposite point which was that ‘once any exception to the general rule is allowed, 
the client’s confidence is necessarily lost’.24  
 
Chapter VI challenges the immutability of legal professional privilege and 
argues that the measures applied by Lord Taylor in Derby have enlarged the 
application of the doctrine beyond what is necessary to facilitate the 
administration of justice. In critiquing the factors that influenced the reasoning 
of Lord Taylor, this chapter posits that how his ruling in Derby was distinct from 
the previous judgments over which he presided. Where he once advocated a 
narrow scope to the rule, Derby confirmed it was absolute.  
 
This thesis concludes that Lord Taylor’s rigid and unyielding application fell out 
of step with the historical interpretation of the privilege and ceased to avail any 
degree of flexibility or judicial discretion. This broadening of the rule has 
weakened its force by usurping the central truth-finding function of the courts 
                                               
22 R v Keane [1994] 1 WLR 746. 
23 Ibid 751. See also R v Turner [1995] 1 WLR 264, 268.  
24 [1996] AC 487, 508B (Lord Taylor); Greenough v Gaskell (1883) 1 M & K 98, 103 (Lord 
Brougham LC). There is a dearth of empirical evidence to support the claim that the client’s 
confidence would necessarily be lost.  
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and stifled the ends of justice. Presenting a constant challenge for trial and 
appeal judges, the ‘absoluteness’ rationale created a tension between truth, on 
the one hand, and efficacy on the other. This thesis exposes as a legal fiction the 
‘absoluteness’ of legal professional privilege and contends that a contemporary 
interpretation adopted by Lord Taylor has misapprehended the Wigmorean 
theory.  
 
In spite of Lord Taylor’s misapprehension, subtle traces of Wigmore’s 
philosophy are contained in his judgment. Wigmore, for instance, noted that, if a 
privilege met his criteria, it must be classed as absolute in order to achieve the 
desired behavioural effect of promoting full and frank disclosure. Regrettably, as 
only minimal analysis has been accorded to the exploration of this theme, the 
connection has not been made between Lord Taylor’s judgment in Derby and 
Wigmore.25   
                                               
25 This proposition is addressed throughout the course of the thesis.  
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CHAPTER II: DERBY: THE ULTIMATE ARBITER OF LEGAL 
PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
 
The fallacy of the absolutist nature of legal professional privilege owes much of 
its legacy to R v Derby Magistrates’ Court, Ex parte B.1 In this 1995 English case, 
the House of Lords, constituted by Lord Taylor of Gosforth CJ, Lord Lloyd of 
Berwick, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord Keith of Kinkel and Lord Mustill, 
anchored the doctrine to a 16th-century paradigm which held that, once legal 
professional privilege attached to a certain communication, the privilege was 
absolute and could not be breached by any court for any reason. This result left no 
opportunity to balance the needs of other competing interests against the interest 
in preserving the confidentiality of privileged communications.2 Lord Taylor of 
Gosforth CJ announced:  
 
If a balancing exercise was ever required in the case of legal 
professional privilege, it was performed once and for all in the 16th 
century, and since then has applied across the board in every case, 
irrespective of the client’s individual merits.3  
 
This chapter assesses the factors leading to Lord Taylor’s pronouncement that the 
privilege was settled once and for all in the 16th century. The purpose is to frame 
the period in which legal professional privilege was conceptualised so as to 
highlight that the rule was not a 16th century English construct. English law and 
procedure absorbed ancient Roman legal principles. Albert Alschuler stated that 
‘the history of the privilege ... is almost entirely a story of when and for what 
                                               
1 R v Derby Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte B [1996] AC 487. 
2 Adrian Zuckerman, ‘Legal Professional Privilege – The Cost of Absolutism’ (1996) 112 Law 
Quarterly Review 535, 535–6.  
3 [1996] AC 487, 508E (Lord Taylor). 
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purpose people would be required to speak under oath’.4 This chapter traces the 
history of legal professional privilege and provides an analysis of the origins of 
the rule from ancient Rome through to the 19th century.  
 
Section II contrasts the perspectives of Bentham and Wigmore; comparing the 
latter’s Elizabethan rationale with the former’s assertion that a Roman construct 
predicated on servitude informed the principle’s existence. In utilising Bentham 
and Wigmore’s philosophies, this chapter develops the historical justification for 
the existence of legal professional privilege, which is a recurrent theme 
throughout the thesis, and introduces some ideas about the way this has shaped 
contemporary judicial thinking.  
 
The chapter begins with a series of Wigmorean interpretations, which initially 
claimed that the privilege was rooted in a medieval status-based exception dating 
to the reign of Elizabeth I, where the tenets of oath and honour proscribed lawyers 
testifying on behalf of clients. Wigmore’s argument seems incomplete, given the 
Benthamic philosophy that this principle was of such high antiquity, with English 
law having been, in its first incarnation, imported from ancient Rome.5 Section III 
canvasses competing academic views in order to discern whether the majority of 
cited authorities echo Benthamic or Wigmorean sentiments regarding the 
absorption of Roman legal principles into later English law. Contrary to its 
understood origins, this chapter affirms that traces of Roman law can be found in 
the procedures of English courts.  
 
II  LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE: HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
 
A  Wigmore on the Evolutionary Path of Legal Professional Privilege 
 
The position taken by Lord Taylor CJ that legal professional privilege was settled 
in the 16th century may logically be attributed to the influence of Wigmore. 
                                               
4 Albert Alschuler, ‘A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent’ 




Contending that the privilege was initially conceived to safeguard the oath and the 
honour of the lawyer in a society predicated on inequality of rank,6 Wigmore’s 
rationale supported the traditional justification for the existence of the rule.7 
Wigmore’s pronouncement that legal professional privilege was connected to the 
evolution of the legal profession throughout the later Middle Ages, reinforces the 
fact that the legal profession had established the necessary level of specialisation 
such that client–counsel communications were entitled to fall under an obligation 
of secrecy.8  
 
Wigmore interpreted the theoretical justifications underpinning legal professional 
privilege as a status-based exception courtesy of the esteemed nature of 
lawyering. He argued that under the tenets of oath and honour, the lawyer could 
waive the privilege9 because it was for the lawyer alone to determine what honour 
demanded.10  
 
An inference may be drawn that the reactionary and parallel evolutionary paths 
shared by the legal profession and legal professional privilege would eventually 
converge and be mutually reinforced.11 The basis for this proposition lies in the 
assumption that, as the status of the legal profession grew in prominence; 
corresponding rules of professional conduct would also emerge to govern client–
counsel relations.  
 
                                               
6 Michel Rosenfeld, ‘The Transformation of the Attorney-Client Privilege: In Search of an 
Ideological Reconciliation of Individualism: The Adversary System and the Corporate Client’s 
SEC Disclosive Obligations’ (1982) 33 Hastings Law Journal 495, 496. 
7 ‘Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications’ (1985) 98 Harvard Law Review 1450, 
1472. 
8 Anton-Hermann Chroust, ‘Legal Profession During the Middle Ages: The Emergence of the 
English Lawyer Prior to 1400’ (1956) 31 Notre Dame Law Review 4, 566-8. 
9 John Wigmore and Colin McNaughton, Evidence in Trials at Common Law (Little, Brown & 
Co, 1905) § 2291. 
10 Justin Gleeson, James Watson and Elisabeth Peden, Historical Foundations of Australian 
Law: Volume II – Commercial Common Law (Federation Press, 2013) 136. 
11 Anton-Hermann Chroust, above n 8, 573. 
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Through strictly limiting the operation of legal professional privilege to 
communications arising between clients and themselves, lawyers were afforded 
a competitive advantage over other professional groups. This ensured they were 
indispensable to the proper functioning of the legal system12 and the 
administration of justice, which could not be advanced if clients were unable to 
confide in those skilled in law.13 In limiting the privilege in this manner, 
relations between lawyer and client were emphasised as conveying special 
significance and constituted part of the functioning of the law itself. Ensconced 
in their privileges, lawyers could afford to be tolerant; so long as they guarded 
those privileges well, both barristers and solicitors were indispensable.14  
 
Lawyers defended their privileges by appealing to the public’s need for their 
services and unique area of expertise, thereby morphing into important beacons 
of order in society. Evincing the growing sense that lawyers were becoming 
increasingly important components within the English judicial system,15 a strong 
sentiment of maintaining client confidences would evolve into a necessary 
function of the lawyer.  
 
This normative proposition fortified the privilege. Privacy was a legitimate end in 
and of itself. The fact that communications were disclosed in confidence 
conferred the benefit of the privilege and provided conclusive protection in the 
future. Even Lord Eldon LC in Parkhurst v Lowten remarked: ‘Once confidence 
ceases, privilege ceases’, for without an assurance of confidentiality, there could 
be no trust or dependence on any person.   
 
In the eighth volume of A Treatise on the Systems of Evidence in Trials at 
Common Law,16 Wigmore announced that the testimonial disqualification 
                                               
12 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 94 (Wilson J). 
13 Justin Gleeson et al, above n 10, 143. 
14 Michael Birks, Gentlemen of the Law (Stevens & Sons, 1960) 1. 
15 William Dunham, Radulphi de Hengham Summae (Cambridge University Press, 1932) 4–7. 
16 John Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law: Including the 
Statutes and Judicial Decisions of All Jurisdiction of the United States, Vol IV (Little, Brown & 
Co, 1905). Bentham distinguished treatises and abridgements as follows: ‘treatises contain, with 
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enjoyed by lawyers sprang from medieval jurisprudence, with the venerated 
history of legal professional privilege dating back to the reign of Elizabeth I. He 
specifically claimed that the rule had its origins in section 12 of the 1562 Act for 
Punishment of Such as Shall Procure or Commit Any Wilful Perjury17 and 
anyone who failed to testify upon service of process, or bore false witness, was 
liable to penalty.18 ‘The history of the privilege goes back to the reign of 
Elizabeth I, where the privilege already appears as unquestioned. It is therefore 
the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications’.19 
 
Erroneously claiming that it arose contemporaneously in response to the then-
novel right of testimonial compulsion which officially gained recognition in the 
1570s,20 Wigmore stated that legal professional privilege already appeared as 
unquestioned at this time and concluded that it was one of the oldest of the 
privileges for confidential communications.21 He later recanted this statement and 
insisted that legal professional privilege emerged from the Court of Chancery in 
the 14th century, most likely around the year 1375.22 In a separate statement, he 
added:  
 
                                                                                                                                
or without rules, argumentation about rules, while abridgements contain alleged rules with or 
without (though commonly without) the argumentation out of which the rules were spun, and in 
which they were drowned’. See Jeremy Bentham, Codification of the Common Law: Letter of 
Jeremy Bentham, and Report of Judges Story, Metcalf and Others (John Polbemus, 1882) 10.  
17 Act for Punishment of Such as Shall Procure or Commit Any Wilful Perjury 1562, 5 Eliz 1 c 9. 
18 Jonathan Auburn, Legal Professional Privilege: Law & Theory (Hart Publishing, 2000) 2–3. 
19 See Wigmore and McNaughton, above n 16, §2290–1. Legal professional privilege applies to 
confidential communications, whether written or oral, between a client and lawyer, where the 
latter is acting in a professional capacity. The privilege constitutes a guarantee of security in 
which discussions can take place absent a fear of disclosure. Communications must be made for 
the purpose of enabling the lawyer to conduct the cause, with the test being whether 
communications are necessary for the purpose of carrying on the proceeding in which the lawyer 
is engaged.   
20 Auburn, above n 18, 2–3. 
21 Wigmore and McNaughton, above n 16, § 2290–1. 
22 Wigmore and McNaughton, above n 16; Auburn, above n 18, 3. 
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The policy of the privilege has been plainly granted since the latter 
part of the 1700s on subjective considerations. In order to promote 
freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, the apprehension 
of compelled disclosure by the lawyers must be removed, hence the 
law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client’s consent. Such 
is the modern theory.23 
 
Wigmore failed three times accurately to discern the history of legal professional 
privilege and imparted a lasting, albeit erroneous, impression that the privilege 
first took root in the 16th century as a by-product of Elizabethan transformation.24 
For Lord Taylor CJ to accept Wigmore’s various statements is to overlook his 
terminology in which the scholar expressly articulated that the privilege already 
appeared as unquestioned by the 1570s and was one of the oldest of the privileges 
for confidential communications, having originated in section 12 of the 1562 
Perjury Act. If the privilege was already unquestioned by the 16th century and was 
regarded as one of the oldest privileges pertaining to confidential 
communications, it must have been in use prior to this era.  
 
Assuming that legal professional privilege was in fact framed in section 12 of the 
1562 Perjury Act, it would not have been a preserve of the common law as is 
universally agreed, but would have conformed to a statutory provision. Legal 
professional privilege cannot be distinctly traced back to any statutory enactment. 
Rather, this thesis argues that it derived its authority and recognition from the 
common law; through systematic reporting and publication of precedent-driven 
cases in the early 1500s.25  
 
Consider Lee v Markham,26 in which the defendant’s counsel was excused from 
testifying so as ‘not [to] be compelled to answer to any interrogation, to [have] 
                                               
23 Wigmore and McNaughton, above n 16, § 2290–1. 
24 Ronald Desiatnik, Legal Professional Privilege in Australia (Prospect Media, 1999) 9.  
25 See Geoffrey Hazard, ‘An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege’ (1978) 66 
California Law Review 1061, 1070. These 16th century cases involved judicial consideration, 
without guidance of statute.  
26 (1569) Monro 375, Tothill 48. 
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ministered unto him which shall touch or concern the discussing of the title’.27 
Similarly, in Breame v Breame28 and Windsor v Umberville,29 the Court 
proscribed counsel acting in a cause from being examined in that same matter.30 
In Berd v Lovelace,31 the Court of Chancery ordered that Thomas Hawtry, lawyer, 
not be examined in relation to communications that had passed between himself 
and his client. Declaring that Hawtry would ‘not be compelled to be deposed, 
touching the same, and that he was not in danger of any contempt, touching the 
not executing of the said process’,32 the Court’s ruling signified that, while 
lawyers were competent to testify, it would not compel their testimony.33  
 
The position enunciated in Berd v Lovelace34 established the rule that a lawyer 
previously retained to act could not be subpoenaed to testify against a client,35 
either past or present, as this was repugnant to the policy of the law. In addition to 
ignoring any injury to clients, the early justification ignored protection of any 
                                               
27 Ibid. 
28 (1571) Tothill 48. See also Ronald Bridgman, A Digest of the Reported Cases on Points of 
Practice and Pleading in the Courts of Equity in England and Ireland and of the Rules and 
Orders of the Same Courts; from the Earliest Period to the Present Time (Edward B Gould, 
1829) 178. 
29 (1574) Monro 411. 
30 Bridgman, above n 28, 178. 
31 [1577] Cary 62. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Auburn, above n 18, 1. With the passing of the Common Law Procedure Act 1854 and the 
Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (UK), the High Court of Justice assimilated the legal 
procedures of the Court of Chancery and the Court of Common Law (as well as other courts). 
Where there was any variance between the old practice of the two courts, the more convenient 
one would prevail. See William Hastings, A Digest of the Law of Practice Under the Judicature 
Acts and Rules: And the Cases Decided in the Chancery and Common Law Divisions from 
November 1875 to August 1880 (Stevens & Haynes, 1880) 1, 3. See also Colin Tapper, 
‘Privilege, Policy and Principle’ (2005) 121 Law Quarterly Review 181, 182. 




particular professional relationship or the preservation of client–counsel 
communications. These were not valued as an end in and of themselves.36 
 
The rationale that the privilege belonged to the lawyer was carried through in 
several cases which essentially limited the scope of legal professional privilege to 
the exchange of communications between lawyer and client for the purpose of 
obtaining legal advice.37 The next of these, in chronological order, is Austen v 
Vesey,38 in which a solicitor for one of the litigants was discharged and ‘not 
admitted to be examined’. Hartford v Lee39 similarly determined that counsel 
could not be compelled to testify ‘touching a matter in variance, wherein he hath 
been of counsel; it is ordered he shall not be compelled to testify’. In Kelway v 
Kelway,40 Roger Taylor enjoyed the same privilege when he was excused from 
answering any interrogatories touching the secrecy of the title ‘or any other matter 
which he knoweth as solicitor only’. In the 1579 matter of Dennis v Codrington,41 
it was ordered that a lawyer in that suit should not be compelled, by virtue of 
subpoena or otherwise, ‘to be examined upon any matter wherein he had been 
counsel, either by the indifferent choice of both parties or with either of them, by 
reason of annuity or fee’.  
 
In the subsequent cases of Strelly v Albany42 and Cutts v Arminger,43 the Court 
confined the operation of legal professional privilege to matters arising from the 
respective lawyers’ involvement in the case at hand.44 In Strelly, the Court 
                                               
36 Edward Imwinkelreid, ‘The New Wigmore: An Essay on Rethinking the Foundation of 
Evidentiary Privileges’ (2003) 83 Boston University Law Review 315, 319–20. 
37 Paul Rice, John Corr and David Drysdale, Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States. 
(Lawyers Cooperative Publishing, 2nd ed, 2009) 6. 
38 (1577) Cary 63. 
39 Ibid. 
40 (1579) Cary 89. 
41 (1579) Cary 100. 
42 (1583) Monro 519–520. 
43 (1585) Monro 544. 
44 Breame v Breame (1571) Tothill 48. 
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ordered that the lawyer should not be examined in this cause45 and in Cutts: ‘He 
hath not dealt therein but as a counsellor for the plaintiff; it is therefore ordered, 
that the said Fuller shall not be enforced to be examined in the cause’.46  
 
By the time Ward v Waldron47 came to be prosecuted, the Court permitted 
counsel to invoke a claim of privilege only to avoid being ‘bound to make answer 
for things which may disclose the [innermost] secrets of his client’s cause and 
thereupon he was [unable] to be examined’. The shallow scope of legal 
professional privilege was again evident in Havers v Randoll,48 where counsel 
could not be questioned over ‘anything concerning his clynts title’. Creed v 
Trap49 meanwhile limited the operation of legal professional privilege to the 
professional knowledge acquired by the lawyer in relation to his representation of 
the client; ‘but for any other matter, it shall be lawful for the plaintiff to examine 
him’. 
 
Containing principles which were recognised and applied as sound law on the 
subject of client–counsel communications, these Court of Chancery cases – which 
together comprised the basis for Wigmore’s ‘honour theory’ of legal professional 
privilege – contained principles which were recognised and applied as sound law 
on the subject of client–counsel communications. As a general precept in early 
modern English law, these cases demonstrate that legal professional privilege 
evolved through the common law as opposed to legislative enactments per 
Wigmore’s assertion.  
 
These authorities failed to describe the right of a lawyer to ‘avoid compulsory 
disclosure as a privilege and certainly not as a legal professional privilege’.50 This 
is to say that 16th–century English law did not recognise the rule as a means of 
                                               
45 Strelley v Albany (1583) Monro 519–520. 
46 Cutts v Arminger (1585) Monro 544.  
47 (1654) 82 ER 853. 
48 (1581) Choyce Cas 149. 
49 (1578) Choyce Cases 121. 
50 Justin Gleeson et al, above n 10, 132. 
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excusing lawyers from testifying. Bulstrod v Lechmere51 firmly enunciated this 
view. In Bulstrod, the defendant allegedly had in his possession an ancient deed 
belonging to his client, Dingley, which the plaintiff sought to discover by 
exhibiting a demurrer to a bill.52 The defendant pleaded that he was a counsellor 
and it had been agreed between the parties that no information should be disclosed 
or made use of by the other side.53 The court ruled that the defendant ‘shall have 
the privilege of the bar and is not obliged to answer’.54 Furthermore, any 
information that came to the knowledge of his lawyer prior to being retained as 
counsellor in the conduct of the cause, or upon any other account, should afford 
him the privilege of the bar and he should not be put to answer.55  
 
Unfortunately, the word ‘privilege’ misstated the application of the doctrine, with 
the English Law Report commenting that the word not should have been inserted 
between shall and have, so as to actually read: ‘The barrister for the defendant 
shall not have the privilege of the bar and is obliged to answer’.56 While historical 
records do not elaborate on precisely how this mistake occurred, it has been 
suggested that the negative was transposed probably through typographical 
error.57 This erroneous version, which gave the privilege an evolutionary 
advantage, would become the emerging practice as documented in cases for the 
next two hundred years.58     
                                               
51 (1676) 2 Freeman 5. 
52 Bridgman, above n 28, 179.  
53 Ibid.  
54 Bulstrod v Lechmere (1676) 2 Freeman 5. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 See English Law Reports: (1557–1865) 22 ER Equity Cases Abridged, Volume 2 in which it is 
stated: ‘The negative has obviously been here transposed; probably through a mere typographical 
error. With respect to facts known by a barrister, or attorney, unprofessionally, the claim of 
privilege can not be maintained’. See also John Beames and William Halstead, The Elements of 
Pleas in Equity: With Precedents of Such Pleas (O Halstead, 1824) 279. 
58 While no direct correlation exists between the Bulstrod and Derby judgments, Lord Taylor CJ 
pronounced in Derby that when claimed, legal professional privilege ‘could not be overridden’. 
This parallels the fallible Bulstrod ruling that the lawyer ‘shall have the privilege of the bar and is 




It was not until 1816 that Parkhurst v Lowten59 corrected the erroneous Bulstrod v 
Lechmere judgment, wherein that court held that, with regard to facts known to a 
lawyer unprofessionally, the claim of privilege could not be maintained and 
‘refusal to answer was in itself a breach of trust’. This is significant because, prior 
to Parkhurst, any knowledge or information, whether or not independently 
acquired by the lawyer, mistakenly fell within the scope of the privilege, when in 
actual fact no privilege should have attached. While the vision for legal 
professional privilege reached reasonable clarity only in the 16th century, with the 
value attached to Elizabethan lawyers culminating in an expansion of legal 
business, legal professional privilege found its origins in the accumulated 
historical events which preceded it.  
 
B  Bentham, Rome and the Origins of Legal Professional Privilege 
 
English utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham dominated English legal thought 
in the 18th and 19th centuries with his ‘truth theory’ of adjudication. Bentham 
insisted that the overriding objective of the judicial system was the 
ascertainment of truth.60 Attaching priority to rectitude of decision, he opposed 
exclusionary rules that defeated access to probative evidence.61 He argued: 
‘Evidence is the basis of justice: exclude evidence, you exclude justice’.62 In 
contrast to Wigmore, who claimed the privilege was formed in the 16th century, 
Bentham paid homage to the Roman origins of English jurisprudence when he 
                                               
59 (1816) 36 ER 589.  
60 Edward Imwinkelried, ‘Questioning the Behavioral Assumption Underlying Wigmorean 
Absolutism in the Law of Evidentiary Privileges’ (2004) 65 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 
145, 150. 
61 Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence: Specially Applied to English Practice, Vol V 
(Hunt and Clarke, 1827) 227. See also William Twining, Theories of Evidence: Bentham and 
Wigmore (Stanford University Press, 1985) 70. 
62 Ibid 227. 
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stated that legal professional privilege was grounded in the Roman legal maxim 
that no one was bound to accuse himself.63  
 
Noting that these ‘principles and rules were of such high antiquity that the time 
cannot be assigned when they did not have an existence and use’,64 Bentham 
cautioned against the propensity to forget that ‘both Roman and English systems 
of law were in use in England’;65 with English law having been, in its first 
concoction, imported from ancient Rome.66 While Bentham noted an 
evolutionary connection, he differentiated between the severity of exclusion 
created by the privilege and observed differences between the effects of the 
Roman law and those cemented in later English practice.  
 
Where the Roman objective was to keep secret as much client–counsel evidence 
as possible, the English rule was confined to complex causes.67 According to 
Bentham, the degree of refinement accorded the rule constituted no small 
improvement, with England’s interpretation of the ancient Roman privilege 
excluding not only client–counsel relations, but extraneous witness testimony.68 
As a result, the mischief produced by the English rule was not nearly as 
damaging as that produced under Roman law, in which the systematic 
concealment was so unnatural to justice and so unpalatable to the general 
complexion of the English judicature that it required justification in the sight of 
English lawyers when it was planted in English soil.69  
                                               
63 Jeremy Bentham and John Bowring, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Vol VII (Simpkin, Marshall & Co, 1843) 
<http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/bentham-the-works-of-jeremy-bentham-vol-7-rationale-of-judicial-
evidence-part-2?q=Elizabeth#Bentham_0872-07_853>. 
64 Jeremy Bentham, Codification of the Common Law: Letter of Jeremy Bentham, and Report of 
Judges Story, Metcalf and Others (John Polbemus, 1882) 29. 
65 Bentham and Bowring, above n 63. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 This was not limited to client–counsel communications, but also excluded testimony based on 
the characteristics of impropriety, inconsistency and mischievousness. Bentham and Bowring, 





According to Bentham, the roots of contemporary legal professional privilege 
were clearly traceable to the era of Roman jurisprudence ‘which provided the 
organisational and legal framework’ for the rule to seep into later legal practice. 
He excoriated the judiciary for failing to consider that ‘English precedents have 
been grounded on original Roman law’70 and limiting their reflections to English 
precedents for legal professional privilege. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
ancient Romans ‘failed to develop distinctive standards of professional conduct, 
professional organisations or disciplinary standards’,71 Roman law faintly 
foreshadowed the beginnings of a distinctive and prestigious legal profession,72 
with Roman orators and lawyers forming the earliest legal profession in any 
sense of the term.73  
 
An ancient variation of legal professional privilege can be traced back to the 
prosecutions of Herennius and Hortensius in 116 BC and 70 BC respectively.74 
In the first case, Gaius Marius75 was charged with ambitus; the offence of 
electoral corruption76 for which he would later be acquitted.77 The prosecutor, of 
which history records no name, sought to compel Gaius Herennius to testify 
against Marius; who had been a client of the House of Herennii.78 Under Acilian 
law, consul Manius Acilius Glabrio decreed that no one could be ordered to give 
evidence if they are their ancestors are past or present clients of the defendant or 
                                               
70 Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence: Specially Applied to English Practice, Vol 
VII (Simpkin, Marshall & Co, 1843) 848. 
71 Anton-Hermann Chroust, ‘Emergence of Professional Standards and the Rise of the Legal 
Profession: The Graeco-Roman Period’ (1956) 36 Boston University Law Review 587, 58. 
72 James Brundage, The Medieval Origins of the Legal Profession: Canonists, Civilians and 
Courts (Chicago University Press, 2008) 11. 
73 Ibid 58. 
74 Max Radin, ‘The Privilege of Confidential Communication between Lawyer and Client’ 
(1928) 16 California Law Review 487, 488. 
75 Abel Greenidge, The Legal Procedure in Cicero’s Time (Forgotten Books, 2013) 484. 
76 Ibid; Plutarch, Lives: Demetrius and Antony. Pyrrhus and Gaius Marius, Vol IX, Bernadotte 
Perrin trans, Harvard University Press, 1920) 5.  
77 Plutarch, above n 76, 475. 
78 Ibid; Greenidge, above n 75, 484.  
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of his ancestors, or if they or their ancestors are, whether now or in the past, 
patrons of the defendant or of his ancestors,79 including anyone pleading the 
case of the defendant.80 This highlights that Herennius’ objection to testifying 
was partially based on an assumed duty of loyalty and servitude towards his 
client.  
 
By contrast, the 70 BC proceedings against former Sicilian governor Gaius 
Verres on a charge of extortion,81 invited early discussion of ‘honour’ in 
connection with men who engaged in the practice of law. This concept was 
adopted throughout the Ciceronian period, in which Cicero lamented his 
inability to summon Verres’ defence counsel, Quintius Hortensius Hortalus, to 
testify against his client.82 Declaring that counsel was feigning ignorance as to 
‘what our experience at the Bar has repeatedly shown to us’,83 Cicero noted that 
he could not ignore the duty to prosecute ‘so flagrant a plunderer as Verres was 
commonly believed to be’,84 particularly in an era when it was becoming 
increasingly difficult for Roman citizens to obtain justice:  
 
For indeed, in these days, no surer means of securing our country’s 
welfare can be devised than the assurance of the Roman people that – 
given the careful challenging of judges by the prosecutor – our allies, 
our laws, our country can be safely guarded by a court composed of 
senators; nor can a greater disaster come upon us all than a 
                                               
79 The significance of ‘ancestry’ rested on the virtuous displays of excellence achieved by past 
generations of men for the benefit of ancient Rome. Providing structure by operating within a 
shared behavioural code, an integral feature of the mos maiorum was the duty to increase the 
level of glory for one’s family which lasted in perpetuity. See Sarolta Takacs, The Construction 
of Authority in Ancient Rome and Byzantium: The Rhetoric of Empire (Rutgers, 2009).  
80 Avalon Project, Acilian Law on the Right to Recovery of Property Officially Extorted, 122 BC 
Yale Law School <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ancient/acilian_law.asp>. 
81 Max Radin, above n 74, 487. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Marcus Cicero, Verrine Orations 2 – Second Pleading Speech on Gaius Verres (C. D. Yonge 
trans, George Bell & Sons. 1903) 149 [27]. 




conviction, on the part of the Roman people, that the Senatorial Order 
has cast aside all respect for truth and integrity, for honesty and 
duty.85  
 
Cicero commented that only a lawyer in his representation of an accused was 
exempt from bearing witness against him86 on the grounds that he cannot give 
testimony in the case he was conducting: ‘Only [the] patronus is exempted from 
giving evidence’.87 Cicero’s rationale corresponded with the Herennian decision 
of 116 B.C. This is significant insofar as it demonstrates that it was merely 
customary, rather than mandatory, that a lawyer not bear witness against his 
client.  
 
Legal professional privilege was not the subject of honour concomitant with the 
practice of law as Wigmore alleged. It was grounded in the notion of slavery, 
with the privilege belonging to the client. This view gains currency when one 
accepts that the concept of not speaking against one’s client was rooted in an 
equally old and powerful feeling that a servant must keep his master’s secrets.88 
Within the framework of traditional Roman views, there was an expectation that 
a promise between lawyer and client created a natural obligation where members 
of the legal fraternity, who were conceived of as servants and helpers,89 would 
obey the unifying principles of fidelity and piety.90  
 
The next section considers the scholarly literature echoing Benthamic and 
Wigmorean sentiments regarding the absorption of Roman legal principles into 
                                               
85 Marcus Cicero, above n 83, 125 [4–5]. 
86 Ibid. See also Abel Greenidge, above n 75, 484. 
87 The original Latin phrase is: ‘Nonne te mihi testem in hoc crimine ei-ipuit non istius 
innocentia sed legis exception … queive ... causam deicet dum taxat unum’.  
88 Max Radin, above n 74, 487. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Abel Greenidge, above n 75, 484. In Latin: ‘Hi homines inviti in reum testimonium ne 
dicunto; qui sobrinus esr reo propiorve cognatione coniunctus quive soccer, gener, victricus 
privignusve eius erit’. 2, 3] 
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later English law. This informs which view ultimately prevailed and eventually 
influenced R v Derby Magistrates’ Court; ex parte B.91  
 
III  GENESIS OF THE PRIVILEGE: THE SCHOLARLY LITERATURE SURROUNDING 
BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 
 
The previous section developed the history of legal professional privilege by 
examining its evolution according to the perspectives of Bentham and Wigmore. 
This section has elicited novel historical and normative perspectives on a 
longstanding doctrine which is widely accepted across the common law world, 
but the theoretical basis for which has rarely been questioned. This established 
that Lord Taylor’s reasoning followed the Wigmorean presumption that the rule 
was established in the 16th century, whereas Bentham traced its antecedents to 
ancient Rome. This analysis has support. Albert Alschuler succinctly stated that 
‘the history of the privilege ... is almost entirely a story of when and for what 
purpose people would be required to speak under oath’,92 while William 
Twining wrote that legal professional privilege had ‘a rich and complex history 
that stretched back at least as far as classical rhetoric’.93 Geoffrey Hazard noted 
that ‘the historical record is not authority for a broadly stated rule of privilege’ 
and commented that it was ‘rather, an invitation for reconsideration’.94 Eben 
Moglen noted that the history of legal professional privilege revealed how 
procedure made substance and how legal evolution, like natural selection itself, 
adapted old structures to new functions, bringing us closer to the real 
mechanisms of legal development.95 Wigmore made a striking, albeit similar, 
concession when he stated: 
 
                                               
91 [1996] AC 487. 
92 Albert Alschuler, ‘A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent’ 
(1995–96) 94 Michigan Law Review 2625, 2641–2. 
93 William Twining, above n 61, viii. 
94 Geoffrey Hazard, above n 25, 1070. 
95 Eben Moglen, ‘Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination’ (1994) 92 Michigan Law Review 1086, 1090. 
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If one instance better than another serves to exemplify the manner in 
which history may cover up the origin of a legal principle, destroy all 
traces of its real significance, change and recast its purpose and its 
use, while preserving an identity of form and leaving it with its vigour 
of life unabated and its legal orthodoxy untainted, it is this rule.96 
 
Frederick Pollock and Frederic Maitland who, as historians of English law, 
distinguished themselves through their ‘insights and superb historical sense’,97 
stated that Roman law failed to exhibit a face of authority in the English courts.98 
They perceived the 16th-century form of legal professional privilege as distinct 
from the privilege practised in the preceding Roman and medieval eras, and 
offered grounds to support their contention. Firstly, Roman legal principles were 
not received into later English law, with every shred of evidence belonging to 
Roman law crushed, thrashed and forced to give up its meaning.99 Secondly, 
labelling Roman law a product of time and circumstance, an historical artefact 
rather than a body of universally valid legal wisdom,100 they claimed that the duty 
to uphold client confidences was the result of primitive custom, rather than a 
natural extension of a formally constituted legal profession governed by a code of 
conduct.  
 
                                               
96 John Wigmore, ‘Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere’ (1891) 5 Harvard Law Review 1, 71. 
97 Pollock revered Maitland as ‘a man with a genius for history, who turned its light upon law 
because law, being his profession, came naturally into the field’. Indeed, Maitland used medieval 
law as a tool to ‘open … the mind of medieval man and to reveal the nature and growth of his 
institutions’. Pollock, on the other hand, exhibited ‘commanding qualities of mind and 
character’, and overwhelmed with the sweep of his learning and knowledge of facts. Robert 
Schuyler, ‘The Historical Spirit Incarnate: Frederic William Maitland’ (1952) 57(2) American 
Historical Review 303, 303.  
98 See also Richard Hurd, Moral and Political Dialogues: Being the Substance of Several 
Conversations between Diverse Eminent Persons of the Past and Present Age, Digested by the 
Parties Themselves (London, 1759) 232. 
99 Frederick Maitland, ‘Why the History of English Law is Not Written’, An Inaugural Lecture 
Delivered in the Arts School at Cambridge on 13th October 1888 (Cambridge University Press, 
1888) 5. 
100 William Bouwsma, ‘Lawyers and Early Modern Culture’ (1973) 78(2) American Historical 
Review 303, 326. 
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This assertion stands in contrast to arguments advanced by William Holdsworth, 
Charles McCormick and Lord Brougham, each of whom affirmed the Benthamic 
pronouncement that the loyalty owed by a lawyer to his client was deeply rooted 
in Roman law.101 Pollock and Maitland concluded that the absence of a fully 
formed legal profession in Roman times precluded the need to accord special 
protection to the client–counsel relationship and fixed 3 September 1189 as the 
date at which English law began to speak clearly, articulately and continuously.102 
Brougham noted that the English common law underwent many additions and 
alterations in the process of time, with parts collected from a variety of ancient 
Roman codes.103 Plainly acknowledging the correlation between Roman and 
Elizabethan principles of confidentiality, Max Radin104 and James Gardner105 
claimed that traces of Roman law survived in the procedures of English courts. In 
reality, whether or not we care to admit it, Roman and medieval attitudes are very 
much “in our bones”.106 
 
The effects of Roman law did not disappear entirely, with medieval lawyers 
deriving much of their law from Roman sources,107 while courts and jurists 
adopted the Roman tradition of preventing lawyers from testifying in proceedings 
in which they were professionally engaged.108 Bentham stated that this was born 
                                               
101 Charles McCormick, McCormick on Evidence (West Publishing Co, 2nd ed, 1972) 175. See 
also William Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Vol IX (Methuen & Co, 3rd ed, 1944) 98; 
University of Northern Iowa, ‘Review: Life and Character of Henry Brougham’ (1831) 33(72) 
North American Review 227, 247.    
102 Frederick Maitland, above n 99, 4. 
103 University of Northern Iowa, ‘Review: Life and Character of Henry Brougham’ (1831) 
33(72) North American Review 227, 247. 
104 Max Radin, above n 74, 487–8. 
105 James Gardner, ‘A Re-evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege (Part I)’ (1963) 8 Villanova 
Law Review 279, 289. 
106 Max Radin, above n 74, 493. 
107 James Brundage, ‘Vultures, Whores and Hypocrites: Images of Lawyers in Medieval 
Literature’ (2002) 1 Roman Legal Tradition 56, 57. 
108 Guillame Durand, Speculum iudiciale (Sandra Hindman ed, Les Enluminures, 2013) 1.4 De 
teste s1.74 [1:298–9]. ‘A governor must see that those who represent clients in law suits do not 
give evidence in cases in which they appear’. Titus Livius cited in The Digest of Justinian 
Chapter Two 
29 
of ancient Roman influence. Wigmore discounted its Roman origins and made 
several conflicting statements in which he variously contended that the privilege 
came into existence in 1375, was born of the 1562 Perjury Act, stated that it did 
not gain recognition until the 1570s and asserted that the policy of the privilege 
was granted in the latter part of 1700. Wigmore’s pronouncement lacks the 
evidential foundation to support it, but his contention proved sufficiently 
persuasive to convert mainstream thinking into adopting the 16th century as the 
birthplace of the doctrine.  
 
Legal professional privilege did not arrive in English law on a certain footing. Its 
way was paved by successive historical steps, including a series of ‘largely 
isolated responses to particular problems at different times’.109 A more appropriate 
phrasing of its evolution might be that legal professional privilege, rather than 
serving as a quaint remnant of an ancient legal system, enjoyed a reassertion of its 
status, whereby it finally achieved formal recognition in the common law.  
 
Legal professional privilege was boldly articulated in the 16th century, but it was 
not a phenomenon of Elizabethan England. Despite the doctrine coming to 
prominence in this era when the Court of Chancery issued precedent-making 
pronouncements on this subject matter, England did not give birth to the concept 
of legal professional privilege. This is significant because the House of Lords in 
Derby recognised English law as the relevant starting point. Consequently, it 
overlooked other historical edicts in which narrowly construed the privilege; with 
suppression of confidential communications requiring justification rather than 
being automatically granted.110  
 
IV  CONCLUSION 
 
                                                                                                                                
(Theodor Mommsen and Paul Kreuger ed, Alan Watson trans, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1985) IV, 22.5.1.25. See also James Brundage, above n 107, 325. 




The first defining attribute of the privilege was a moral underpinning informed by 
the concepts of servitude and loyalty rather than profession and honour. The 
foundations of not speaking against someone with whom one had a particular 
relationship were embedded in the ancient rationale whereby lawyers were 
proscribed from testifying against clients.  
 
This chapter has analysed the rationales underpinning the historical justification 
for legal professional privilege according to the perspectives of Bentham and 
Wigmore. Wigmore denied the struggles and achievements of his legal 
predecessors and obscured the ancient common law application of the privilege. 
Wigmore constituted significant influence in judicial opinion and his philosophy 
was absorbed into legal thinking and reproduced by Lord Taylor CJ in R v Derby 
Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte B.111 The judicial interpretation of the rule’s history 
has informed its operation and enlarged its scope beyond what history intended. 
This chapter has demonstrated that, through adopting a Wigmorean view of the 
history of legal professional privilege, Lord Taylor’s articulation in Derby fails to 
withstand scrutiny and obfuscates the true heritage of the doctrine and its ancient 
application under the common law.   
 
Chapter III introduces the practical setting in which Lord Taylor framed the scope 
of legal professional privilege and considers whether a Benthamic or Wigmorean 
vision guided the scope of the rule. This chapter assesses whether Lord Taylor 
aligned himself with one or both of their pronouncements in the earlier privilege 
cases over which he presided. Particular attention is paid to his ruling in Balabel v 
Air India112 which stands in direct contrast to the pronouncement formulated in 
Derby.  
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CHAPTER III: LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE: A JUDICIAL 
UNCERTAINTY 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Chapter II concentrated on the origins of legal professional privilege and 
explained the history of the rule for the purposes of this thesis. The objective of 
Chapter III is to establish the scope and certainty of the rule. Section II examines 
Lord Taylor’s second articulation in Derby, namely that the privilege is applicable 
‘across the board in every case’. Balabel v Air India1 tests this presumption. 
Rather than the privilege being as broad as Derby implied, Balabel adopted a 
narrow scope of the rule, with Lord Taylor CJ establishing a presumption in 
favour of disclosure. This indicates that judicial uncertainty has muddied an 
absolute and consistent application of the rule. It raises questions about the clarity 
of the rule prior to Balabel and reveals a series of shifts in judicial thinking about 
the application of the privilege.  
 
Balabel was significant for discerning whether the rule extended to 
communications seeking or giving legal advice, or to all information passing 
between lawyer and client.2 Linking the constriction of the privilege to truth-
seeking values, Lord Taylor, in Balabel, was conscious of the need to discern the 
bounds of the privilege. He aimed to ascertain the proper point of balance 
between two imposing imperatives; specifically, the need to make available to the 
court the maximum amount of information while avoiding unfairness to clients 
through having confidential client–counsel communications divulged. Lord 
Taylor CJ overturned his Balabel stance in Derby when he pronounced an 
‘absoluteness’ rationale.  
  
                                               




The balance of Section II analyses Bentham’s theory of adjudication in which he 
articulated what needed to be done in order to remedy defects in the law and 
facilitate justice through admitting all relevant evidence.  
 
Section III considers whether either rationale, or portions thereof, filtered through 
to Lord Taylor’s reasoning in Balabel. Required to define the parameters in which 
the privilege did or ought to operate, Lord Taylor, in Benthamic fashion, linked 
the constriction of the privilege to truth-seeking values and aligned himself with 
historical judicial decisions that espoused a traditional justification for the rule. 
Conscious of the need to discern the bounds of the privilege, he sought to 
ascertain the proper point of balance between the need to make available to the 
court the maximum amount of information and the need to avoid unfairness to 
clients through having confidential communications revealed.  
 
Section IV utilises a passage in Derby to discover whether Lord Taylor, like 
Bentham and Wigmore, disavowed ‘privileges’ which accorded protection to 
values or professional relationships outside the legal profession. In R v Umoh 
Mfongbong,3 Lord Taylor remarked that ‘it was at first thought that the reason for 
the privilege was that a lawyer ought not, in honour, to be required to disclose 
what he had been told in confidence’.4 Culminating in the client’s right to control 
or stem the flow of information about him,5 legal professional privilege anchored 
the legal profession as a whole. This informs whether the privilege offers real or 
fancied protection to lawyers and whether the protection enhances the services 
they are uniquely qualified to offer.  
 
While acknowledging that legal professional privilege is today a preserve of the 
client; in its earlier incarnation, the principle was invoked to justify the existence 
of a beleaguered legal profession.  This view is supported by the dicta of Lord 
Taylor in Derby, wherein he distinguished the continued significance of lawyers: 
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 (1987) 84 Cr App R 138. 
4 [1996] AC 487, 504E (Lord Taylor). 
5 Geoffrey Stone, ‘The Scope of the Fourth Amendment: Privacy and the Police Use of Spies, 
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‘A man must be able to consult his lawyer in confidence … The client must be 
sure that what he tells his lawyer in confidence will never be revealed’.6 Having 
regard, therefore, to the above, it is undeniable that in the 20th and 21st centuries, 
the legal profession continues to derive benefit, whether directly or indirectly, 
from the existence and application of legal professional privilege.   
 
II  NARROW OR BROAD: THE SCOPE OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS IN 
BALABEL V AIR INDIA 
 
The obiter observations of Lord Taylor CJ in Derby are in direct conflict with his 
own assessment of the privilege in an earlier case over which he pronounced 
judgment in 1988.7 Where Lord Taylor proclaimed in Derby that the privilege had 
been settled once and for all in the 16th century and thereafter applied across the 
board in every case to which it bore relevance, Balabel v Air India8 reflected the 
degree of judicial uncertainty, arbitrariness and inconsistency with respect to the 
balancing of the rule. The reason for this difference of approach by Taylor is 
addressed in Section III. 
 
As the operation of privilege created a tension between access to information, on 
one hand, and efficacy on the other, the proportionality exercise of which Lord 
                                               
6 [1996] AC 487, 507D. On Pp 71-72 of my thesis, I further discuss the unique advantage that 
legal professional privilege offers to the legal profession. 
7 Although it may appear that Balabel and Derby address distinct points with respect to the 
privilege, a close textual analysis confirms that each concerns the scope and breadth of the rule. 
Balabel was referenced in Derby and it would be remiss of me not to incorporate this noteworthy 
case in my scholarship. The ability to produce a thorough examination of other LPP cases over 
which Lord Taylor has presided provides unique insight into how his position altered throughout 
the course of his judicial appointments and culminated in his ‘absolutist’ approach in Derby. In 
particular, his ruling in Balabel is contrasted against his dicta in Derby to reveal a series of shifts in 
judicial thinking. Lord Taylor recognised that LPP was not immutable. Criticising cases which 
extended the doctrine without limit to all communications, the Balabel Court remarked that the 
privilege was not as clear as it might have been prior to Lord Taylor’s ruling. Where Lord Taylor 
advocated a narrow scope in Balabel, he reversed his position in Derby when he pronounced an 
‘absoluteness’ rationale. This is sfurther explained on Pp 48-49 and 72 of my thesis. 
8 [1988] Ch 317. 
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Taylor spoke pertained to the need to weigh competing interests of privacy 
against disclosure; and truth finding and accuracy against the desire to maintain 
client confidences. The public interest in permitting clients to confide in lawyers 
was pitted against the public interest in ensuring that all relevant material was 
before the court. 
 
In Balabel, the Court considered whether the privilege extended merely to some 
or all communications seeking or giving legal advice, or to all information 
passing between lawyer and client.9 This point cast light on the erroneous 
pronouncement in Derby. Adapting the language used by Lord Brougham in 
Greenough v Gaskell,10 Lord Taylor affirmed: 
 
In Balabel v Air India, the basic principle justifying legal professional 
privilege was again said to be that a client should be able to obtain 
legal advice in confidence. The principle which runs through all these 
cases … is that a man must be able to consult his lawyer in 
confidence, since otherwise he might hold back half the truth. The 
client must be sure that what he tells his lawyer in confidence will 
never be revealed without his consent … Once any exception to the 
general rule is allowed, the client’s confidence is necessarily lost.11 
 
This did not paint an accurate picture of the outcome in Balabel. Rather than the 
privilege being as broad as Derby implied, Balabel adopted a narrow scope of the 
rule, with Lord Taylor CJ establishing a presumption in favour of disclosure. This 
was not the first instance in which he advocated truth finding and accuracy in the 
trial process. When Peter Taylor QC, as he then was, appeared as junior 
prosecutor in R v Ward,12 which led to the conviction of Judith Ward in 1974 for 
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the murder of British soldiers, he offered to testify during her 1992 appeal. Lord 
Taylor was appointed Lord Chief Justice of England in this same year.  When his 
offer was declined and he was advised that his evidence was not required, Lord 
Taylor was vexed to the extent that he later spoke publicly of it.13  
 
An inference may be drawn that Lord Taylor aligned himself with Bentham’s 
presumption that the privilege may operate as an indefensible obstruction which 
attaches ‘to every man; one safe, unquestionable and ever ready accomplice for 
every crime imaginable’.14 The Court in Ward underscored the importance of 
‘ensuring that there is a proper understanding of the nature and scope … of the 
duty’.15 This led Lord Taylor CJ to champion reform in the area of full disclosure 
of evidence. By all accounts, it would appear that, prior to adopting an 
‘absoluteness’ rationale in Derby, Lord Taylor displayed Benthamic leanings 
whereby he sought to foster a traditional judicial preference for truth finding and 
obviate conduct that prejudiced the proper administration of justice.  
 
A  The Benthamic Principle  
 
Bentham considered that legal professional privilege was incongruous with the 
search for truth because of its power to conceal rather than illuminate all of the 
facts. His central argument against the privilege was grounded in contempt for the 
unethical conduct of the legal profession. Bentham levelled the following attack 
against the premise that reverence should be accorded to communications entered 
into between lawyer and client:  
 
Why should any higher regard be paid to the engagements with legal 
practitioners, into which, after the fact, these very criminals may have 
entered to aid their safety? … It is in the interests of society that 
                                               
13 ‘Lord Taylor of Gosforth’, The Times, 30 April 1997, 22 
<http://hillsborough.independent.gov.uk/repository/docs/CPS000002800001.pdf>. 
14 Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence: Specially Applied to English Practice, Vol II 
(Hunt and Clarke, 1827) 338. 
15 R v Ward (Judith Theresa) [1993] 96 Cr App R 1. 
Chapter Three 
37 
honest engagements should be observed and dishonest engagements 
violated.16 
 
The soundness of the privilege rarely raised any question;17 however, Bentham’s 
incisive arguments set him apart as one of the only eminent names enrolled in 
radical opposition to the rule.18 Claiming that ‘my optics were to such a degree 
distorted that, to my eyes, the imperfections of the phantom rule … seemed only 
errors calling for an easy remedy’,19 Bentham derided the argument that 
confidential communications should be shielded from discovery on the basis that 
they may possibly produce unpleasant consequences. He asserted that this concept 
was ‘one of the most pernicious and most irrational notions that ever found its 
way into the human mind’.20  
 
This sentiment was recapitulated by Lord Bolinbroke who observed that ‘the 
profession of the law … is in its abuse and abasement, the most sordid and 
pernicious’.21 Twenty-two years prior to the 1827 publication of Bentham’s 
Rationale, American law reformer Jesse Higgins contended that true justice did 
not require the presence of laws or lawyers; for equality, character and honesty 
would suffice.22 The common law, he claimed, produced ‘intolerable expense, 
                                               
16 Jeremy Bentham, Treatise on Judicial Evidence (Filiquarian Legacy Publishing, 2012) 247. 
17 John Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law: Including the 
Statutes and Judicial Decisions of All Jurisdiction of the United States, Vol IV (Little, Brown & 
Co, 1905) § 2291, 3199. 
18 William Twining, Theories of Evidence: Bentham and Wigmore (Stanford University Press, 
1985) 2. Although Bentham chiefly wrote about evidence from 1803 to 1812, his principal 
works, in which he documented a confronting body of judge-made law that was relatively new or 
perceived as having the force of law, were not published until the 1820s. 
19 Ibid 22. 
20 Jeremy Bentham, above n 16, 193–4. 
21 Lord Bolinbroke, cited in George Sharswood, An Essay on Professional Ethics (T & J W 
Johnson & Co, 2nd ed, 1860) 171.  
22 Jesse Higgins, Sampson Against the Philistines, or The Reformation of Lawsuits and Justice 
Made Cheap, Speedy and Brought Home to Every Man’s Door: Agreeably to the Principles of 
the Ancient Trial by Jury, Before the Same was Innovated by Judges and Lawyers (B Graves, 
1805) iv, 6, 37. 
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delay and uncertainty of lawsuits’.23 He believed the truth could only be arrived at 
by ‘question[ing] the parties and letting them altercate and question each other’.24 
Higgins opposed the rules of non-disclosure in a law reform pamphlet entitled 
Sampson Against the Philistines.25 Deriding legal professional privilege for 
exposing the prodigious evil of our jurisprudence and the absurdity of common 
law,26 Higgins claimed that the operation of the privilege prevented parties 
‘getting at the truth in court’.27  
 
Bentham was intellectually consistent insofar as he continually, and without 
contradiction, insisted on the abolition of legal professional privilege. He stated 
that if a person has engaged in an act of supposed mischievousness which the law 
thinks fit to prohibit, he or she shall not be imbued with the power to flatter 
himself or herself with the hope of safety by having recourse to legal professional 
privilege.28 Bentham identified two redeeming features – arbitration and cross-
examination – which had filtered through the English procedural system as better 
serving the ends of justice. Bentham proposed a system modelled on the 
principles of arbitration, in which fact-finding would be unimpeded by the rules 
of non-disclosure.  
 
Holding that testimony should be open to scrutiny via cross-examination and 
extra-judicial publicity,29 Bentham opined that these attributes would aid in 
ascertaining whether a witness was liable to engage in falsehood.30 Any 
innovation to the contrary, including evidence which the parties had failed to 
bring forward, would be sufficient to strike horror into a professional and learned 
                                               
23 Ibid 38. 
24 Ibid 31. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid iv.  
27 Ibid 37. 
28 John Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common 
Law (Little, Brown), 3rd ed, 1940 & Supp, 1993) § 3200. 
29 Jeremy Bentham, above n 16, 327–8. See also William Twining, above n 18, 31. 
30 Ibid 328. 
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mind.31 A proponent of the utilitarian principle, Bentham stated that its aim was to 
promote happiness by approving or disapproving of conduct according to the 
tendency that increased the happiness of the greatest number of individuals.32  
 
According to Gerald Postema, Bentham’s perspective, while in one sense 
stringent, added up to a radical doctrine of judicial freedom.33 Impressed by the 
intellectual achievement it represented, Postema applauded the extraordinary 
power of Bentham’s insight into the adaptability of ‘the greatest happiness 
principle’34 in legal and political theory:   
 
Bentham’s work is significant not only from a historical point of view 
but also from a philosophical and practical one. This is so for two 
reasons; First, Bentham’s theory of adjudication represents the only 
sustained attempt in the English language at a philosophical account 
of the law of procedure. To the extent that he raises and formulates 
problems in this area, his work is of considerable philosophical 
interest, even if his theory must ultimately be rejected. Second, 
passing notice of certain of Bentham’s remarks on procedure have 
frequently been taken by commentators as evidence for a plausible 
‘indirect utilitarian’ … interpretation of Bentham’s general moral and 
political theory.35 
 
                                               
31 Ibid 327. 
32 As well as addressing Bentham’s central hypothesis in the present chapter, it is dealt with 
again in Chapter 4, Section II and Chapter 5, Section II. It is canvassed in these sections because 
it is relevant to the argument in those sections about the clash of values inherent in the privilege 
as it applies in the context of civil and criminal law. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation (Oxford University Press, 1780) 2. 
33 Gerald Postema, ‘The Principle of Utility and the Law of Procedure: Bentham’s Theory of 
Adjudication’ (1977) 11 Georgia Law Review 1393, 1424. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid 1393–4. 
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Labelling Bentham ‘a hero of our profession’36 whose ‘great influence on our law 
took time’,37 Alschuler equally recognised Bentham’s devotion to addressing 
procedural problems; particularly legal professional privilege. In Twining’s 
words, ‘His passionate commitment to law reform was balanced by a combination 
of intellectual honesty, courage and patient attention to detail’.38 Bentham 
operated on the premise that social utility alone justified the application of the 
law. This provides further clues to Bentham’s own values. These emerge in ‘his 
attitude to the presumption of innocence and his antipathy [towards] the legal 
profession’,39 wherein he characterised the natural system of justice by the 
‘absence of artificial rules and technical devices of the Technical System of 
Procedure’.40  
 
Bentham attributed the creation of the ‘technical system’ to ‘the sinister interests 
of the legal profession (Judge & Co)’,41 in which English judges had ‘taken care 
to exempt members of the legal profession from the obligation, unpleasant as it 
was, of rendering service to justice’.42 Bentham argued that the privilege and rules 
of evidence were created and defended by the legal establishment out of concern 
for its own pretensions of infallibility.43 Bentham sought to remedy these defects 
in the law by having the decisions of judges subjected to public scrutiny via 
publicity.44  
 
In the second volume of Rationale of Judicial Evidence: Specially Applied to 
English Practice, Bentham asked: ‘When a statute was found troublesome, in 
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what instance was it ever an ineffectual bar to the wishes of an English judge?’45 
As a ‘prerequisite for any hope of real gain to be derived from legal professional 
privilege’, Wigmore similarly foresaw ‘the need for the judiciary to improve in 
spirit; for better rules would avail little if the spirit of using them did not also 
improve’.46  
 
Bentham denounced judge-made law and ridiculed the laws of England as a 
‘fathomless and boundless chaos made up of fictions … and exquisitely contrived 
chicanery which maximised delay and justice’47 designed to conceal the fact that 
the law remained largely unsettled. Stephen criticised the efficacy of Bentham’s 
scholarly works and disavowed his contention that legal professional privilege 
hindered the judiciary’s ability to adjudicate effectively:  
 
During the last generation, Bentham’s influence has to some extent 
declined, partly because some of his books are like exploded shelves, 
buried under the rules which they have made, and partly because, 
under the influence of some of the most distinguished of living 
authors, greater attention has been directed to legal history and in 
particular to the study of Roman Law.48 
 
Lord Taylor was aware of these concerns and sought to do what he could to repair 
the system.49 He noted that greater consistency and the exercise of independent 
discretionary judgment were critical to achieving this vision.50 Hence, in Balabel, 
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Lord Taylor opined that there were rules of conduct about making sure all 
materials were available at trial.51 
 
1  The Reasoning of Lord Taylor in Balabel 
 
Articulating a desire to confine the availability of legal professional privilege, 
Lord Taylor predicated its application to client–counsel communications only if 
their aim was to obtain appropriate legal advice. His judgment bore parallels to 
the 1730 case Radcliffe v Fursman52 in which the House of Lords had limited the 
scope of the privilege solely to legal advice imparted to clients by their lawyers. 
This rationale was amplified in the 1792 case of Wilson v Rastall53 and again in 
Williams v Mundie;54 both of which assist in explaining how Lord Taylor likely 
derived his reasoning. 
 
In Wilson, which was also integral to the decision in Derby, Buller J emphatically 
stated that the rule of professional secrecy extended only to the facts stated to a 
lawyer for the purpose of enabling him to conduct the proceeding.55 In that case, a 
lawyer named Reynolds who had ceased to act for a defendant charged with 
bribery, was called to testify at trial as to knowledge he had acquired through 
confidential communications while engaged as counsel.56 Although Reynolds 
desired to testify, Buller J would not suffer him to give evidence and strongly 
reproached him for his anxiety to reveal the secrets of his former client.57  
 
The Wilson Court, comprising Buller J, Lord Kenyon CJ and Grose J, was 
unanimous that, if the evidence to be given would reveal a communication, 
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whether written or oral, between Reynolds and Petrie for the purpose of providing 
legal advice, then neither counsel nor client could be compelled to answer 
questions revealing that communication. Unconstrained by time limits, the rule 
was not altered by a lawyer ceasing representation, with the privilege surviving 
the death of either party and enduring in perpetuity.58 Buller J noted that it must 
be proven that communications were made to Reynolds in his character as a 
lawyer, and if someone was employed as a steward he may be examined.59  
 
The opinion of Lord Taylor was also within the principle formulated in the 1824 
case of Williams v Mundie.60 In Williams, Abbott CJ confirmed that legal 
professional privilege extended only to communications between lawyer and 
client as related to a cause or suit existing at the time the communication was 
made, or a cause or suit about to be commenced.61 He added:  
 
The rule I have invariably laid down in cases of this kind is that … 
what an attorney learns otherwise than for the purpose of a cause or 
suit, I think he is bound to communicate … Having formed this 
opinion, I think it unnecessary that the question should be further 
discussed here.62  
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Decided over a century prior to Balabel, James LJ in Original Hartlepool 
Collieries Company v Moon63 commented:  
 
The communications between a man and his solicitor, with respect to 
that, may be wholly irrespective of any question of professional 
advice or assistance of any kind ... Communications may happen to 
be made with a man who happens to be a solicitor, which would be of 
exactly the same character as, and neither more nor less privileged or 
confidential than, communications between a man and his steward, or 
between a man and his land agent, who did not happen to be a 
solicitor.64 
 
As early as 1730, the ability to raise a claim of privilege was predicated upon the 
lawyer having been consulted in his professional capacity for the purpose of 
dispensing legal advice.65 Lord Taylor LJ, with whom Donaldson and Parker LJJ 
concurred, paraphrased Wigmore when he observed in Balabel that ‘it is common 
ground that the basic principle justifying legal professional privilege [arose] from 
the public interest requiring full and frank exchange of confidence between 
lawyer and client to enable the latter to receive legal advice’.66 
 
By adhering to Wigmore’s philosophy on his own account and following this 
interpretation of the rule, Taylor LJ, as he then was, arrived at a narrow view of 
the privilege.67 He emphasised that the rule ‘should be strictly confined within the 
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narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle’.68  While long 
been attributed to Wigmore, it appears this remark was borrowed from two 19th-
century judgments attributed to Shaw CJ in Foster v Hall69 and Truro LC in Glyn 
v Caulfield.70 In Foster, Shaw CJ stated that ‘this rule of privilege, having a 
tendency to … prevent the full disclosure of the truth, ought to … be construed 
strictly’,71 while Truro LC, in Glyn, cautioned that legal professional privilege 
should not extend further than absolutely necessary to enable clients to safely 
obtain professional advice.72 
 
The above passages, which espouse a narrow construction of the rule, reflect a 
strong view about the limits of the privilege. Balabel was significant for 
discerning whether the rule extended to communications seeking or giving legal 
advice, or to all information passing between lawyer and client and exemplified 
the tension between an expansive rationale and a constrictive interpretation of the 
rule.73  This leads into a discussion of the facts giving rise to Balabel v Air 
India,74 including whether Lord Taylor foresaw the seeking of non-legal advice or 
communications made in the day-to-day course of business as coming within the 
ambit of the privilege.   
 
III A DIVERGENCE OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY  
 
A  Balabel: The Facts 
 
Balabel concerned the formation of a leasing agreement in which Air India sub-
leased a Bond Street property from Marchcoin Ltd, owned by Ahmed and Elsa 
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Balabel. Marchcoin fell into arrears on the rent, causing Air India to forfeit their 
sub-lease. Upon Marchcoin paying the arrears in full, relief from forfeiture was 
granted and they enjoyed protection under Part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act 
1954 (UK).75 A new sub-lease was negotiated between Marchcoin and Air India, 
with lawyers Slaughter & May acting for Marchcoin. Mr Anthony Wade 
represented Air India.76  
 
Relying on documentation supplied by Marchcoin, including memoranda and 
notes, Air India sought specific performance to compel the lessee to honour the 
existing sub-lease, rather than subject them to a new contract. The fact in issue 
was whether any agreement was made with respect to a fresh sub-lease. In order 
to substantiate the allegation, Marchcoin sought discovery of documents; however 
Bulcraig & Davis cited legal professional privilege to resist discovery of: 
  
(1)  Communications between Air India and Bulcraig & Davis outside 
the realm of seeking or giving legal advice; 
(2)  Drafts, working papers, attendance notes and memoranda of 
Anthony Wade relating to the proposed new sub-lease; 
(3)  Internal communications of Air India other than those seeking 
advice from Bulcraig & Davis.77 
 
When the proceeding was initially tried before Master Munrow on 14 October 
1987, Air India’s claim of privilege was upheld, with Munrow declaring that it 
was not a prerequisite for a document to incorporate a specific piece of legal 
advice in order to obtain the benefit of the privilege.78 This was reminiscent of 
Collins v London General Omnibus Co79 which first enunciated a ‘dominant 
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purpose’ test in 1893. In that case, the Collins Court was content to recognise that 
a ‘reasonable apprehension’ of litigation would suffice to raise the privilege80 and 
‘documents brought into existence pursuant to a standing instruction previously 
given were privileged’.81  
 
In defining what conformed to ‘reasonable apprehension’, Charles J stated that 
litigation may be merely threatened or already on foot.82 This signalled the first 
time that a ‘dominant purpose’ was enunciated, with the doctrine of legal 
professional privilege now incorporating a ‘reasonableness element’. In adopting 
the ‘dominant purpose test’, the Court looked behind the communication to 
determine its nature and was content that, even if there were two or more apparent 
purposes for a communication coming into existence, so long as its dominant 
purpose was to facilitate the giving of legal advice, then legal professional 
privilege would apply. 
 
At trial in the Balabel case, Munrow stated that, if Wade were employed in a 
conveyancing transaction to mitigate legal difficulties that the client may 
otherwise encounter, communications passing between client and counsel 
remained privileged.83 Marchcoin appealed this decision and issued a subpoena 
for the production of evidence against Anthony Wade. Deputy High Court Judge 
Paul Baker QC heard the appeal. He discharged the subpoena; however, upon 
reviewing the authorities, adopted a more restrictive view with respect to the 
principle of legal professional privilege.84  
 
Referring to the unreported judgment of Scott J in Committee of Receivers of 
Galadari v Zealcastle Ltd,85 despite it lacking precedential authority, Baker 
applied a balancing test in which he upheld Marchcoin’s objection with regard to 





83 Balabel v Air India [1988] Ch 317. 
84 Ibid. 
85
 Committee of Receivers of Galadari v Zealcastle Ltd (6 October 1986) (Unreported) (Scott J). 
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certain communications.86 Baker J specifically distinguished documents which 
simply recorded information, transactions or meetings as not enjoying the 
protection of the privilege,87 because, although negotiations for a fresh sub-lease 
were within the scope of ordinary business, they were not made in contemplation 
of giving or receiving legal advice. This clearly evidences the weighing of 
competing interests and serves to demonstrate that the privilege remained 
unsettled.  
 
Where Munrow J ruled that legal professional privilege could be claimed over 
communications, irrespective of whether they contained legal advice, Baker 
concluded:  
  
The defendants in my judgment are entitled to withhold all 
communications which seek or convey advice, even though parts of 
them may contain narratives of facts or other statements which in 
themselves would not be protected. On the other hand, documents 
which simply record information or transactions, with or without 
instructions to carry them into execution, or which record meetings at 
which the plaintiffs were present, are not privileged.88 
 
Air India brought an appeal to the Court of Appeal, constituted by Lord 
Donaldson MR, Parker and Taylor LJJ. Their Lords were required to decide 
whether Baker’s pronouncement was correct with respect to limiting the privilege, 
or if all communications between lawyer and client within the ordinary business 
of professional relations were encompassed within the scope of the privilege.89 If 
the latter were correct, a blanket privilege would apply over all the documents in 
dispute.  
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Balabel was significant for discerning whether the rule extended to 
communications seeking or giving legal advice, or to all information passing 
between lawyer and client.90 Taylor LJ criticised Baker J’s test as too narrow and 
Munrow J’s as too wide. This thesis contends that Taylor LJ’s formulation sat 
somewhere between Baker and Munrow JJ by expanding Baker J’s test and 
reshaping Munrow J’s in order to create a sustainable medium. In refining the 
existing formulations, Taylor LJ limited the privilege to the giving and receiving 
of appropriate legal advice. By the terms of this narrow qualification, the 
privilege had no relevance outside the realm of disseminating legal advice. 
 
It is therefore clear that Taylor LJ did not foresee the seeking of non-legal advice 
or communications made in the day-to-day course of business as coming within 
the ambit of the privilege. Moreover, if Taylor LJ and the House of Lords were 
still attempting to define the parameters in which the privilege did, or ought to, 
operate, the logical conclusion follows that the test espoused in Derby was 
incorrect. Despite Lord Taylor’s assertion that legal professional privilege had 
been settled since the 16th century, the privilege could not have been immutable in 
the four preceding centuries, nor could it have been predictably ‘applied across 
the board in every case’91 if the 20th century Balabel Court was still discerning its 
breadth and scope.  
 
Although it may appear that Balabel and Derby address distinct points with 
respect to the privilege, a close textual analysis confirms that each concerns the 
scope and breadth of the rule. In Balabel, Lord Taylor qualified the privilege by 
limiting it to the giving and receiving of legal advice. While it might be argued 
that Balabel merely demonstrates an instance of the settled law not being 
correctly applied, Hazard remarked that the privilege was ‘applied with 
hesitation’ and ‘recognition of the [the rule] was slow and halting until after 
1800’.92 Donaldson LJ in that same case conceded that the existing authorities 
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with respect to legal professional privilege were not as clear as they might have 
been prior to Balabel.93 Balabel exemplified the tension between an expansive 
rationale and a constrictive interpretation of the rule.94  
 
B  Lord Taylor and the Authorities that Influenced Him in Balabel 
 
Admitting that a divergence of judicial authority95 obscured the scope of legal 
professional privilege, Taylor LJ underscored the importance of reverting to the 
basic principles justifying the rule as being an exception to the general rule that 
all relevant evidence is discoverable and admissible.96 Citing in his decision 
several English judgments which were consonant with the development of the 
common law as early as 1920, Taylor LJ referred to O’Rourke v Darbishire.97 In 
that case, Finlay VC affirmed that while trustees of a trust were entitled to consult 
a lawyer with respect to that trust, only communications genuinely made for the 
purpose of obtaining legal advice could remain privileged. He cautioned that the 
privilege did not cover mere business or incidental communications.98 
 
Aligning himself with the judicial decisions that espoused a traditional 
justification for the privilege, Taylor LJ noted that the foundation for the ‘legal 
advice test’ was laid in Smith-Bird v Blower99 and Conlon v Conlons Ltd.100 Both 
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cases were decided along the same lines as O’Rourke. In the first of these cases, 
Blower wrote to his lawyer outlining his plans to sell his property. The Court of 
Chancery deemed the letter unprivileged because it was not created for the 
purpose of obtaining legal advice, but was written in response to an enquiry by his 
lawyers, informing them that he had agreed to sell his property to Mr Brown.101  
 
In Conlon, Morris LJ confirmed that legal professional privilege did not 
encompass communications between client and lawyer authorising the latter to 
offer terms of settlement.102 Morris LJ ruled that, if professional communications 
between lawyer and client are of a confidential character for the purpose of 
acquiring legal advice, then, in general, privilege and protection exist, however an 
enquiry relating to whether or not the client endorsed his lawyer to write letters of 
authority was not an enquiry as to communications passing confidentially 
between the pair.103  
 
This contrasted with the earlier English authorities of Pearse v Pearse104 and 
Minet v Morgan.105 In Pearse, Bruce-Knight VC commented that client–counsel 
communications made without the prospect of litigation were protected from 
discovery on the basis that they pertained to legal work of the calibre in which 
lawyers were ordinarily employed.106 Pearse concerned the bequest of the Barrow 
and Munscombe estates from Mark Broadfoot Westron to his eldest daughter, 
Jane Morse Westron, and the subsequent right of Westron to assert a claim of 
non-disclosure with respect to communications passing between himself and his 
solicitors relative to the bequest. As distinct from Wilson, which restricted the 
scope of legal professional privilege to communications necessary to conduct 
proceedings, Pearse deemed ‘the question of the existence or non-existence of 
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any suit, claim or dispute, immaterial’.107 As any professional communication 
passing between client and lawyer may possibly be eligible for protection, the 
justification for the privilege was no longer confined to disseminating legal advice 
or pending litigation.108  
 
Knight-Bruce VC reminded the chancery that ‘the discovery and vindication and 
establishment of truth [were] the main purposes certainly of the existence of 
Courts of Justice’. He warned that ‘for the obtaining of these objects … not every 
channel is or ought be open to them … Truth, like all other good things, may be 
loved unwisely – may be pursued too keenly – may cost too much’.109 David 
Louisell reiterated this view a century later when he contended that it was ‘the 
historic judgment of the common law ... in western society that whatever 
handicapping of the adjudicatory process is caused by recognition of the 
privileges, it is not too great a price to pay for secrecy in certain communicative 
relations’.110 The inference, therefore, was that legal professional privilege was a 
‘power to shut off inquiry to pertinent facts in court’,111 whereby truth should 
cede to confidentiality. In consequence, the protection afforded by the privilege 
placed the client in somewhat of a novel, if not exalted, position: beyond the 
reach and limits of the law.112  
 
Adopting the rule laid down in Pearse, Lord Selborne, in Minet v Morgan,113 
confirmed that a connection with litigation was not a prerequisite for legal 
professional privilege to attach to confidential communications. In that case, the 
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court confirmed that the litigant could not be compelled to disclose any 
communications made between themself and their lawyer, irrespective of whether 
or not they were made before any dispute arose.114 Furthermore, the lawyer could 
not disclose their client’s secrets without the client’s express permission.115  
 
The protection formulated around the privilege in the earlier 1730 case of 
Radcliffe v Fursman116 had now been expanded courtesy of Bruce-Knight VC in 
Pearse v Pearse,117 and Lord Selborne in Minet v Morgan118 to include 
communications made prior to the commencement of proceedings. His Honour 
Lindley MR, in Calcraft v Guest, stated that, in examining the earlier authorities, 
he was bound to follow the ruling laid down in Minet, ‘and that if there are any 
documents which were protected by the privilege to which I am alluding, that 
privilege has not been lost. I take it that, as a general rule, one may say that once 
privileged, always privileged’.119 Despite representing the strongest possible 
authority for the indefinite continuation of the rule, Lord Lindley qualified his 
statement by adding: ‘I do not mean to say that privilege cannot be waived’.120  
 
The degree of priority given to one rule over the other has varied. In promoting 
unrestrained communications between lawyer and client, all disclosures falling 
within this rule were now subject to a claim of privilege. A claim of privilege 
could be sustained so long as a practitioner demonstrated some measure of legal 
knowledge.121 The widening of this rationale in Pearse and Minet was designed to 
afford protection to clients who were not presently contemplating proceedings, 
but who would otherwise be left vulnerable and without the prospect of invoking 
the privilege if and when they chose to instigate proceedings.  It also recognised 
that the type and nature of legal work carried out by lawyers was broad, 
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encompassing not only legal advice and guidance, but additional and often 
extraneous matter in relation to the types of precautions clients should take with 
respect to their legal rights and obligations.122   
 
Taylor LJ noted that the secrecy rule was firmly crystallised in Anderson v Bank 
of British Columbia.123 In that case, James LJ stated that it had long been 
established that communications passing directly or indirectly between a client 
and his lawyer were privileged, with the rule extending no further. In that same 
proceeding, Sir George Jessel MR articulated that the protection availed by the 
privilege was very limited in character and was restricted to obtaining the 
assistance of lawyers.124 He cautioned that it did not go beyond the obtaining of 
legal advice and assistance, with communications protected from production or 
discovery only to enable clients to obtain legal advice safely and sufficiently.125 
The object and meaning of the rule lay in the fact that litigation could only be 
transacted by the employment of those skilled in law. Anyone who was required 
to prosecute their rights or defend themselves from an improper claim should be 
able to place unrestricted and unbounded confidence in the assistance of 
professionally trained lawyers.126 After all, ‘the first duty of a [lawyer] was to 
keep the secrets of his client’:127 
 
The meaning of the rule is, I understand, truly laid down by Lord 
Brougham in the case of Greenough v. Gaskell … The object and 
meaning of the rule is this: that as, by reason of the complexity and 
difficulty of our law, litigation can only be properly conducted by 
professional men, it is absolutely necessary that a man, in order to 
prosecute his rights or to defend himself from an improper claim, 
should have recourse to the assistance of professional lawyers, and it 
being so absolutely necessary, it is equally necessary, to use a vulgar 
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phrase, that he should be able to make a clean breast of it to the 
gentleman whom he consults with a view to the prosecution of his 
claim, or the substantiating his defence against the claim of others; 
that he should be able to place unrestricted and unbounded confidence 
in the professional agent, and that the communications he so makes to 
him should be kept secret, unless with his consent (for it is his 
privilege, and not the privilege of the confidential agent), that he 
should be enabled properly to conduct his litigation.128 
 
This echoed the basic tenets of morality, fidelity and servitude. While the ancient 
Roman rule of legal professional privilege was rationalised on the basis of 
mitigating procedural injustice by restraining potentially corrupted testimony,129 
19th-century developments in the doctrine of legal professional privilege held that 
procedural rights and due process could only be facilitated through excluding 
professional confidences from disclosure in court.  
 
Wheeler v Le Marchant articulated the same principle. The three-judge court 
comprising Jessel MR, Cotton LJ and Brett LJ, concluded that legal professional 
privilege was ‘confined entirely to communications which took place for the 
purpose of obtaining legal advice from professional persons’.130 In Wheeler, the 
Court held that only those communications made ‘in contemplation of some 
litigation, or for the purpose of giving advice or obtaining evidence with reference 
to it’ could be privileged.131  Referred to by the House of Lords in Derby, the 
Wheeler Court held that ‘we ought not carry the rule any further than it has been 
carried’.132  
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Wheeler refrained from extending legal professional privilege to different classes 
of communications, owing principally to the very limited character of the 
protection, whereby it was restricted to the rendering of legal assistance and 
advice in relation to the conduct of litigation in order that that such advice may be 
obtained safely.133 ‘It does not appear necessary, either as a result of the principle 
which regulates this privilege … to extend the rule’.134  
 
This reasoning continued the refrain espoused by Lord Chancellor Truro some 
thirty years earlier, when he warned that the privilege ought not to extend farther 
than was absolutely necessary to enable clients to obtain professional advice with 
safety.135 In the subsequent case of Lyell v Kennedy (No 3),136 Taylor LJ again 
outlined the limited circumstances in which the privilege applied. In Lyell, Cotton 
LJ stated that where a party represented themselves and did not engage a lawyer, 
this being the very ground of privilege, whatever they learnt when the proper 
interrogatories were put to them they must produce or disclose.137 
 
By contrast, the courts in Carpmael v Powis138 and Minter v Priest139 advocated a 
broader scope of the rule, with Lord Lyndhurst in Carpmael opining:  
 
[T]he privilege extends to all communications between a solicitor, as 
such, and his client, relating to matters within the ordinary scope of a 
solicitor’s duty. Now, it cannot be denied that it is an ordinary part of 
a solicitor’s business to treat for the sale or purchase of estates for his 
clients. For some purposes his intervention is indispensable in such 
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transactions: he is to draw the agreements, to investigate the title, to 
prepare the conveyance. All these things are in the common course of 
his business. But it is said that the fixing of a reserved bidding and 
other matters connected with the sale are not of that character, 
inasmuch as they might be entrusted equally well to anyone else. It is 
impossible, however, to split the duties in that manner without getting 
into inextricable confusion. I consider them all parts of one 
transaction – the sale of an estate: and that a transaction in which 
solicitors are ordinarily employed by their client. That being the case, 
I consider that all communications which may have taken place 
between the witness and his client in reference to that transaction are 
privileged.140 
  
The Carpmael judgment was followed in Minter v Priest,141 in which the Court of 
Appeal was asked to rule on whether Priest was entitled to assert a claim of 
privilege over communications made in an interview with his lawyer in whom he 
defamed Minter. The court upheld the claim to privilege; noting that the interview 
was conducted within the ordinary scope of the lawyers’ business.142 The House 
of Lords disagreed and reversed the decision on the basis that the lawyer was not 
acting in his professional capacity because he engaged in a malicious scheme with 
the intention of profiting with Priest.143  
 
In Minter v Priest,144 the majority justices, comprising Lords Buckmaster, 
Thankerton and Atkin LJJ, stated that it was not an automatic conclusion that 
whatever conversation ensued between lawyer and client gained protection from 
disclosure. Instead, they held that, in order for communications to be privileged, 
they must be fairly referable to the professional client–counsel relationship and 
anything outside that boundary afforded no protection.145 Lord Atkin altogether 
rejected Carpmael in favour of the test applied by Cotton LJ in Gardner v 
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Irvin.146 While emphasising that confidential communications were integral to 
receiving legal advice, Lord Atkin considered that any client–counsel 
communications not effected for the purpose of giving or receiving professional 
legal advice were not protected.147 He concluded that information made other than 
for the purpose of giving or receiving legal advice was not within the rule.148 
 
Minority justices, Lawrence and Greer LJJ reiterated James LJ’s position in 
Anderson when they similarly stated that it had long since been established that 
communications were privileged if they passed in a professional capacity.149 
Moreover, they deemed it unnecessary for communications to be made either 
during or relating to an actual or expected litigation because the privilege applied 
to all mutual communications between lawyer and client within the ordinary 
scope of professional employment.150 
 
Taking these authorities into account, Taylor LJ extended the definition of ‘legal 
advice’ to ‘advice as to what should prudently and sensibly be done in the 
relevant legal context’.151 He returned the scope of legal professional privilege to 
its 19th-century roots. This now meant that confidential communications passing 
between lawyer and client were immune only if they directly correlated to legal 
advice of a professional character.  
 
His dicta did not tie the justification for legal advice privilege to the conduct of 
litigation; thereby reflecting the policy reasons that justified its presence in the 
                                               
146 (1878) 4 Ex D 49. 
147 Minter v Priest [1930] AC 558, 581 (Lord Atkin). 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid 675 (Lawrence LJ). 
150 Ibid 683 (Greer LJ). See also Carpmael v Powis (1846) 50 ER 495, 692 (Lyndhurst LC). 
151 Ibid. According to Richard Pike, in ‘The English Law of Legal Professional Privilege: A 
Guide for American Attorneys’ (2006) 4(1) Loyola University Chicago International Law 
Review 51, 72, ‘English lawyers arguably took these statements as a license to claim privilege in 
virtually all client communications’. 
Chapter Three 
59 
law and creating a loophole in which the veil of privilege could be pierced.152  
Taylor LJ furthermore observed that the privilege originally related only to 
communications where legal proceedings were contemplated or on foot. He 
asserted that this rationale enhanced the standing of the legal profession and 
elevated the client–counsel relationship above other professional relations.153  
 
The correlation between legal professional privilege and the development and 
recognition of an honourable legal profession forms the central theme of Section 
IV.  As one is inextricably entwined with the other, an analysis of the growth of 
the legal profession will necessarily reflect the rise of, and need for, legal 
professional privilege as a means of justifying the profession’s continued 
existence.  The ways in which continued developments within the legal profession 
have shaped and refined its evolution will be examined.  
 
IV A PRIVILEGE FOR OTHER PROFESSIONS 
 
The remark that legal professional privilege elevated the client–counsel 
relationship above other professional relationships demonstrates that Lord Taylor 
CJ acknowledged a correlation between the exclusivity of the legal profession and 
the justification for legal professional privilege. Holding that the rationale for the 
rule was grounded in its ability to ‘assist and enhance the administration of justice 
by facilitating the representation of clients by legal advisers … [and] keeping 
secret their communications’,154 R v Derby Magistrates Court; ex parte B155 
espoused a Wigmorean rationale that clients should ‘make a full and frank 
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disclosure of the relevant circumstances to the solicitor’.156 Expressly citing the 
Duchess of Kingston’s Case,157 Lord Taylor remarked in Derby that it was 
previously thought ‘the reason for the privilege was that a lawyer ought not, in 
honour, to be required to disclose what he had been told in confidence’.158 
 
A  Duchess of Kingston & Exclusivity of Legal Professional Privilege 
 
The House of Lords’ decision in the Duchess of Kingston’s Case was significant 
for discerning whether legal professional privilege belonged exclusively to the 
legal profession or if members of other professions in whom at least equal 
confidence was reposed could invoke it.159 Where the modern ideology of legal 
professional privilege holds that the rule now belongs to clients of the profession, 
this change was formally recognised in 1833 when Bolton v Corporation of 
Liverpool established that, in the curial setting, the defendant, being ill-equipped 
to present his own case, benefitted from having a legal practitioner speak on his 
behalf.   
 
In the earlier 1776 The Duchess of Kingston’s Case, however, the orthodox view 
held that the privilege of non-disclosure continued to apply to members of the 
legal profession. This case brought into sharp relief the contrast between 18th-
century notions of honour and ancient concepts of fidelity and piety. Lord 
Mansfield, in articulating the Court’s response, stated: 
‘The  protection  of  attorneys  is  as  what  is  revealed  to  them  by  their  client
…’ 
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This case also perfectly illustrates a point made by Charles McCormick who 
concluded that legal professional privilege accorded real or fancied protection or 
prestige to special groups of people. This assured the legal profession a 
competitive advantage over other professional groups and acted as ‘marketing 
strategy’ of sorts, which ensured practitioners were indispensable to the proper 
functioning of the legal system and the administration of justice.  
 
In the Duchess of Kingston’s Case, Lord Mansfield enunciated that while legal 
professional privilege covered the rubric of instruction with regards to preparing a 
defence, no lawyer could exert authority sufficient to withhold evidence:  
 
The protection of attorneys is as what is revealed to them by their 
client, in order to take their advice or instruction with regard to their 
defence … This is no secret of the client, but is a collateral fact … 
and it has been often determined that as to fact, an attorney or counsel 
has no privilege to withhold evidence.160 
 
Influencing Wigmore’s stance,161 and arguably Bentham before him, the Duchess 
of Kingston’s Case was evaluated against his own paradigm. Wigmore stated that 
every communication must satisfy all four elements in order to qualify as 
privileged.162 Failing this, the communication would be left without support.163 
The questions posed by Wigmore were whether the communications originated in 
confidence; whether said confidence was essential to sustaining the physician–
patient relationship; whether such relations should, in the opinion of the public, be 
fostered and whether the injury resultant from disclosure outweighs the benefit to 
justice.164  
 
Contrasting the American jurisdictions in which the medical profession enjoyed 
no privilege for physician–patient communications against those that did 
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recognise such a provision, Wigmore concluded that patients would not abstain 
from seeking medical treatment absent a guarantee of privilege. He postulated 
that the fallacy of a physician–patient privilege lay in the misapprehension that 
the second element generally existed.165 In fact, physician–patient 
communications were seldom confidential and, even if they were, they were 
historically made without a privilege to protect them from discovery.166  
 
Wigmore determined that a privilege was inconsequential for enhancing the 
physician–patient relationship, as only the third element was relevant to fostering 
physician–patient relations.  
 
Even where the disclosure to the physician is actually confidential, it 
would nonetheless be made though no privilege existed. People 
would not be deterred from seeking medical help because of the 
possibility of disclosure in court. If they would, how did they fare in 
the generations before the privilege came? Is it noted in medical 
chronicles that, after the privilege was established in New York, the 
floodgates of patronage were let open upon the medical profession 
and long concealed ailments were then for the first time brought forth 
to receive the blessings of cure?  
 
And how is it today in those jurisdictions where no privilege exists 
does the medical profession in two thirds of the Union enjoy, in a 
marked way, the afflux of confidence contrasting with the scanty 
revelations vouchsafed in that other third where no privilege protects? 
If no difference appears, then this reason for the privilege is 
weakened; for it is undoubted that the rule of privilege is intended not 
to subserve the party’s wish for secrecy as an end in itself but merely 
to provide secrecy as a means of preserving the relation in question 
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whenever without the guarantee of secrecy the party would probably 
abstain from fulfilling the requirements of the relation.167 
 
Accordingly, ‘the secrecy of private confidences was no justification for a legal 
privilege’168 and physician–patient confidentiality stood upon no better footing 
than other relationships.169 The ‘honour’ component referenced by Lord Taylor 
functioned as a pledge never to breach a professional confidence, but did not 
establish grounds for claiming legal professional privilege over protected 
communications.  
 
The Duchess of Kingston’s Case brought into sharp relief the contrast between 
18th-century notions of honour as advanced by Wigmore and ancient concepts of 
fidelity and piety articulated by Bentham. The concept of ‘necessity’ determined 
whether a particular communication was of a protected kind. Despite medical 
practitioners being moved to jealously guard the honour of their profession, this 
case confirmed the proposition that medical practitioners were proscribed from 
asserting a claim of non-disclosure on behalf of their patients.170  
 
Dissatisfied with the common law framing of legal and medical privileges in the 
Duchess of Kingston’s Case, Buller J in Wilson v Rastall171 emphatically stated:  
 
There are cases to which it is much lamented that the law of privilege 
is not extended; those in which medical persons are obliged to 
disclose information acquire[d] by attending in their professional 
characters. This point was very much considered in The Duchess of 
Kingston’s Case, where Sir C. Hawkins, who had attended the 
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Duchess as a medical person, made the objection himself, but was 
over-ruled and compelled to give evidence against [her].172  
 
With the broader medical profession unable to articulate its need for such a 
privilege, the orthodox view held that non-disclosure continued to apply to 
members of the legal profession. In denying members of disciplines outside the 
legal profession invoking a claim of privilege, this increased the value of their 
services which they were uniquely placed to offer. ‘Every lawyer … has the same 
thing to sell, even though it comes in slightly different models and at varying 
prices. The thing he has to sell is The Law’.173  
 
According to Wilson, only three specific classes of legal professionals – counsel, 
solicitor and attorney – could invoke a claim of legal professional privilege; ‘for it 
would be an unusual sort of entitlement if they could not, insofar as a court could 
otherwise overcome the client’s objection by calling counsel to testify and this 
would be counterintuitive to the right to proper legal representation’.174 This 
demonstrates that, over the span of centuries, legal professional privilege evolved 
through a series of evolutionary stages which culminated in the solidarity and 
exclusiveness of the legal profession.  
 
Wilson further held that the rule of privilege was absolute and communications 
passing between a lawyer, not in his capacity as legal adviser but as an under-
sheriff, did not conform to privileged communications.175 This last point derived 
its legitimacy from the 1413 Bailiffs of Sheriff’s etc. Act,176 which proscribed 
certain classes of people from competing with lawyers in the practice of law, with 
under-sheriffs, clerks, receivers and bailiffs prevented from acting as attorneys 
and taking advantage of their official position.177  
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It is indeed hard in many cases to compel a friend to disclose a 
confidential conversation; and I should be glad if by law such 
evidence could be excluded. It is a subject of just indignation when 
persons are anxious to reveal what has been communicated to them in 
a confidential manner.178 
 
Joseph Chitty,179 Edward Smirke and Henry Roscoe180 embraced this proposition 
in their works; each rejecting privileges for other professional relationships. 
Chitty noted that, although it had been regretted by courts, the law as it stood 
compelled physicians, surgeons and others who were entrusted with delicate 
communications to make the fullest disclosure.181 Smirke and Roscoe similarly 
observed that physicians and surgeons were not privileged from compulsory 
disclosures, no matter how confidential their nature.182 Charles McCormick 
equally concluded that legal professional privilege accorded real or fancied 
protection or prestige to special groups of people,183 with the Duchess of 
Kingston’s Case exemplified Bentham and Wigmore’s concerns that professional 
prestige verged on the cusp of flowing into other professions and creating new 
sets of privileges.   
 
B  Bentham and Wigmore on Privileged Relations 
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solicitors and attorneys by taking the rule one step further in preventing unqualified persons from 
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While 20th-century cases such as Smith and Great Central Railway Co appear to 
have broadened the scope of legal professional privilege, Bentham and Wigmore 
disavowed ‘privileges’ which accorded protection to values or professional 
relationships outside the legal realm.184 Bentham made plain his opposition to 
privileges designed to protect confidential communication.185 Wigmore, by 
contrast, argued that the rationale for the privilege was providing secrecy as a 
means of preserving professional relationships in which clients would otherwise 
refrain from communicating without a guarantee of secrecy.186 In his treatment of 
the theme, Wigmore stated at length that there was no justification for expanding 
the rule beyond the legal profession. He believed there ought to be few recognised 
privileges; but if, at a systemic level, a privilege was necessary, it must be 
absolute to achieve the desired behavioural effect of promoting full and frank 
disclosure.187  
 
For Wigmore, legal professional privilege was a corollary to the right to counsel 
and promoted effective client–counsel relations at the earliest possible stage, 
namely pre-litigation. Given that Bentham’s philosophy was premised on the 
social utility of seeking the greatest good for the greatest number,188 it may be 
concluded that Bentham would have endorsed this Wigmorean proposition from a 
utilitarian perspective.189 Noting that Bentham failed to convince the judicature 
and legislature to abolish privileges in wholesale fashion, Wigmore devised a 
more balanced approach to correcting the ‘warring mass of judicial precedents’.190 
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Adopted as ‘gospel’ by virtually all western legal scholars who succeeded him,191 
Wigmore’s paradigm ‘was then, and remains today, typical of English legal 
writings’.192  
 
The Harvard Law Review193 claimed that, on its face, the Wigmorean paradigm 
was sufficiently open-ended to encompass practically any form of privilege and, 
as a result, provided little guidance to legal analysis.194 Wigmore crafted his 
threshold in such a fashion as to exclude other professional relationships. He 
‘tried to constrict the recognition of privileges as much as possible’195 and 
contended that the mere fact that a communication was made in express or 
implied confidence of a confidential relation was insufficient to create a 
privilege.196 Wigmore held that this did not constitute adequate grounds for 
recognition, for no pledge or oath of secrecy could withstand the demand for truth 
in a court of justice.197 He cited, in support of his contention, Greenlaw v King, 
which held that ‘persons in the most closely confidential relation are bound to 
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disclose communications made to them’.198 Wigmore also acknowledged the 
lament of judges who criticised the broad brush of legal professional privilege, 
with Best CM, in Broad v Pitt,199 opining: 
 
I think this confidence in the case of attornies is a great anomaly in 
the law. I, for one, will never compel a clergyman to disclose 
communications, made to him by a prisoner; but if he chooses to 
disclose them, I shall receive them in evidence. There is also no 
privilege of this description in the case of a medical man. A man is 
not acting as an attorney, when he is consulted about a deed; and I 
cannot distinguish his situation from that of any other man. I can 
make a distinction where a person requires information for the 
purpose of defending himself or of commencing an action. I am of 
opinion that the evidence ought to be received.200  
 
Even Lord Brougham in Greenough v Gaskell, like Buller J in Wilson, 
commented that it was ‘not very easy to discover why a like privilege ha[d] been 
refused to others, and especially to medical advisers’201 who render equally 
valuable services to individuals and the public, yet are denied the right to assert a 
claim of privilege.202 This is arguably attributable to the fact that negligible deficit 
would result to the integrity of the professional relationship when the benefits of 
encouraging communications within the relevant class of relation are weighed 
against the cost of obstructing truth seeking.203 Other professionals must, if 
compelled, disclose what has passed between themselves and their clients.204  
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Bentham would have agreed with Lord Brougham and Buller J that the elevation 
of the rule, in terms of its exclusivity, was inconsistent; however, Lord Brougham 
and Buller J both appear to have accepted that the existing authorities precluded 
any extension to the privilege. Turner VC in Russell v Jackson205 similarly 
observed that the rule which shielded client–counsel communications from 
disclosure did not rest purely upon the confidence reposed by the client in his 
lawyer, for no such protection existed in other cases in which at least equal 
confidence was reposed; for instance, that of physician and patient or clergyman 
and prisoner.  
 
This led Wigmore to pronounce that ‘the privilege remains an anomaly. Its 
benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain and concrete’.206 
Buried within his treatise was his seldom publicised admission that, ‘if only for 
the sake of the peace of mind of lawyers, it is better that the privilege should 
exist’.207 ‘In modern times, the loss to truth is a comparatively small sacrifice’.208 
Rupert Cross enjoined that ‘the merits of the doctrine are obvious but its precise 
implications and limitations, if any, have not been worked out’.209  
 
The Wigmorean disciple, scholar and drafter of the First Amendment, Zechariah 
Chafee, asserted that the relationship between lawyer and client was materially 
different from that of other confidences,210 despite them being dependent upon the 
exercise of professional service and trust. While Chafee believed that ‘each 
privilege should be judged on its own merits’,211 he noted that the administration 
of justice could not bear to be stifled by petty claims to professional prestige or 
inter-professional jealousies when the correct and rightful focus should be on the 
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fact that a broader right of non-disclosure could cause irreparable harm if 
misused.212   
 
C R v Umoh Mfongbong 
 
Taylor J, as he then was, together with Lord Lane CJ and Rose J, was faced with 
the task of considering whether legal professional privilege should remain a 
preserve of the legal profession or extended to other professional relationships. 
The occasion for this came in R v Umoh Mfongbong,213 where a prisoner sought 
legal advice from a prison officer who was acting in the capacity of legal aid 
officer. The facts in Umoh involved a fight in Mfongbong’s flat, during which he 
was stabbed and taken to hospital.214 Upon conducting a search of the property, 
police officers seized a briefcase containing two packets of drugs and brought a 
charge of conspiracy to supply heroin.215 While in prison, Mfongbong spoke with 
the principal prison officer, Tucker, with respect to his legal aid application and 
also made disclosures regarding the heroin.216  
 
At trial, Worthington J rejected the argument that communications passing 
between Mfongbong and Tucker were privileged and compelled disclosure; 
thereby leading to a conviction.217 On appeal, recourse was had to Jones v Great 
Central Railway Co218 and R v Smith (SI),219 both of which stood as authority for 
the courts to further extend the operation of legal professional privilege. In Jones 
v Great Central Railway Co,220 the House of Lords concurred that in order to 
enable a client to safely and unreservedly confide in his lawyer, all 
communications between them, whether or not through an agent, were protected.  
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The plaintiff sought legal assistance from his trade union pertaining to an 
allegation of unfair dismissal.221 Prior to appointing a lawyer and enabling him to 
commence a suit, Jones was bound by union rules to supply certain details, which 
necessitated written correspondence passing between himself and union 
officials.222 The question to be decided by Lord Loreburn LC, Lord Macnaghten, 
Lord James and Lord Shaw was whether the correspondence amounted to 
privileged communications.223  
 
Noting that disclosure of written correspondence was commonly required 
between law firms and their agents, Lord Loreburn LC commented that it was 
rare in litigation for communications to be confined to the passing of letters 
between lawyer and client.224 Any organisation that transacted business by 
correspondence was subject to the same rule which favoured placing before a 
court all material circumstances which may lead to a just decision.225 Lord 
Loreburn LC stated:  
 
Both client and solicitor may act through an agent, and therefore 
communications to or through the agent are within the privilege. But 
if communications are made to him as a person who has himself to 
consider and act upon them, then the privilege is gone; and this is 
because the principle which protects communications only between 
solicitor and client no longer applies. Here, documents are in 
existence relating to the matter in dispute which were communicated 
to some one who is not a solicitor, nor the mere alter ego of a 
solicitor.226 
 









This judgment expanded the privilege by permitting agents to assert a claim on 
behalf of a party to the proceeding. In Smith, the defendant had been charged with 
murder and underwent a psychiatric evaluation in prison to assess whether his 
defence of automatism was physically possible.227 As the medical reports were 
subsequently sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions, the court ruled that 
communications could not be regarded as confidential.228 Smith applied for leave 
to appeal his conviction on the basis that confidential communications made to 
his psychiatrists in a patient-prisoner context were inadmissible.229 The Smith 
Court ruled that reports between doctors and prisoners were not confidential and 
therefore admissible in law.230  
 
Mfongbong, in the present case, advanced a similar contention that 
communications passing between himself and Tucker attracted the privilege 
because they involved a legal aid application.231 The House of Lords disagreed 
and ruled that the communications made scant mention of legal assistance and 
therefore lacked the necessary requirement of giving or receiving legal advice in 
order to remain confidential.232  
 
Lord Lane CJ, with whom Taylor and Rose JJ concurred, stated that ‘in our view, 
no privilege analogous to that between lawyer and client can arise and such 
privilege should be strictly confined to communications with lawyers or their 
agents’.233 A legal aid officer is neither.234 The House of Lords ruled that, except 
in extenuating circumstances, communications between a prisoner and prison 
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officer acting in the capacity of a legal officer were subject to legal professional 
privilege; however disclosures made to prison officers on other occasions did not 
fall within the scope of that protection.235 This correlates with the dicta of Lord 
Taylor in Derby, whereby he distinguished the continued significance of lawyers: 
‘A man must be able to consult his lawyer in confidence … The client must be 
sure that what he tells his lawyer in confidence will never be revealed’.236  
 
Through confining legal professional privilege to lawyer–client communications, 
this reinforced the already advantaged standing of the profession and underpinned 
the services that lawyers are uniquely placed to offer. Claiming that the legal 
profession has been less than forthcoming about the real purpose for legal 
professional privilege, Professor Norman Spaulding remarked: ‘Our lack of 
candour now verges on duplicity. We seem to be ashamed to admit what we do 
for our clients under cover of the privilege. And with our shame and 
circumlocution, confusion and controversy about the doctrine has multiplied’.237  
 
William Simon espoused a different albeit equally controversial notion as to the 
usefulness of confidential communications. He argued that the privilege was not 
merely an ideology, but a marketing strategy. Simon claimed that in the legal 
field’s competition with other professions, strong confidentiality rights were a 
more valuable advantage than legal expertise and ‘put a premium on services that 
lawyers were distinctly qualified to provide’.238 He concluded: ‘The net effect of 
confidentiality, therefore, is probably to reduce compliance with the law’.239  This 
is exemplified in the fact that many lawyers insist that it is their duty to exploit 
loopholes in the interests of their clients, whereby legal advice is framed in such a 
way that it assists clients bypass a law by casting their affairs in a way that 
                                               
235 Ibid 138. 
236 [1996] AC 487, 507D. 
237 Norman Spaulding, ‘Compliance, Creative Deviance, and Resistance to Law: A Theory of the 
Attorney-Client Privilege’ (2013) 2013 Journal of the Professional Lawyer 135, 135. 
238 William Simon, ‘The Confidentiality Fetish: The Problem With Attorney-Client Privilege’ 





technically conforms to it but ultimately defeats its purpose through skilful 
evasion. This reinforced the Benthamic argument that legal professional privilege 
impeded the administration of justice by affording lawyers an express licence to 
engage in wilful concealment.240 
 
Noting that legal professional privilege obviously attached to communications 
concerning legal advice passing between lawyers and clients, Taylor LJ sought to 
limit the types of communications that came within the ambit of the privilege. 
Taylor LJ aimed to mitigate abuses of the rule by cautioning the need to re-
examine its scope and keep it within justifiable bounds.241 While accepting that 
legal professional privilege now extended beyond anticipated proceedings, Taylor 
LJ stated in Balabel that those cases which adopted a broad view of the scope of 
privilege242 and extended it without limit to all client–counsel communications 
were too wide.243 As distinct from his ruling in Derby, Taylor LJ emphasised that 
the rule did not extend to client–counsel relations where the relationship was not 
essential to the outcome of the case.  
 
V  CONCLUSION 
 
 
Chapter III exposed the false premise about the true nature of legal professional 
privilege and whether the contemporary interpretation adopted by the legal 
fraternity misapprehended the Wigmorean Theory. By revealing a series of shifts 
in judicial thinking in terms of the application of legal professional privilege, this 
chapter has exposed the falsity of Lord Taylor’s articulation in Derby that the 
privilege ‘applied across the board in every case, irrespective of the client’s 
                                               
240 John Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common 
Law (3rd ed. 1940 & Supp. 1993) 3201. 
241 Ibid. 
242 The cases which adopted a broad scope with respect to legal professional privilege were: 
Pearse v Pearse (1846) 63 ER 950; Morgan (1873) LR 8 Ch App 361; Calcraft v Guest [1898] 1 
QB 759; Carpmael v Powis (1846) 50 ER 495; Minter v Priest [1930] AC 558. 
243 Balabel v Air India [1988] Ch 317, 331 (Taylor LJ). 
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individual merits’.244 As exemplified in his obiter comments in Balabel, a 
divergence of judicial authority obscured the scope of the rule. Conceding that the 
existing authorities with respect to legal professional privilege were ambiguous 
and lacked clarity, Lord Taylor was required to define the parameters in which the 
privilege did, or ought to, operate.  
 
It is evident that no opportunity existed in which to consistently apply the 
privilege and it follows that the rule was neither absolute nor balanced, given that 
Balabel reverted to basic 19th-century principles which recognised 
communications between lawyer and client only if their purpose was the giving or 
receiving of legal advice. All other relevant client–counsel communications were 
rendered discoverable and admissible. Balabel epitomised a trend towards 
narrowing the scope of the rule 
 
This accorded with the findings in Chapter II, which highlighted that when legal 
professional privilege was first planted on English soil, the systematic 
concealment of client–counsel communications was so unnatural and so 
unpalatable to the judicature that it required justification in the sight of English 
lawyers. Chapter III demonstrated that this rationale underscored Lord Taylor’s 
desire to constrain the privilege as narrowly as possible. Notwithstanding this 
fact, Lord Taylor recognised that the rationale for the rule elevated the client–
counsel relationship above other professional relations and imbued them with an 
exceptional exclusivity unattainable by others in whom at least equal confidence 
was reposed.  
 
Bentham and Wigmore wholly rejected proposals for ever-multiplying privileges. 
Deeming other professional relations to be undeserving of protection because they 
could subsist without a guarantee of privilege, Wigmore attributed the desire of 
other professions to enhance their own prestige and standing as the root cause of a 
misplaced reliance on a privilege analogous to legal professional privilege.245  
 
                                               
244 [1996] AC 487, 508E (Lord Taylor). 
245 John Wigmore, Treatise, above n 17, § 2285, 530. 
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Conversely, as a fundamental feature of the client–counsel relationship, the 
protection afforded by legal professional privilege existed not only as a legal 
concept, but as a matter of ethical conduct which functioned as an integral 
component of the English judicial system.246 Legal professional privilege was 
linked by three commonly accepted assumptions. First; the practical necessity that 
clients benefitted from having the assistance of lawyers who stood in their shoes. 
Second; that client disclosure was necessary in order for lawyers to fully and ably 
aid their clients. Third; in order for clients to freely and willingly confide in 
lawyers, it was paramount that lawyers be able to guarantee confidentiality of 
communications. Lord Taylor’s ruling in Mfongbong reproduced this justification, 
whereby he declined to recognise a privilege between a prisoner and prison 
officer acting as a legal aid officer.247    
 
Chapter IV addresses whether privilege shields every secret client-counsel 
conversation or communication. Specifically, considering the third of Lord 
Taylor’s assertions, this chapter considers whether legal professional privilege has 
been interpreted and applied ‘irrespective of the client’s merits’. Of particular 
importance are the limitations imposed on the rule including waiver and the 
crime-fraud exception. Through utilising the contentions of Bentham and 
Wigmore, this chapter argues that Lord Taylor has allowed the rule to be invoked 
on a case-by-case basis according to specific purposes and contexts, with the 





                                               
246 William Dunham, Radulphi de Hengham Summae (Cambridge University Press, 1932) 4–7. 
247 An inference may be made that Lord Taylor’s decision was informed by the Wigmorean edict 
that legal professional privilege need not extend beyond the legal profession.  
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CHAPTER IV: THE LIMITS AND EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL 
PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter III demonstrated the Wigmorean preference to accord a narrow 
interpretation to the rule such that all four criteria must be fulfilled in order for a 
claim of privilege to be maintained. Chapter IV traces the inconsistent treatment 
received by the privilege, in which it was abridged, enlarged and modified until a 
general consensus was formed as to the operation and limitation of this legal 
precept. The starting point is Lord Taylor CJ’s assertion in R v Derby 
Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte B1 that clients must be entitled to confidentially 
seek legal advice, since they may otherwise refrain from revealing the whole 
truth.  
 
Section II contrasts the reasoning of Lord Taylor against Bentham and Wigmore, 
including the instances giving rise to forfeiture of privileged communications. 
Using comparative case law analysis, this chapter directs particular attention to 
the crime-fraud exception grafted onto the common law by the leading case R v 
Cox & Railton.2 Section III critiques the exception of waiver from a Wigmorean 
perspective, while Section IV contends that a case-by-case balancing exercise has 
determined whether confidential communications have been vitiated. The 
judgments of Lord Taylor in Goldman v Hesper3 and Tanap Investments (UK) v 
Tozer4 are employed to demonstrate that waiver has been inconsistently 
                                               
1 [1996] AC 487. 
2 (1884) 14 QBD 153. This proceeding concerned the perpetration of a fraudulent conveyance in 
which Cox posed as a purchaser of Railton’s property, with intent to deprive the creditors of their 
dues.  
3 [1988] 1 WLR 1238.  
4 In Tanap, the company was unable to effect settlement on the day stipulated in a contract of 
sale, following the purchase of land from Tozer. Lawyers for Tanap allegedly rescinded the 
contract due to a discrepancy with the land boundary and sought repayment of the deposit. Tozer 
refused to return the deposit, prompting Tanap to lodge a writ pursuant to Law of Property Act 
1925 (UK) s 49(2) for return of same, plus interest and damages. In response, Tozer 
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recognised. In addition, cases specifically cited by Lord Taylor in Derby, 
including Hobbs v Hobbs and Cousens5 are recapitulated to assess whether the 
judicial interpretation of legal professional privilege was measured and reasonable 
or rigid and uncompromising.  
 
The question addressed in this chapter is whether documents can be disclosed to a 
court, either voluntarily to avoid a former client misleading the court, or on the 
request of opposing counsel. If judicial intervention is permitted in this context, it 
is a small step to interpret it according to various legal scenarios. This chapter 
concludes that legal professional privilege is not absolute because the privilege 
cannot reattach to material affected by disclosure, whether or not it is misleading, 
criminal or fraudulent.    
 
II  PRIVILEGE AND THE CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION 
 
Legal professional privilege has been deemed indispensable to private justice. In 
mandating a rationale for absoluteness of the rule, Lord Taylor CJ, in R v Derby 
Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte B resolved that  
 
[A] man must be able to consult his lawyer in confidence, since 
otherwise he might hold back half the truth. The client must be sure 
that what he tells his lawyer will never be revealed without his 
consent. Legal professional privilege is much more than an ordinary 
rule of evidence, limited in its application to the facts of a particular 
case. It is a fundamental condition on which the administration of 
justice as a whole rests. It is not for the sake of the applicant alone 
that the privilege must be upheld. It is in the wider interests of all 
                                                                                                                                
counterclaimed for specific performance, or in the alternative damages, and a declaration of 
forfeiture of monies. Tanap Investments (UK) v Tozer [1991] WL 839041; also known as Tanap 
Investments (UK) Limited v (1) Thomas Christian Tozer (2) Robert Henry Stallibrass Hiscocks, 
(3) Rowan John Cherrington [1991] WL 839041. 
5 [1960] P 112. 
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those who might otherwise be deterred from telling the whole truth to 
their solicitors.6  
 
While this rationale may prove true for the ordinary class of cases in which clients 
genuinely seek legal advice as to their rights and responsibilities, the privilege 
must, as a minimum, cease to be a cloak for criminal conspiracy.7 This was 
central to Bentham’s hypothesis. In seeking to abrogate legal professional 
privilege, he claimed that the rule amounted to little more than a mechanism 
behind which the guilty party could shield their misdeeds.8 It consisted of 
‘illogical and indefensible technical rules’9 which went beyond making ‘every 
man’s house his castle’10 by enabling the guilty party to ‘convert [his] castle into 
a den of thieves’.11  
 
Bentham’s argument is compelling. Legal professional privilege, both in theory 
and practice, operates to prevent lawyers against divulging the wrongs of 
deceitful clients and may potentially transform a lawyer’s office into a sanctuary 
and repository for material evidence of crime.12 In consequence, lawyerly 
integrity is undermined, which in turn undermines the impartial protections of the 
legal system and the rule of law.13  
                                               
6 [1996] AC 487, 507D (Lord Taylor CJ). 
7 John Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law: Including the 
Statutes and Judicial Decisions of All Jurisdiction of the United States Vol IV (Little, Brown & 
Co, 1905) § 2298, 3216. 
8 An innocent person, having nothing to fear from disclosure, would not be deterred from 
confiding in their legal counsel. 
9 William Twining, Theories of Evidence: Bentham and Wigmore (Stanford University Press, 
1985) 188–9. 
10 Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence: Specially Applied to English Practice, Vol II 
(Hunt and Clarke, 1827) 340. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Frank Truman Export Ltd v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1977) 1 QB 952, 961 
(Swanwick J). 
13 Henry Peck, Undermining Attorney-Client Privilege Weakens the Rule of Law Human Rights 





Bentham’s argument against the privilege remains particularly valid for occasions 
where clients do seek their lawyer’s assistance with a view to committing a 
criminal or fraudulent act. The difficulty lies in defining the boundaries of this 
limitation. Given that the laws of England presuppose that a) one is innocent until 
proven guilty; and b) full and frank disclosure are the hallmarks of the 
contemporary privilege theory, the furnishing of legal advice to a guilty client 
presents a dilemma.14   
 
A  Bentham Vindicated  
 
While there is a distinction between the client who conceals embarrassing 
information and one who harbours criminal or fraudulent intent, legal professional 
privilege is brought into operation only when a client professionally consults his 
lawyer in confidence and is justified on the basis that such confidence must be 
encouraged.15  
 
Bentham posited a rhetorical question when he asked: ‘Whence all this dread of 
truth? Whence comes it that any one loves darkness better than light, except it be 
that his deeds are evil?’16 The only consequence, therefore, of abolishing the rule 
would be to prevent a mendacious client from suppressing evidence and 
advancing a false claim.17  
 
That it will often happen that in the case supposed no such confidence 
will be reposed, is natural enough: the first thing the advocate or 
attorney will say to his client, will be, ‘Remember that whatever you 
say to me, I shall be obliged to tell, if asked about it’. What then, will 
                                               
14 Jeremy Bentham as cited by John Henry Wigmore, Treatise, above n 7, § 2291, 3202. 
15 Christopher de Courcy Ryder, The Justification for Legal Professional Privilege (Wellington, 
1990) 18. 
16 Jeremy Bentham, above n 10, 479.  
17 Ibid 144. 
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be the consequence? That a guilty person will not in general be able 
to derive quite so much benefit from it.18 
 
Denouncing Bentham’s assertion that honesty would yield a greater good, 
Wigmore asserted that the rule of privilege was perfectly adapted to its end, 
which is the execution of the law.19 Wigmore contradicted Bentham’s argument 
that the rule amounted to a dubious device behind which wrongdoers could shield 
their misdeeds. Where Bentham stated that clients predominantly relied on legal 
professional privilege to shield communications which supported their own guilt, 
Wigmore announced that ‘to the man who, having no guilt to disclose, has 
disclosed none to his lawyer, nothing could be of greater advantage than that it 
should appear; as it naturally would if the lawyer were subjected to 
examination’.20 He later conceded that it was doubtful, from a policy perspective, 
that greater good would result from upholding the rule rather than using evidence 
made available from denying the privilege altogether.21  
 
The earliest step in eliminating ‘deceit at law’ was contained in Chapter 29 of the 
Statute of Westminster I 1275 (UK) which imposed penalties on lawyers who 
engaged in collusion or deceit. Should a client repose no confidence by virtue of 
withholding information, the supposed confidence necessary for the operation of 
legal professional privilege is deemed not to exist and the client is not protected 
by the rule.22  
 
Legal professional privilege cannot be invoked when a client consults their lawyer 
with a view to the commission of a future crime or fraud.23 In such circumstances, 
                                               
18 Jeremy Bentham and John Bowring, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Vol VII (Simpkin, Marshall & Co, 1843) 473–9, 
cited in John Wigmore, Treatise, above n 7, § 3200. 
19 John Wigmore, Treatise, above n 7, § 3200. 
20 Ibid § 3201. 
21 Ibid §1061, 1230. 
22 Christopher de Courcy Ryder, above n 15, 18. 
23 R v Cox and Railton (1884) 14 QBD 153; See also the English rules of professional conduct. 
These have evolved over time to include reporting requirements in relation to clients who express 
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the principle cannot protect confidential communications from disclosure. 
Interestingly, some of the older English authorities went so far as to suggest that 
even iniquitous client–counsel communications were deserving of protection.24  
 
Cromack v Heathcote25 is an early example of this. In that matter, the plaintiff 
consulted Smith, a lawyer, to draw up a fraudulent assignment of goods. Smith 
declined to be party to a fraudulent enterprise and refused to draft the document, 
which would have effected an unlawful transaction. He dissolved the professional 
relationship and another practitioner drew the deed.26 Its validity was questioned 
on the basis of fraud in an action against the sheriff.  
 
During the first trial, which was heard by Richards CB, the communication 
between Smith and the plaintiff was rejected on the basis that it conformed to a 
confidential communication made to a lawyer despite the element of fraud being 
present.27 The defence moved to have the verdict set aside on grounds that the 
fraudulent evidence was improperly rejected.  
 
In determining whether the rule encompassed communications made outside the 
scope of legal proceedings and if it was vitiated by fraud,28 the Court of Appeal, 
presided over by Dallas CJ, Burrough and Richardson JJ, had recourse to Wilson v 
Rastall.29 Their Honours upheld the original verdict that communications were 
privileged and any evidence of fraud was not to be divulged by the lawyer to 
whom it was made. Declaring he had no doubt that it would be most mischievous 
if there were uncertainty as to whether such a communication were privileged, 
Burrough J formed the opinion that the rule of legal professional privilege was not 
                                                                                                                                
an intention to commit a future crime or fraud. The Solicitors’ Code of Conduct 2007 (UK) r 4(12) 
states that a lawyer may ‘reveal confidential information to the extent necessary to prevent a client 
or a third party committing a criminal offence likely to result in serious bodily harm’. 
24 See Cromack v Heathcote (1820) 6 Eng C Law Rep 1; Doe v Harris (1833) 5 Car & P 592. 
25 (1820) 6 Eng C Law Rep 1. 
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid. 
28 Cromack v Heathcote (1820) 6 Eng C Law Rep 1. 
29 (1792) 4 TR 753. 
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confined to lawyers employed in a cause and communications passing between 
client and lawyer were professional.  
 
This thinking carried through to the 1833 case of Doe v Harris30 in which Parke J 
stated that a lawyer could be questioned regarding whether his client sought his 
assistance to draw a certain deed, but not whether he sought to obtain this advice 
for a lawful or an unlawful purpose. In that case, the facts turned on whether a 
deed, by which a property was transferred from an insolvent party to the 
defendant, was a bona fide or fraudulent transaction.31 Parke J concluded that 
there was a significant degree of difficulty in the witness disclosing whether the 
communication between himself and his client was for a lawful or unlawful 
purpose without telling the court what it was.32 It might merely be that the litigant 
enquired whether a particular action could legally be carried out.33 
 
Proving that no matter how strict or loose the rules of confidentiality may be, 
clients and their lawyers have been granted a measure of ability to distort facts, 
withhold information and manipulate the immunity imbued by the privilege.34 On 
this basis, ‘the argument employed as a reason against mandating disclosure 
would appear to be the very argument that pleads in favour of it’.35 Clients who 
receive poor advice because they fail to be fully candid and open with their 
lawyers have only themselves to blame. Hazard noted that although it has always 
been recognised that the privilege is governed by some limits, for ‘at minimum it 
is inadmissible that legal consultation be a cover for thuggery and theft’, the rule 
is critical to the modern lawyer’s role as an adviser to clients.36 The difficulty is 
where to draw the boundaries and define the kinds of secrets that lawyers may or 
                                               
30 (1833) 5 Car & P 592.  
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid  
33 Ibid.  
34 Lloyd Snyder, ‘ Is Attorney-Client Confidentiality Necessary?’ (2002) 15 Georgetown 
Journal of Legal Ethics 477, 505. 
35 John Wigmore, Treatise, above n 7, § 3200. 
36 Geoffrey Hazard, ‘An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege’ (1978) 66 
California Law Review 1061, 1091. 
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may not keep.37 If the client lied to their lawyer or perjured themselves and is 
later confronted by the truth, the government has little reason to aid them.38 
Ultimately, ‘the law should probably not be written for the benefit of liars or 
perjurers’.39 
 
An early example in which the court was prepared to recognise the possibility of a 
client–counsel conspiracy occurred in Gartside v Outram.40 In that case, the 
employer plaintiffs sought to restrain their defendant employee from divulging 
information obtained by him in the course of his employment which indicated that 
their business had been engaged in fraudulent conduct.41 The plaintiffs denied 
perpetrating any fraud and alleged that the defendant had threatened to make 
similar unsubstantiated statements to other third parties.42 Sir Page Wood VC 
permitted interrogatories to be made on the basis that, if the defendant proved the 
allegation and those facts were made out, it would be a good defence and the 
plaintiffs’ claim would be defeated.43 Formulating the proposition that no 
confidence could attach to an iniquitous communication, Lord Hatherley, in that 
same case, observed:  
 
The true doctrine is that there is no confidence as to the disclosure of 
iniquity. You cannot make me the confident of a crime or fraud, and 
be entitled to close up my lips upon any secret which you have the 
audacity to disclose to me relating to any fraudulent intention on your 
part; such a confidence cannot exist.44 
 
                                               
37 Ibid. 
38 Nix v Whiteside, 475 US 157, 170–1 (1986). 
39 Ibid. 
40 (1856) 26 LJ Ch 113. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid 114 (Wood VC). 
44 Ibid 114 (Lord Hatherley). 
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This passage has been developed in England to justify disclosure of confidential 
client–counsel communications. Two decades later, Cockburn CJ, in R v Orton,45 
echoed the same sentiment when he authoritatively stated that ‘if a client had a 
dishonest purpose in view of the communication he makes to his attorney … it 
deprives the communications of privilege … The fraudulent character of the 
communication takes away the privilege.’46  
 
1  R v Cox & Railton 
 
Stephen J subsequently adopted the reasoning of Cockburn CJ in R v Cox & 
Railton47 when the former refused to uphold the protection of legal professional 
privilege involving certain types of communication. The Derby Court reviewed 
Cox & Railton.48 The facts in that case were not dissimilar to Cromack. While it is 
noted that the lawyer in Cromack declined to be party to a fraudulent enterprise, 
Cox is distinguished on the basis that the lawyer counselled his clients as to the 
means by which to avoid seizure and sale of land. He advised them to dissolve 
their partnership and execute a bona fide sale between the two men. When Railton 
enquired as to whether anyone aside from themselves knew of the partnership,49 
the lawyer replied: ‘No, not that I am aware of, only my clerks’.50 Unbeknownst 
to the lawyer, instead of dissolving their partnership, Cox and Railton retained it 
and proceeded with the fraudulent transaction.  
 
All communications between a solicitor and his client are not 
privileged from disclosure, but only those passing between them in 
the legitimate course of professional employment of the solicitor. 
                                               
45 (1878) 39 LT 293. 
46 Ibid (Cockburn J) cited in R v Cox & Railton (1884) 14 QBD 153. 
47 R v Cox & Railton (1884) 14 QBD 153.  
48 [1996] AC 407, 507E-F. The Derby Court stated that R v Cox & Railton ‘was said to fall within 
the exception recognised by Stephen J. The argument was not that the privilege had to be balanced 
against some other public interest, but rather that the communications were never privileged at 
all’. 




Communications made to a solicitor by his client before the 
commission of a crime for the purpose of being guided or helped in 
the commission of it, are not privileged from disclosure.51 
 
The Queen’s Bench held that, while secrets ‘must be told in order to see whether 
[they] ought to be kept’,52 the detection of crime deprived communications of 
their privileged status. Ultimately, no privilege could be said to attach if a client 
sought his lawyer’s assistance to commit a criminal or fraudulent act. Stephen J 
explicated how courts should determine whether a specific communication was 
designed to further a crime or fraud:  
 
In each particular case the court must determine ... whether it seems 
probable that the accused person may have consulted his legal adviser 
... before the commission of the crime for the purpose of being guided 
or helped in committing it.53 
 
This judgment accorded with the position taken in Annesley v Earl of Anglesea,54 
namely that professional confidence cannot exist when a lawyer is an organiser, 
entrepreneur or willing co-conspirator in a scheme tainted with the character of 
fraud. This would in turn give rise to allegations of breach of the law and could 
not be said to form part of his professional duty.  
 
Their dispute focused on whether a more precise definition of the 
privilege would include or exclude matters of the sort that [the Earl’s 
attorney] had learned. The analysis, both because they reveal how 
unformed the rule of privilege was at the time and because they 
anticipate substantially everything that has since been said on the 
subject.55 
 
                                               
51 Ibid 153.  
52 Ibid 168. 
53 Ibid 175. 
54 (1743) 17 How St Trials 1139. See also Geoffrey Hazard, above n 36, 1075.  
55 Ibid.  
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Client–counsel communications would be reduced to communications between 
two fraudulent people.56 It was clear law that the privilege did not protect 
communications made in order to elicit an illegal objective. If lawyers were to 
find themselves bound by legal professional privilege in such circumstances, it 
would wring grievous hardship upon them, for ‘their lips would have to remain 
sealed, which might place them in the unenviable position of being suspected 
party to their client’s crime’.57 
 
Stipulating that communications were not protected if they fell outside the 
legitimate ambit of the client–counsel relationship, the Court, in its formulation, 
noted that the intention of the clients and not their lawyer was the decisive factor. 
The clients needed to have consulted with their lawyer ‘before the commission of 
the crime for the purpose of being guided or helped in committing it’.58 Quoting 
from the judgment of Bovill CJ in Tichborne v Lushington,59 Stephen J said: 
 
I believe the law is, and properly is, that if a party consults an 
attorney, and obtains advice for what afterwards turns out to be the 
commission of a crime or a fraud, that party so consulting the attorney 
has no privilege whatever to close the lips of the attorney from stating 
the truth. Indeed, if any such privilege should be contended for, or 
existed, it would work most grievous hardship on an attorney, who, 
after he had been consulted upon what subsequently appeared to be a 
manifest crime and fraud, would have his lips closed, and might place 
him in a very serious position of being suspected to be a party to the 
fraud, and without his having an opportunity of exculpating himself.60 
  
                                               
56 In Annesley v Earl of Anglesea (1743) 17 How. St. Trials 1139, Giffard conspired with the 
Earl of Anglesea to have James Annesley hanged for a murder known to be a tragic accident. 
This would clear the path for the Earl to inherit a vast estate rightfully belonging to Annesley. 
See also de Christopher de Courcy Ryder, above n 15, 18. 
57 R v Cox & Railton (1884) 14 QBD 153. 
58 Ibid 175. 
59 Tichborne v Lushington (Unreported, 10 May 1871) cited in R v Cox & Railton (1884) 14 
QBD 153. 
60 (1884) 14 QBD 153, 175. 
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Cox and Railton did not confide their intentions in their lawyer, nor do things in 
combination with him, over and above what was required of the lawyer in his 
professional duty: ‘There was nothing to shew the defendants had any fraud in 
view when they went to, or, indeed, when they came away from the solicitor’.61 
The privilege was not lost and the communications retained their confidential 
character.  
 
The reason on which the rule is said to rest cannot include the case of 
communications, criminal in themselves, or intended to further any 
criminal purpose, for the protection of such communications cannot 
possibly be otherwise than injurious to the interests of justice, and to 
those of the administration of justice. Nor do such communications 
fall within the terms of the rule. A communication in furtherance of a 
criminal purpose does not ‘come into the ordinary scope of 
professional employment’.62 
 
The presumed intention Stephen J had in mind was that a communication could 
not retain its privileged character because it would not come ‘within the ordinary 
scope of professional employment’; a phrase borrowed from Lord Brougham in 
Greenough v Gaskell.63 It is submitted that the court in Cox & Railton need only 
look to the rationale espoused by Lord Brougham, which provided sufficient 
justification for the crime-fraud exception:64 
 
[I]f the client has criminal object in view in his communications with 
his solicitor one of these elements must necessarily be absent. The 
client must either conspire with his solicitor or deceive him. If his 
criminal object is averred, the client does not consult his adviser 
professionally, because it cannot be the solicitor’s business to further 
any criminal objects … The solicitor’s advice is obtained by fraud.65 
 
                                               
61 Ibid 162. 
62 Ibid 167 (Stephen J). 
63 (1833) 1 Myl & K 98.  
64 Christopher de Courcy Ryder, above n 15, 18–19. 
65 Greenough v Gaskell (1883) 1 Myl & K 98 (Lord Brougham). 
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Moulding the modern scope of the crime-fraud limitation according to Bentham’s 
proclamation, R v Cox & Railton66 ruled that an iniquity exception applied to 
client–counsel communications made for the purpose of facilitating a crime or 
fraud, irrespective of whether the lawyer knowingly assisted in the furtherance of 
such a pursuit. The interpretation derived from this case was that, if the client had 
in mind a guilty purpose when seeking his lawyer’s advice, legal professional 
privilege was out of the question.67 This proceeding remains the leading case on 
the crime-fraud exception and demonstrates fidelity to Bentham’s way of thinking 
by preventing the privilege from acting as an ‘indefensible obstruction’ and 
shield. In Balabel, Lord Taylor aimed to foster a judicial preference for truth 
finding and similarly opined that there were rules of conduct about making sure 
all materials were available at trial and advocated for the privilege to be strictly 
confined.  
 
B  An Impossible Conspiracy 
 
The proceedings illustrate the historic common law position with respect to the 
crime-fraud exception. It was shallow in scope and operated to nullify the 
privilege in instances where a client specifically consulted his lawyer with a view 
to the commission of a crime or fraud.68 It is argued that, where a lawyer is acting 
in accordance with the rules of professional conduct, he will be prepared to 
disclose evidence of illicit communications made with the object of furthering a 
crime or fraud.69  
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Given that the justification for legal professional privilege is to promote 
legitimate client–counsel communications so that clients may unbosom 
themselves in exchange for legal advice and representation, any clients who have 
illicit intentions in mind when consulting their lawyer can have no reasonable 
expectation that the privilege will shield such consultations.70 In the 
circumstances, the obvious and necessary quality of confidentiality is lacking. It is 
an abuse of the client–counsel relationship, which falls within the ordinary course 
of professional employment and it would be unreasonable to seal the lawyer’s lips 
if it subsequently transpired that the client had sought legal assistance for a 
fraudulent or criminal enterprise.71  
 
This last point regarding the need for communications to concern a criminal or 
fraudulent purpose flowed through to R v Smith.72 In this 1915 proceeding 
colloquially known as the ‘Brides in the Baths’ murders, George Joseph Smith 
was convicted of murdering a succession of wives in almost identical 
circumstances.73 The trial judge admitted confidential communications passing 
between Smith and his lawyer concerning Smith’s financial gain through 
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‘mutually beneficial wills and resettlement of his wives’ properties’.74 The Court 
of Criminal Appeal, presided over by Lord Reading CJ, held that the trial judge 
had erred in admitting evidence of client–counsel communications, which he 
stated did not relate to the commission of a crime within the meaning of R v Cox 
& Railton.75  
 
Phillipps’ Treatise on the Law of Evidence states that, ‘if the case of R v Smith 
had been fully in point against the admission of the evidence, it could not be 
considered good law’.76 Phillipps noted that the will of Smith’s last wife, Betsy 
Munday, was professionally deposited with the lawyer as a matter in confidence 
between them and solely for Smith’s own interests.77 R v Smith78 was directly on 
point in R v Tylney, Henry and Jemima Tuffs.79 In that proceeding, the trio of 
Tylney, Tuffs and Tuffs were charged with intent to defraud the beneficiary of a 
will, namely, William Tuffs. No proof of the latter’s existence was established 
and the Tylney Court held that, if the existence of a forged will could not wrong 
anyone and no adverse consequence could result, it would seem that even an 
intent to defraud could not be imputed.  
 
Having entertained doubts as to whether or not the defendants could be convicted 
on such a count, Parke B determined that a valid objection could be sustained to 
prevent a forged will being produced by the defendants’ lawyer on the ground that 
it was a privileged communication.80 Legal professional privilege is not prevented 
from attaching merely because a lawyer is employed to advance an account of 
events known by the client to be untrue or involving a ploy to mislead his 
adversary and the court. An application of this principle can be seen in the later 
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English judgments of R v Snaresbrook Crown Court; Ex parte DPP81 and R v 
Central Criminal Court; Ex parte Francis & Francis (A Firm).82  
 
In the first of these two cases, a client lodged a legal aid application in which he 
accused a police officer of breaking his nose. He claimed damages for assault. It 
transpired that the injury was unrelated to the police incident and culminated in 
the client’s prosecution for making a false allegation and attempting to pervert the 
court of justice. Although the police alleged that the defendant was furthering a 
criminal purpose, Glidewell LJ stated:  
  
Put a little more extensively, the Law Society holds the legal aid 
application to enable it to decide whether to grant legal aid for 
pursuing a civil claim which may prove to be false, as indeed some 
are. But it does not, I entirely agree with the judge, hold it with the 
intention of furthering a criminal purpose. No intention could be 
further from its thoughts.83 
 
In contrast to Cox & Railton, which made it clear that the relevant iniquitous 
intention must derive from the client and not the lawyer, Snaresbrook decided that 
the Law Society’s intention was a prevailing interest. In Francis & Francis, a 
third angle was considered, namely the criminal intent of a third party. In that 
case, trial judge, Machin J, pursuant to s 27 of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 
1986, ordered a law firm to produce all documents, accounts and records 
pertaining to a property purchase made by one of its clients using funds from an 
alleged drug trafficker. Francis & Francis sought a declaration that the order 
breached the rules of natural justice or related to items subject to legal 
professional privilege.84 It further claimed that neither the firm nor its client 
intended to further a criminal conspiracy.85  
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The question to be decided by the Court was whether the documents in the 
possession of the law firm were confidential or held with the intention of 
furthering a criminal purpose. In the circumstances, the conduct of a fraudulent 
third party was sufficient to nullify the privilege because that party was using the 
unsuspecting client and their law firm to perpetrate a fraud. Lloyd LJ, in his 
judgment, observed that this proceeding raised a difficult but important question 
as to the definition of items subject to legal privilege.86 He resolved that courts are 
always reluctant not to follow their previous rulings, but if persuaded that a 
previous ruling is clearly wrong, they are bound to say so.87 Ultimately, 
‘disclosure of a third party’s iniquity must, in the interest of justice, prevail over 
the privilege of the client, even though the client may be innocent’.88 This concept 
is discussed further in Chapter V, while the following section concentrates on the 
more established limitations and exclusions to the rule as gleaned from the 
judgments of Lord Taylor.  
 
III  WIGMORE ON WAIVER: THE ‘FAIRNESS’ FACTOR 
 
Wigmore’s four-tiered paradigm accorded a narrow construction to the rule of 
legal professional privilege, whereby he premised the application of the privilege 
around four basic elements. Articulating the conditions antecedent to a valid 
claim of privilege, Wigmore asserted that if the following fundamental canons 
were not satisfied, there neither is, nor ought to be, a privilege:89  
 
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that 
they will not be disclosed; 
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(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the 
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the 
parties; 
 
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the 
community ought to be sedulously fostered; 
 
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the 
disclosure of the communications must be greater than the 
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.90  
 
It logically follows that any communication or document asserted as falling under 
the rule must be tightly confined and not circulated, whether or not through a 
wilful act; otherwise the privileged character of the communication will 
necessarily be lost. Wigmore’s contention that the purpose of waiving the rule 
over a whole document where only partial disclosure had occurred was grounded 
in ‘fairness’ so as not to mislead or deceive.  
 
The practical foundation to Wigmore’s argument can be expressed as being 
grounded in the fact that any form of disclosure is inconsistent with the purpose 
of legal professional privilege. In the narrowest sense of the term, ‘waiver’ occurs 
when a client who is entitled to assert the privilege volunteers the privileged 
communication in the course of legal proceedings.91 Privilege ultimately ceases if 
the client is not desirous of secrecy,92 and once confidentiality has been 
irretrievably lost it cannot be reclaimed. Privilege cannot re-attach.  
 
Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal 
adviser in his capacity as such, the communications relating to that 
purpose, made in confidence by the client, are at his instance 
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permanently protected from disclosure by himself or by the legal 
adviser, except the protection be waived.93  
 
Wigmore initially argued that, under the 16th-century justification for the 
privilege, the tenets of oath and honour enabled the lawyer alone to waive the 
rule, because it was for him to determine what oath and honour demanded;94 yet 
when he identified the circumstances giving rise to waiver of legal professional 
privilege, he put the ball squarely in the client’s court. The privilege could be 
displaced, Wigmore claimed, if the client revealed a confidential communication 
in the presence of a third party.95  
 
The reason for his change in viewpoint corresponded with the 17th- and 18th-
century theories96 in which the lawyer was deemed incompetent to reveal 
confidential client communications connected to litigation, before the law 
changed and prohibited disclosure except upon consent from the client. Wigmore 
noted that Bentham had long ago denounced the use of the term ‘competent’ to 
excuse lawyers from testifying.  
 
Wigmore stated that the party invoking the privilege ought to be permitted to 
waive it and that its scope was subject to exceptions.97 He added that waiver could 
occur not only through verbal communication, but by way of gestures, including 
partial disclosure. Defined as the renunciation of a right or entitlement, ‘waiver’ 
would prevent the client from thereafter relying on the privilege, since the 
dominance of the modern theory held that it belonged to the client alone; the 
power to waive it rested solely with the client.98  
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Wigmore cautioned that individual circumstances would vary in each ruling and 
must therefore depend on the case in hand.99 Confining his illustrations to civil 
cases for convenience, Wigmore borrowed from the judgments in Greenough v 
Gaskell100 and Cobden v Kenrick,101 wherein he noted that privilege could not be 
retained where the information could not be termed the subject of a confidential 
disclosure.102 He distinguished voluntary assertions from communications made 
confidentially for the purpose of conducting a suit and cautioned that, where 
disclosure to a third party under legal professional privilege ordinarily constituted 
a waiver of the rule, this was not effected unless the party’s conduct touched a 
certain point of disclosure.103  
 
Wigmore noted two further points: if the privilege had been erroneously declined 
or refused, said party could not appeal on the ground of error or mistake,104 and 
upon the death of the client there was no demand for a cloak of secrecy.105 He did 
not elaborate on whether he viewed such a scenario as an implied waiver to the 
privilege. Instead, Wigmore posited the question: ‘What constitutes a waiver by 
implication? Judicial decision gives no clear answer to this question’.106 
Nevertheless, it can reasonably be inferred from the sum of his remarks that the ex 
post importance of confidential communications and the interests of a deceased 
client could not be adversely impacted by the absence of legal professional 
privilege.  
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Recognising that there was a want of harmony in the rulings, Wigmore resolved 
that ‘no doubt much ought to depend upon the circumstances of each case’.107 He 
maintained that courts were under no obligation to guard secrets that were not, by 
their nature, private; for ‘the moment confidence ceases, privilege ceases’.108 
Wigmore articulated several points for determining whether or not waiver had 
occurred in a particular context.  
 
The first tenet was that the client’s own offer to testify in proceedings did not 
constitute a waiver, for the purpose of either examination or cross-examination; 
otherwise a claim of privilege would serve only to close the client’s mouth on the 
stand.109 The second principle was that any knowledge casually acquired by the 
client’s lawyer as an ordinary witness did not amount to a waiver; but any 
knowledge obtained outside this scope was a waiver. Considering that lawyers 
should not generally be called as witnesses in their clients’ cause,110 the client 
ought not employ their lawyer in a manner that would produce a double-minded 
attitude111 whereby the lawyer would have to decline to invoke their legal 
function as an adviser if they were deemed fit to testify as a witness.112  
 
Third, Wigmore pronounced that, if the client offered up the testimony of their 
lawyer as to facts confidentially communicated between them, it was a waiver.113 
It had the effect of waiving the privilege over all other communications passing 
between the pair in a professional capacity.114 Should the client offer partial 
testimony as to communications between themselves and their lawyer, the 
principle of fairness dictates that it results in a waiver of the whole of the 
communications.115 
                                               
107 Ibid §2312, 3238. 
108 Parkhurst v Lowten (1816) 36 ER 589, 596 (Lord Eldon). 
109 John Wigmore, Treatise, above n 7, § 2327, 3253. 
110 Ibid § 1911. 
111 Ibid § 2291, 3204. 
112 Ibid § 2327, 3253. 
113 Ibid § 2327, 3254. 





Despite Wigmore’s pronouncement, judicial opinion has varied as to whether the 
legal profession should, in a variety of different contexts, permit the privilege to 
be re-established over waived communications. As Section III will show, the 
courts of England have predominantly deferred to Wigmore when seeking to 
resolve any uncertainty with respect to the rule. This is exemplified in two cases 
over which Lord Taylor adjudicated: Tanap v Tozer116 and Goldman v Hesper.117 
Each of these proceedings produced markedly different outcomes and added 
significantly to the confusion regarding the extent of legal professional privilege. 
 
IV NATURAL JUSTICE AND LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE: LIMITATIONS AND 
EXCLUSIONS 
 
A  Goldman v Hesper 
 
The question to be decided by the Court of Appeal in Goldman v Hesper118 was 
whether an assertion of privilege could be claimed over a bill of taxation pursuant 
to Order 62 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. A dissolution of marriage suit 
between appellant Michael Goldman and respondent Walpurga Hesper, 
culminated with Calvert QC, sitting as trial judge, ordering Goldman to pay all of 
Hesper’s costs on a common fund basis.119 Goldman subsequently persuaded 
Hesper to provide written consent voluntarily surrendering the privilege and 
permitting him to inspect papers relating to taxation of costs in the suit. After 
waiving her right to claim privilege over the documents, Hesper sought legal 
advice and was instructed to withdraw her consent and reassert her claim of 
privilege.120  
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Referring to the decisions of Stevenson J in the divorce hearing of Hobbs v Hobbs 
and Cousens121 and Hobhouse J in Pamlin v Express Newspapers,122 the Goldman 
Court noted that conflicting judicial decisions had emerged regarding whether or 
not a party was entitled to inspect documents relied upon by their adversary, 
including privileged communications.123 Such a revelation frustrates the sole 
purpose of the privilege. In Hobbs, which was considered in Derby, Stevenson J 
emphasised the importance of the rule. He noted that, even if doubt existed as to 
the area covered by legal professional privilege, it was evident that in divorce 
litigation intolerable consequences would arise if someone in the respondent’s 
position were permitted to see the inside of the lawyer’s brief delivered on behalf 
of the appellant.124 Stevenson J added that natural justice and common sense 
could not triumph over the privilege and decried any attempt by the respondent to 
inspect or closely examine the contents of counsel’s brief.125 Bentham himself 
noted the impracticality of reconciling legal professional privilege and natural 
justice. 
 
In Pamlin, Hobhouse J resolved the question in favour of natural justice over 
confidentiality of privileged communications. Adopting the counter-view to 
Stevenson J, he pronounced that, ultimately, the principle that each side must 
have the right to see any relevant material which their adversary is placing before 
the trier of facts, and which is taken into account in arriving at a decision, must 
prevail.126 Hobhouse J opined that it was for the appellant to elect whether they 
desired to waive the privilege or assert it in order to retain confidentiality over the 
documents.127 
 
Goldman relied on the Pamlin judgment when he advanced the position that, as a 
matter of natural justice, he should be entitled to inspect any communication 
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which Hesper sought to use.128 He stated that only through viewing the taxation 
bill could he know whether to challenge any of the items listed and suggested that 
it was wrong to permit the Registrar to see Hesper’s documents while he was 
denied sight of them.129 Counsel for Goldman, Mr Pleming, argued that Hesper 
could not recant her waiver over specific privileged material.130  
 
Taylor LJ, who delivered the judgment of the court with which Lord Donaldson 
MR and Woolf LJ concurred, contended that this argument could not succeed.131 
He distinguished the material facts of Goldman, in which no action had been 
taken on the letter of waiver, from a scenario in which documents had already 
been dispatched for inspection and concluded that, upon taking legal advice, 
Hesper was perfectly entitled to withdraw permission.132 While this ruling went 
some way towards affirming Wigmore’s stance that waiver was not effected 
unless the party’s conduct touched a certain point of disclosure,133 Goldman 
exemplified that waiver could be retracted upon a client subsequently obtaining 
legal advice.  
 
In the course of his judgment, Taylor LJ added that the approach taken by 
Stevenson J in Hobbs was ‘too rigid and uncompromising. There may be 
instances in which taxing officers may need to disclose part, if not all, of the 
contents of a privileged document in striking the appropriate balance’.134 
 
Just as he had done in Balabel, Taylor LJ again recognised that legal professional 
privilege was not immutable. Applying a pragmatic approach, he averred that it 
necessitated the weighing of competing interests through ‘striking an appropriate 
balance’ with respect to privileged communications. Taylor LJ additionally noted 
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the usefulness of the view promulgated by Hobhouse J, particularly the principle 
that litigants must be availed recourse to any relevant material upon which their 
adversary relies and which is utilised by a court or tribunal in reaching its 
conclusion.135  
 
In adhering to a ‘natural justice’ approach with respect to the rule, Taylor LJ 
recognised that legal professional privilege was not one-directional. The rule 
could not have applied ‘irrespective of the client’s individual merits’, as he stated 
in Derby, because the privilege could not operate to include confidential 
communications on one hand, while, on the other hand, exclude further 
confidential communications in which partial disclosure had not compromised the 
integrity of that information. Taylor LJ concluded that even a voluntary waiver or 
disclosure to or by a third party, such as a taxation officer, would not proscribe 
the owner of the document from reasserting a claim of privilege in any subsequent 
context.136  
 
Taylor LJ referred to British Coal Corporation v Dennis Rye Ltd (No 2).137 In that 
case, the Court of Appeal, presided over by Dillon, Neill and Stocker LLJ, held 
that it was possible for the privilege to be waived ‘for a specific purpose and in a 
specific context only’.138 In British Coal, communications brought into existence 
for a civil proceeding were subsequently disclosed in a criminal investigation.139 
The question to be decided by the Court was whether disclosure to police could 
be construed as a waiver of privilege in favour of the defendant for the purposes 
of the civil proceeding. Neill LJ stated that British Coal Corporation had divulged 
communications for the limited purpose of facilitating a criminal investigation in 
accordance with their duty, and objectively this did not conform to an express or 
implied waiver of privilege in relation to the civil suit.140 
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Taylor LJ utilised the ‘limited purpose’ rationale to restore the privilege which 
Hesper had voluntarily surrendered. The Goldman judgment diverged from 
Bentham and Wigmore, who did not recognise a ‘limited purpose waiver’. 
According to Wigmore, if a client selectively volunteered information, the 
dictates of fairness prohibited them from withholding the remainder of it and this 
would be fatal to the privilege, irrespective of the client’s intent.141 Even 
accidental waiver of information would suffice to preclude any continuing 
confidence in privileged documents.  
 
Although Wigmore noted that the reasoning of the courts is ‘too often loosely or 
obscurely stated’,142 neither he nor Bentham would have endorsed an approach in 
which waiver could be utilised for a limited purpose or in a limited context. If a 
client selectively volunteered information, this would be fatal to the privilege, 
irrespective of the client’s intent143 and the dictates of fairness would prohibit 
them from withholding the remainder of the communication. According to 
attorney and lecturer Jeff Anderson and colleagues:  
 
Wigmore grasped that the elements of fairness and 
consistency had to be taken into account in determining 
whether waiver had occurred in the context of privileged 
communications and suggested that, where one side 
could demonstrate that their adversary’s partial disclosure 
resulted in inherent unfairness, the courts should find in 
favour of waiver.144  
 
Rupert Cross disagreed with the ‘fairness’ rationale when he stated that a waiver 
was generally brought about by the inconsistency which the courts perceived 
between the conduct of the client and the maintenance of the confidentiality, as 
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opposed to some overriding principle of fairness operating at large.145 In other 
words, waiver of legal professional privilege required that the client intentionally, 
and with full knowledge, relinquish their rights. This could only be established by 
examining their conduct at the time when the communication was made.146  
 
Ethics scholar Charles Wolfram147 similarly observed that, in order to amount to a 
waiver, the client’s act of disclosure must have been voluntarily made to a non-
privileged individual; that is, a person not recognised as being covered by the 
privilege.148 He added that, once the privilege struggled into existence, its fragile 
life was threatened by forces that could extinguish it.149 Those forces lie within 
the client’s control and can be snuffed out with their consent.150 Phipson put this 
into practical effect when he stated that the conduct of the party who volunteered 
material to the court is what gives rise to a waiver of privilege.151 He noted that, if 
that party elected to tender part of a document or a sequence of documents before 
the court, they must also tender the remainder of the information in order to 
ensure fairness to their adversary.152  
 
B  Burnell v British Transport Commission 
 
While the argument of ‘fairness’ with respect to waiving the rule was grounded in 
Wigmore’s approach to the privilege, it was articulated at common law in Burnell 
v British Transport Commission.153 Decided in 1956, this personal injury 
proceeding involved the cross-examination of a witness regarding the contents of 
a written statement he had made. While counsel for the plaintiff sought discovery 
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of the document, the defence contended it was protected from disclosure on the 
grounds of privilege.154 The trial judge compelled disclosure and this order was 
upheld by Lord Denning on appeal.155  
 
Reiterating Wigmore’s view that ‘fairness’ underpinned the privilege, he ruled 
that, once a confidential communication was used by counsel during cross-
examination, it was waived not only for that part of the document, but for the 
whole of it.156 Lord Denning added that it would be unfair for the plaintiff’s 
counsel to use the portion which was most advantageous to his client and not 
permit the opposing party or judge to view the remainder of the material which 
may be to his detriment.157  
 
Lord Denning’s justification for declaring that a partial waiver constituted a 
whole waiver of a specific document or communication lay in its ability to 
prevent obstruction through misleading an adversary. His commentary in Burnell 
was reiterated by Mustill J in Nea Katerina:  
 
[T]he principle underlying the rule of practice exemplified by Burnell 
v British Transport Commission is that, where a party is deploying in 
court material which would otherwise be privileged, the opposite 
party and the court must have an opportunity of satisfying themselves 
that what the party has chosen to release from privilege represents the 
whole of the material relevant to the issue in question. To allow an 
individual item to be plucked out of context would be to risk injustice 
through its real weight or meaning being misunderstood.158 
 
The relevant question to ask is whether material affected by partial disclosure 
which is not misleading should retain its privileged character. This question was 
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settled in another case on which Lord Taylor ruled, namely, Tanap Investments 
(UK) v Tozer.159 The judgment was strikingly different from Goldman v Hesper160 
because, where Goldman permitted the privilege to be reasserted once waived, 
Tanap decided that, if the privilege is partially waived in respect of a 
correspondence or communication, it is waived over the entire document.  
 
C  Tanap v Tozer 
 
Five years prior to Derby being decided, Taylor LJ, together with Balcombe LJ, 
presided over Tanap Investments (UK) v Tozer.161 The facts leading to the Tanap 
appeal resulted from trial procedures in which Mummery J relied on Rule 19A of 
the Rules of the Supreme Court 1894 (UK) when ordering disclosure of 
documents by the plaintiff company, Tanap. This piece of legislation deferred to 
Wigmore’s treatise162 when making express provision for courts to inspect 
documents over which a claim of legal professional privilege was made.163 Court 
inspection of protected communications is unlikely to constitute a 
disproportionate interference with the right to legal professional privilege.  
 
The plaintiff company complied with the judicial order and disclosed attendance 
notes, while resisting any further disclosure of documents.164 Tozer argued that 
partial disclosure of information constituted a full waiver of legal professional 
privilege and sought production of the remaining materials.165 In deciding 
whether legal professional privilege could be claimed over client–counsel 
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communications that had been partially disclosed at trial, Taylor LJ approved of 
the reasoning of Hobhouse J in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance 
Corporation Ltd v Tanter.166  
 
D  General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd v Tanter 
 
In Tanter, Hobhouse J averred to an expanse of judicial authority when discerning 
the circumstances in which privilege is waived, and the extent to which 
communications should thereafter be disclosed. In reviewing these authorities, he 
formulated eight principles in relation to the ability, at trial, to claim privilege 
over confidential communications. Hobhouse J first noted that, under the English 
adversarial process, a party could elect what evidence was adduced at trial. 
English law holds that, when representing a client, the lawyer has authority to 
bind their client in any matter pertaining to, or arising from, litigation.167 This 
includes authority to waive the privilege that inures to the benefit of the client.168 
Indeed, notwithstanding the fact that a client may expressly instruct their lawyer 
not to waive the privilege, it is waived if the lawyer mistakenly reveals protected 
information to the court.169 Hobhouse J next stated that the rule of legal 
professional privilege shielded certain categories of communication from pre-trial 
discovery and cited Waugh v British Railways Board170 in support of this. 
 
In Waugh, Lord Simon stated that, despite an opponent’s brief containing relevant 
material, the other side could not see it because this was inconsistent with the 
adversary forensic process based on legal representation.171 Hobhouse J either 
overlooked, or elected not to mention, subsequent remarks made by Lord Simon 
in the same case. It is noteworthy to recount that Lord Simon clarified that the 
privilege should only be upheld where necessary to achieve the purpose for which 
it was designed and, if any document was created for a purpose quite apart from 
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seeking legal advice, there was no need for the privilege.172 In contrast, Hobhouse 
J contended that it was at the discretion of each party to decide whether or not to 
waive the privilege and, if so, the extent to which they did. His fourth point was 
derived from the decisions in Lyell, Burnell and Great Atlantic Insurance Co, 
whereby he stated that the partial waiver of a communication amounted to a 
waiver of the whole of that communication.173  
 
By contrast, Lord Simon was conscious of the need to aid the truth-finding 
function of the courts and could see ‘no intrinsic reason why legal professional 
privilege should prevail in a situation where it was counter-indicative’.174 He 
ultimately resolved that the rule was not absolute, but subject to numerous 
exceptions.175 Hobhouse J, for his part, recapitulated Wigmore wherein he stated 
that the underlying principle was grounded in the need for fairness in the conduct 
of the trial. He confirmed that it went no further than that, nor did it extend to all 
matters relating to the subject of those conversations.176  
 
This was reflected in Derby v Weldon (No 10),177 where Hobhouse and Vinelott JJ 
distinguished the extent of instructions given to the lawyer from the substance or 
content of that advice.178 In that proceeding, the plaintiff resisted an application 
for disclosure of instructions and enclosures to counsel on the basis that privilege 
was waived solely in relation to an attendance note.179 It was argued that this was 
a complete, self-contained document that could be viewed in isolation from, and 
without having recourse to, other material.180 Hobhouse J concluded that ‘the 
underlying principle is … fairness in the conduct of the trial … any waiver of 
                                               
172 Ibid. 
173 Lyell v Kennedy (No 3) (1884) 27 Ch D 1; Burnell v British Transport Commission [1956] 1 
QB 187; Great Atlantic Insurance Co v Home Insurance Co [1981] 1 WLR 529. 
174 [1984] 1 WLR 100.  
175 Ibid.  
176 Ibid.  
177 [1991] 1 WLR 660.   





privilege … would be liable to have the most wide ranging consequences and 
[would] give rise to a reductio ad absurdam.181 
 
Taylor LJ took up this point in Tanap, where he stated that, if the Court followed 
the argument of the defendants, ‘the waiver of privilege would give rise to a 
reductio ad absurdam’.182 Where, in Balabel, Taylor LJ noted that privilege 
attached in meetings between lawyer and client where there was a continuum of 
communication aimed at keeping both informed so that instructions and advice 
may be conveyed,183 he and Balcombe LJ expressed agreement with the 
principles enunciated by Hobhouse J. When formulating their decision, they also 
took into consideration the pronouncement of Lloyd J in Great Atlantic Insurance 
Co v Home Insurance Co.184  
 
E  Consequences for Voluntary and Involuntary Waiver of Legal Professional 
Privilege  
 
Although ultimately decided on appeal, Lloyd L, as he then was, heard Great 
Atlantic Insurance Co in the first instance. Taylor and Lloyd LJJ were two of the 
five judges who presided over R v Derby Magistrates Court; Ex parte B.185 The 
substance of Great Atlantic Insurance Co was grounded in a marine insurance 
agreement. The agreement was authorised by Afia and entered into in 1977 
between the plaintiff insurer, Great Atlantic Co and C E Heath & Co 
(International) Ltd on behalf of Home Insurance Company. Home Insurance 
Company was run by Mr Eiger who engaged in marine insurance brokerage. Mr 
Eiger negotiated marine insurance on behalf of clients whose policies were then 
underwritten by Great Atlantic Co. The Home Insurance Company would re-
insure them. The following year, a quota share marine-and-aviation agreement 
superseded the existing contract.  
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By 1980, Great Atlantic Co expressed concerns about the negotiations and 
business practices in which Eiger engaged. An insurance expert, Mr Alexander, 
was called upon to investigate. He subsequently produced an adverse report, both 
orally and in writing, which detailed Eiger’s conduct. The contents of the report 
were verbally conveyed to an American representative of the attorneys for Great 
Atlantic Co.186 In response to this information, the attorneys of Great Atlantic Co 
sent a memorandum to their client in May 1980. It included a two-paragraph 
account of the discussion between Alexander and their representative and outlined 
other matters pertaining to Eiger.  
 
At trial, the English firm of solicitors representing Great Atlantic Co made no 
attempt to invoke a claim of privilege over the first two paragraphs of the memo 
on the basis that it detailed a discussion which was not, in and of itself, privileged. 
While they allegedly intended to assert privilege over the remainder of the 
document, and other documents, no such claim was made despite the plaintiff 
arguing that the rest of the memo was protected.  
 
Although C E Heath & Co had been unaware that the memo they received was 
incomplete and had no knowledge of the additional information contained therein, 
they sought disclosure immediately upon being made aware of the circumstances. 
Having already been provided copies of the first two paragraphs, they claimed 
that they were entitled to see the material in its entirety. Their argument was 
predicated on the fact that, if the whole document had been privileged and 
privilege had been waived in respect of the first two paragraphs, it had been 
waived over the whole of the document.  
 
Judge Lloyd held that Alexander’s report did not constitute a document over 
which privilege could be asserted. If there were such a discretion as to allow 
courts to restore and enable clients to reassert privilege over a portion of a 
document which had not yet been introduced in evidence, it would be improper 
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for him to exercise it in favour of Great Atlantic Co. Lloyd J ruled in favour of C 
E Heath & Co and granted inspection of the document in its entirety. 
 
On appeal, Templeman LJ, with whom Dunn LJ concurred, equally observed that 
the memorandum did not constitute a document over which privilege could be 
sustained. He cited Wheeler v Le Marchant187 as authority that no privilege could 
be claimed for communications passing between Alexander and the attorney’s 
American representative as no litigation was anticipated or pending at the time the 
report came into existence. It was possible for C E Heath & Co (International) Ltd 
to access communications between Alexander and the American representative. 
 
Templeman LJ adopted the position taken by Lloyd J that ‘the court had no 
jurisdiction to relieve the plaintiffs from the consequences of their own 
mistakes’.188 This reflected the Wigmorean view that ‘the risk of insufficient 
precautions is upon the client. This principle applies equally to all documents’.189 
Emphasising that waiver could be said to occur in cases of involuntary disclosure 
such as the theft of a document, much less its inadvertent inclusion in an affidavit, 
Wigmore affirmed that the principle ultimately left it up to the client and their 
lawyer to take sufficient measures of caution.190 The difference between 
inadvertent and involuntary disclosure is that ‘involuntary disclosure’ results from 
the intervention of an outside force over which the party has no control, whereas 
‘inadvertent disclosure’ is the consequence of an unintentional or accidental act 
which results in the production of information otherwise subject to legal 
professional privilege.191 
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With reference to Great Atlantic, Phipson stated that it was ‘apparent that waiver 
of privilege [was] a doctrine of fairness’.192 The issue central to the determination 
of that case was whether waiver in relation to one document resulted in collateral 
waiver; thereby carrying an obligation to divulge additional communications 
pertaining to the same matter.193 While commenting that it was for the court to 
apply its discretion in deciding what consequences attached to voluntary 
waiver,194 Phipson remarked that, whether or not they were aware of it, the 
plaintiffs in Great Atlantic had sought to disclose one part of a document, while 
claiming privilege for another part of the same document.195 The second point 
made by Phipson was that the doctrine of waiver operated on objective, rather 
than subjective, principles: ‘There are exceptional circumstances, of which fraud 
and obvious mistake are the most important. But unless those exceptions apply, 
the extent of any waiver must be judged objectively’.196  
  
Lloyd J opined that the Tanap appeal provided a useful reminder to the legal 
profession that all communications passing between lawyer and client, where the 
lawyer was acting in a professional capacity, were privileged subject to 
exceptions, and should only be waived with great caution.197 He held that, once 
disclosure took place by introducing a portion of the material into evidence or 
using it in court, it could not be erased, as this may produce a result that is unfair 
or misleading.198 Ruling that the privilege had been waived, the Court of Appeal 
did not reinstate the privilege over the communications.  
 
The Tanap Court adhered to these cited authorities on the basis that, if privilege 
was waived in respect of a note outlining counsel’s advice, it was also waived in 
respect of any written or oral instructions given to counsel for the purposes of 
obtaining that advice. In the absence of disclosure, a real risk existed that the 
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advice would not be seen in its correct context and its weight and meaning may be 
misunderstood.199  
 
That particular ruling challenged the traditional presumption about waiver of legal 
professional privilege and highlighted the conflicting views which had emerged in 
the independent judicial approaches taken in Goldman and Tanap. The 
distinguishing feature of Goldman and Tanap was that waiver was effected only 
after the party’s conduct touched a certain point of disclosure. This was 
irrespective of the fact each had waived their right to invoke the rule. As a 
consequence, the problem of whether privilege could be reasserted over waived 
communications was not sufficiently resolved. It is argued that the Tanap Court 
clearly stated the correct position by adopting a stricter interpretation. This was 
the better application of the doctrine of waiver, as it would otherwise have 
permitted the scope to be broadened to such an extent that any communication, 
whether or not divulged through intent or inadvertence, could conceivably be 
challenged as privileged.200 
 
Opinion differs as to the appropriate balancing of fairness and consistency. James 
Bradley Thayer, in surveying the development of the law of evidence in his most 
famous work, the 1898 A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 
obliquely touched on the theme of legal professional privilege when he wrote that 
the law was not merely concerned with objective truth, but equally preoccupied 
with other elements: 
 
There is another precept which should be laid down as preliminary, in 
stating the law of evidence; namely, that unless excluded by some 
rule or principle of law, all that is logically probative is admissible … 
[yet] there are many exceptions to it … 
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These rules of exclusion have had their exceptions; and so the law has 
come into the shape of a set of primary rules of exclusion; and then a 
set of exclusions to those rules.201 
 
Charles McCormick and Charles Wolfram have argued that voluntary disclosure 
of confidential information prevents a subsequent claim of privilege.202 
McCormick described ‘waiver’ as the intentional relinquishment of a known right 
regardless of whether an individual knew about the existence of the privilege 
rule.203 Wolfram argued that intent should be an irrelevant consideration when 
determining whether privilege had been waived.204 While confirming that 
communications may be ‘stripped of their privileged status where clients elected 
to make a voluntary revelation of a communication or its contents after the 
privilege had attached’,205 he stated that no case had gone so far as to hold that 
every client repetition of information constituted a waiver and such a rule would 
be needlessly rigid.206 Wolfram noted the need to create a rule which 
accommodated the competing values of encouraging client–counsel disclosure, 
while keeping the privilege within reasonable bounds so as to provide access to 
facts by other parties.207  
 
Through highlighting the complexity in applying, waiving and restoring legal 
professional privilege, this section has demonstrated that legal professional 
privilege is not absolute, but is subject to annulment and vitiation. Where 
academic opinion differed as to whether these interests have been sufficiently 
balanced, there is no doubt as to the impracticality of reconciling the rule with 
natural justice.  
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V  CONCLUSION 
 
Through analysis of nineteenth and twentieth century case law, Chapter IV 
highlighted conduct sufficient to extinguish the privilege. In particular, the 
privilege may be vitiated by criminal or fraudulent intent or annulled by waiver. R 
v Cox & Railton208 was the paradigmatic case in proscribing the application of 
legal professional privilege if clients conspired with their lawyers to engage in 
illicit or equivalent underhanded conduct contrary to the interests of justice. 
Burnell v British Transport Commission209 articulated the argument of ‘fairness’ 
with respect to waiving the rule.  
 
Fairness towards the opposing side constitutes the basis for upholding the 
exception of waiver and precludes one party from going to trial with the other’s 
evidence. The common theme which ran through these cases was the ‘Wigmorean 
perspective’ that it may be both unfair and misleading to an adversary if a party to 
a proceeding were permitted to ‘cherry pick’ which portions of a privileged 
communication they wished to divulge. Articulating the requirement that only 
client-counsel communications prompted by a reliance on secrecy could be 
protected from disclosure, Wigmore affirmed that any communications made 
voluntarily did not fall within the ambit of legal professional privilege.210 The 
problem has been difficult from the beginning.211 ‘Better no light from history, 
however, than false light’.212 
 
If the courts had discretion to restore, and enable clients to reassert, privilege over 
a portion of a waived communication, it would be improper to exercise this 
discretion in favour of one party to the detriment of the other, yet as this thesis 
shows, in certain legal contexts legal professional privilege operates to the 
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disadvantage of the parties. Ultimately, fairness to the adversary necessitates that 
all relevant material be furnished to ensure that what is presented is not partial.213  
  
This provides the impetus for Chapter V to addresses whether a third seldom-
recognised exception exists when innocence is at stake.214 Identifying the 
challenges that legal professional privilege presents for the justice system, 
particular emphasis is placed on the ability of criminal defendants to prove their 
innocence. The notion of ‘fairness’ is equally imperative in enabling criminal 
defendants access to potentially exculpatory information.  
 
Owing to the immediate point of distinction being injustice and wrongful 
conviction, this chapter explores whether the effect of invoking a claim of 
privilege could produce injustice. In answering this question, it is imperative to 
consider the application of legal professional privilege in the civil and criminal 
contexts to assess whether the weight given to the principle differs in each. For the 
purposes of this thesis, this chapter contends that, logically, there is a difference in 
the application of the rule with respect to criminal matters if material sought 
makes a difference to the substance of decision–making or is vital to the conduct 
of the defence.  
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CHAPTER V: THE APPLICATION OF LEGAL PROFESSIONAL 
PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW 
 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
 
In light of the findings made in Chapter IV whereby fairness to the adversary 
dictated the furnishing of relevant material to ensure impartiality, it is necessary 
to reconsider the application and benefits of legal professional privilege. Through 
testing the common belief that the rule is an essential mechanism that enables 
lawyers to engage in effective representation of their clients, Chapter V assesses 
whether the privilege achieves an efficient system of justice or creates an ethical 
conflict by ascribing a professional duty that contradicts other ethical values, 
particularly the good of alleviating innocent suffering.1  
 
Critical of the operation of the privilege and cognisant of its defects, the objective 
is to establish whether a different application of the principle does, or should, 
apply in civil and criminal contexts, particularly when the gain to one party is 
offset by a loss to the other. In Derby, Lord Taylor asserted that ‘the privilege is 
the same whether the documents are sought for the purpose of civil or criminal 
proceedings, and whether by the prosecution or the defence’.2  The House of 
Lords was required to determine whether times had changed such that ‘greater 
emphasis [should] now [be] placed upon the court being put into possession of all 
relevant material in order to arrive at the truth’.3  
 
This chapter contends that when courts deal with legal professional privilege, it is 
not enough solely to consider the interests of the parties. This conflict is not 
merely theoretical. It is a practical problem relevant to the outcome in Derby. In 
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that case, Lord Taylor CJ denied the criminal defendant the opportunity to access 
potentially exculpatory evidence on the grounds it was protected by legal 
professional privilege and this privilege could not be balanced against competing 
interests of equal or greater significance. 
 
Legal professional privilege is the ‘thin end of a wedge’ that divides process from 
justice.4  Section II defines civil and criminal law in an attempt to reconcile the 
clash of values between these apparently irreconcilable domains. It is necessary to 
understand whether the justification for legal professional privilege directly 
translates from the criminal legal setting to the civil one.5    
 
Bentham and Wigmore were hesitant to adopt a one-size-fits-all policy with 
respect to the rule; however, Lord Taylor disagreed with the notion that legal 
professional privilege should have distinct applications in civil and criminal 
settings. Bentham despised the privilege on the grounds that it defeated justice. 
Bentham’s rationale for eliminating legal professional privilege requires the 
weighing of speculative benefits provided by the privilege against the real social 
harms that may ensue.  This argument is further assessed against relevant case 
law in an attempt to determine whether a correlation exists between maintenance 
of the privilege and miscarriages of justice. Wigmore recognised the validity of 
Bentham’s argument and conceded that legal professional privilege was misused 
and abused, leading to intolerable obstruction of truth finding. 
 
Section III investigates whether the construction of the privilege promotes or 
hinders the administration of justice and exposes the far-reaching consequences of 
the rule for the justice system. It resolves that the practical application of legal 
professional privilege is incongruous because of the contradiction between 
shielding client–counsel communications and admitting relevant evidence, 
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particularly if the need arises to prove innocence in a criminal prosecution. It is 
noted that Lord Taylor, in Derby, conceded a ‘more stringent duty of disclosure 
[is] now placed upon the prosecution’.6 Lord Nicholls, in that same case, observed 
that ‘all relevant material should be available to courts when deciding cases. 
Courts should not have to reach decisions in ignorance of the contents of 
documents or other material which, if disclosed, might well affect the outcome’.7    
 
Having established the existence of a problem, this section draws upon the views 
of commentators who have expanded upon Bentham’s critique in asserting 
additional arguments against the application of the privilege on the basis that it 
perverts justice.  Legal scholarship is introduced which supports the need to adopt 
a balancing approach to the application of legal professional privilege. Relevant 
judgments are examined in which different rationes decidendi have been applied 
according to particular legal contexts, whereby the balance comes down 
resoundingly in favour of disclosure. This chapter concludes that the rule, by its 
very nature, presents a danger to ‘truth’ by preventing criminal defendants 
accessing material which may prove their innocence or avoid a miscarriage of 
justice.  
 
II  PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
Shortly after his appointment as Chief Justice, Lord Taylor listed the desirable 
attributes of a judge as patience and courtesy, knowledge of the law, experience 
of the court system and the ability to evaluate evidence and relate to people’s 
problems; all of which, he said, should lead to a sound judgment and a safe pair of 
hands.  In his attempt to reconcile the clash of values between these two 
apparently irreconcilable domains, Lord Taylor declined to distinguish the 
privilege in civil and criminal proceedings. Instead, he claimed in R v Derby 
Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte B8 that the principle was the same irrespective of the 
legal context in which discovery was sought. Other critics contend that the 
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privilege presents a dilemma, for ‘all confidentiality is questionable if the 
overriding goal is to get to the truth in an adversarial system’.9  
 
To the collective legal psyche, the process of law must be upheld regardless of the 
outcome. Anything less is perceived as undermining the practice of the law,10 yet, 
in truth, ‘process’ may be the law’s biggest obstacle.11 As it is presently 
interpreted and applied, the extreme ends of legal professional privilege have both 
theoretical and practical capacity to produce betrayal of client trust or draw legal 
practitioners into a clients’ perjury.12 This aligns with the Benthamic and 
Wigmorean interpretations, both of which cautioned that the privilege may 
operate as ‘an indefensible obstruction’ and ‘when the course of justice require[d] 
the investigation of truth, no man ha[d] any knowledge that [was] rightly 
private’.13    
 
Although the privilege has a place in both civil and criminal justice, this chapter 
argues that the benefits derived by the parties are distinct. The justification for 
legal professional privilege may have to be re-examined, particularly in relation to 
civil litigation, because ‘civil litigation conducted pursuant to … Civil Procedure 
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Rules is in many respects no longer adversarial’.14 Given the weakened 
justification for the privilege in the civil justice system, reduced protection for the 
rule would cause no harm to clients’ ability to gain access to justice.  By contrast, 
Derby conceded ‘there may be cases where the principle will work hardship on a 
third party seeking to assert his innocence’.15  
 
The point of contention between the application of legal professional privilege in 
civil and criminal contexts lies in its potential to produce miscarriages of justice.  
The test is the impact of legal professional privilege on hard cases such as those in  
the criminal setting. In concealing from the court potentially exculpatory 
information, legal professional privilege may produce a wrongful conviction. The 
presumption of innocence and the prevention of wrongful conviction are cardinal 
principles of English jurisprudence.16  These values find expression in rules which 
require acquittal in the face of reasonable doubt, rules requiring the identity of 
informants to be divulged where necessary to prove innocence and the public 
interest that no innocent person be wrongfully convicted.17 The rationale 
underpinning the presumption of innocence was that ‘to place the burden of proof 
on a defendant was repugnant to ordinary notions of fairness’.18  
 
A  Privilege: A Threshold Question  
 
In a 1994 parliamentary debate in England, Lord Taylor CJ conveyed his belief 
that full and frank disclosure to one’s lawyer was unlikely to be chilled by the 
prospect of communications one day being revealed, technically with the client’s 
consent but in circumstances in which this could not realistically be refused at 
trial.19 Arguing that the House of Lords should, ‘as far as humanly possible, 
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produce rules that would protect against wrongful conviction and safeguard the 
possibly innocent’,20 Lord Taylor recognised the ‘anxiety to leave no pebble 
unturned in the client’s interests’.21 He subsequently stressed that, if evidence 
could cast light on a fact in issue, it was very welcome.22  ‘Client interests’ may 
be interpreted as issues close to the heart of the client, while wrongful conviction 
affects not only the client, but society as a whole and the administration of justice. 
 
The change in Lord Taylor’s approach coincided with his ruling in R v Keane.23  
In that case, Lord Taylor CJ announced that ‘the great principle is that of open 
justice … If the disputed material may prove the defendant’s innocence or avoid a 
miscarriage of justice, then the balance comes down resoundingly in favour of 
disclosure’.24 In this context, legal professional privilege may operate to the 
detriment of a third party defendant as opposed to the direct defendant having 
unfavourable material revealed. Lord Taylor encouraged trial judges to carry out a 
balancing exercise by having regard to the weight of the public interest in non-
disclosure and to the importance of the documents to the defence.25 He 
recommended that judges view the material in question and hear the reasons 
advanced for its exclusion prior to making a ruling on admissibility.  ‘The duty on 
the prosecution to disclose material in its possession has been broadened as a 
result of [this] decision’.26  
 
Addressing recent judicial developments, Lord Taylor CJ stated that the judiciary 
had extended the principle of legal professional privilege. He cited a recent 
example in which a judge ordered the privilege to be overridden in favour of an 
accused through compelling disclosure of government documents over which 
                                               
20 Geoffrey Robertson, ‘Justice in All Fairness’, The Guardian, 30 April 1997, 19. 
21 Peter Taylor, ‘The Lund Lecture’ (1995) 35 Medicine, Science and the Law 1, 3. 
22 Ibid.  
23 R v Keane [1994] 1 WLR 746. 
24 Ibid 751. See also R v Turner [1995] 1 WLR 264, 268. This is clarified further on Pp 35-36, 
122 and 178 of my thesis. 
25 Ibid. 
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privilege was claimed.27 This, in turn, assisted three defendants to be acquitted of 
criminal charges.28   
 
Owing to the fact that a number of the most celebrated ‘miscarriage of justice’ 
cases turned on whether information had been disclosed or withheld from the 
defence; Lord Taylor CJ agreed that the criminal side of the justice system 
involved important issues of confidence. Appearing for the prosecution in one 
such case which culminated in the wrongful conviction of Stefan Kiszko, Lord 
Taylor noted that there were issues of public perception to consider29 and, more 
compellingly, there was a need to restore public confidence in the criminal justice 
system.30 It is certainly not easy, in a modern society, to sustain the argument that 
client–counsel communications should be preserved at the expense of justice.31 
‘Society has always been aware that any encounter between one individual and 
the entire judicial system is a collision of epic disproportion’.32   
 
In his attempt to reconcile the clash of values between these two apparently 
irreconcilable domains, Lord Taylor declined to distinguish legal professional 
privilege in civil and criminal proceedings. Instead, he reasoned in R v Derby 
Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte B33 that the principle was the same irrespective of 
the legal context in which discovery was sought. This ran contrary to subsequent 
remarks made in the same case where, as a matter of principle, legal professional 
privilege should yield to disclosure in exceptional cases particularly where it may 
                                               
27 Peter Taylor, ‘Richard Dimbleby Lecture’, Peter Taylor, ‘Richard Dimbleby Lecture: The 
Judiciary in the Nineties’ (1993) 19 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 323, 328. See also Peter 
Taylor, ‘Richard Dimbleby Lecture: The Judiciary in the Nineties’ (Lecture, BBC Education, 
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establish the innocence of an accused.34  He added a caveat that ‘the order for 
disclosure does not mean that the privilege has come to an end: it could be cited 
in any related civil proceedings’.35  
 
Baroness Mallalieu, who participated in the 1994 parliamentary debate alongside 
Lord Taylor CJ, reiterated the Benthamic caution that the guilty should not be 
able to get away with their crimes while the innocent are wrongly jailed.36 ‘Justice 
may be being done, but it is not necessarily being seen to be done, and justice 
must be seen to be believed’.37  It is little use having the best jurisprudence in the 
world if those who most need it cannot afford to tap into it.38  ‘Is this law? Is this 
reason? I think it is absolutely contrary to both’.39 Motivated by a desire to 
mitigate miscarriages of justice, she noted that the consequence of elevating legal 
procedures to the standing of evidence could culminate in the realisation of a 
widespread fear that more who are innocent of crime are found guilty of it.40 If 
public policy prevents disclosure, it does so in all circumstances with the 
exception of criminal proceedings where it is necessary to establish innocence.41    
 
Her Peers took the opposite view, with Lord Lloyd contending that the privilege 
was of overwhelming importance and the paramount public policy 
consideration.42 Lord Nicholls accepted that, while there were real difficulties in 
the exercise of judicial discretion, in the absence of principled answers as to how 
one should equate exposure to a minor civil claim against prejudicing a criminal 
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36 United Kingdom, above n 19, 520. 
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defendant, the prospect of a proportionality test was a ‘veritable will-o’-the-
wisp’:43    
 
There is no evident stopping place short of the balancing exercise 
being potentially available in support of all parties in all forms of 
court proceedings. This highlights the impossibility of the exercise. 
What is the measure by which judges are to ascribe an appropriate 
weight, on each side of the scale, to the diverse multitude of 
different claims, civil and criminal, and other interests of the client 
on the one hand and the person seeking disclosure on the other 
hand? 44  
 
B Bentham on Legal Professional Privilege and Criminal Justice 
 
Bentham and Wigmore were hesitant to adopt a one-size-fits-all policy with 
respect to the rule of legal professional privilege. As one of the earliest, and 
certainly most notable, detractors of legal professional privilege, Bentham 
despised the privilege on the basis that it was destructive and conducive to 
defeating justice. He espoused the view that the privilege was an indefensible 
obstruction which attached ‘to every man; one safe, unquestionable and ever 
ready accomplice for every crime imaginable’45 and advocated for its abolition.  
 
Forcibly setting out the injury that may inure, Bentham maintained the propriety 
of compelling lawyers to reveal the secrets entrusted to them by their clients.46 To 
his mind, the defects inherent in the privilege would be self-evident to the lay 
person, save for the fact that they were hidden from view by a screen of 
                                               
43 Ibid. 
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45 Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence: Specially Applied to English Practice, Vol 
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technicalities and inflated, if not false, rationalisations; and lawyers who were 
either blind to, or pretended not to see, the problem:  
 
A rule of law which, in the case of the lawyer, gives an express 
license to that wilful concealment of the criminal’s guilt, which 
would have constituted any other person an accessory in the 
crime, plainly declares that the practice of knowingly engaging 
one’s self as the hired advocate of an unjust cause, is, in the eye 
of the law, or (to speak intelligibly) in that of the law-makers, an 
innocent, if not a virtuous practice. But for this implied 
declaration, the man who in this way hires himself out to do 
injustice or frustrate justice with his tongue, would be viewed in 
exactly the same light as he who frustrates justice or does 
injustice with any other instrument.47  
 
He cited three specific tensions in support of his proposition. The first of these 
was rooted in his belief that the doctrine wrought more harm than good. Bentham 
reasoned that there were many a case in which communications were divulged 
under an assurance of their never reaching the ears of the judge, yet these 
revelations, if disclosed, would actually be of use to justice.48    
 
The second and third reasons advanced by Bentham for the wholesale abrogation 
of legal professional privilege were grounded in the propensity for miscarriages of 
justice to arise: ‘If there was one sort of case, in which, if compared to another … 
was particularly needful and important [of remedy], it would be a penal case … 
and in particular … a capital one, as compared with a non-penal one’.49 As the 
privilege obstructed the discovery of truth, Bentham expounded the need to 
demolish it, so as to ensure that all matters that were just and convenient to decide 
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were before the court. Bentham was opposed to privileges and rules of 
disqualification:50 
 
To borrow a phrase from Antony at Caesar’s funeral, Bentham 
‘came to bury’ privileges, ‘not to praise’ them … Only the 
‘natural’ system, permitting rational inquiry relatively free of 
exclusionary rules, could ensure rectitude of decision – accurate 
decision-making.51 
 
Committed to evaluating everything according to its consequences, Bentham 
suggested that the suffering of the guilty was greater than that of the wrongfully 
condemned, but qualified his proposition by conceding that the evil of unjust 
punishment far exceeded the commission of new crimes by acquitted felons.52 
Pitting the public interest in attaining finality and closure in legal matters against 
moral and ethical standards,53 Bentham urged judges to act upon the presumption 
of innocence and to consider acquittal as the more justifiable option than the error 
that condemns; for ‘in listening to the voice of humanity, we follow only that of 
reason’.54   
 
According to Twining, this argument provided the basis for retaining some heads 
of the privilege.55 Steyn LJ explained the English common law duty of disclosure 
in the following terms: ‘The objective of the criminal justice system is the control 
of crime, but in a civilised society that objective cannot be pursued in disregard of 
other values’.56 Even Thomas Denman, who was an ardent admirer of Bentham, 
advocated limited support for his rationale when he asserted that Bentham’s mode 
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of treating criminals and the accused accorded insufficient weight to their 
interests and safety.57    
 
Bentham foresaw the need for both parties to a proceeding to be in attendance 
and, crucially, to be heard. This, he argued, was the best way of arriving at the 
truth58 and an innocent client would have nothing to fear through divulging the 
truth, because nothing they said or did would devalue their word: ‘A reserve thus 
dictated by prudence and allowed by truth, would be the sole resource of a man of 
sincerity and honour’.59 Promoting the burden of proof over legal professional 
privilege as the most appropriate means of guarding the accused, Bentham noted 
that they still had the right to put the prosecution to proof and bore no legal 
burden in advancing a defence.  
 
‘The … privilege express[es] a value choice between protection of privacy and 
discovery of truth and the choice of either involves the acceptance of an evil 
betrayal of confidence or suppression of truth’.60 Bentham underemphasised the 
injustice of convicting the innocent and overemphasised the importance of 
detecting crime. Bentham weighed in his balance the inconvenience of convicting 
the innocent and argued that the danger inherent in acquitting criminals was of far 
greater social significance than wrongful imprisonment; for the consequence 
flowing from acquitting criminals was the commission of more crime, while the 
conviction of the innocent did not result in the further wrongful conviction of 
innocent people.61    
 
Given that legal professional privilege is equally deemed a corollary to the right 
to counsel, where the objective of ‘process’ is to protect the individual from the 
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overwhelming power of the state,62 rules on disclosure exemplify the extent of the 
state’s power to control information.63 The presumption of innocence and the 
prevention of wrongful conviction are cardinal principles of English 
jurisprudence.64 These values find expression in rules which require acquittal in 
the face of reasonable doubt, rules requiring the identity of informants to be 
divulged where necessary to prove innocence and the public interest that no 
innocent person be wrongfully convicted.65 The rationale underpinning the 
presumption of innocence was that ‘to place the burden of proof on a defendant 
was repugnant to ordinary notions of fairness’.66  
 
Bentham’s view on the presumption of innocence and the potential for the 
privilege to result in wrongful conviction was illustrated in the emphasis he 
placed on moral righteousness, with the main justification for affording protection 
to innocents expressed in terms of a fear of the public’s loss of confidence in the 
machinery of justice.67 For Bentham, it was a pyrrhic victory, whereby he and his 
works endured much criticism. His hypothesis regarding ‘deterrent influences’, 
specifically the inability of ‘a guilty person to … derive quite so much assistance 
from his law adviser in the way of concerting a false defence’,68 was criticised 
and generally regarded as more complicated than his argument suggested. 
Savaging Bentham’s presumption that even if the privilege did benefit the guilty 
just as well as the innocent, French scholar Pierre Dumont commented:  
 
[a]dmit the opinion of Mr Bentham … and the accused have no 
longer counsel; they’re surrounded by agents of justice and the 
police against whom they ought to be so much more on their guard 
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… There are so many spies and informers placed around the 
accused as … to suppress the defence entirely.69  
 
Charles McCormick cautioned that the legal profession need not yield fully to the 
force of Bentham’s argument because a client, whether innocent or guilty, may 
mistakenly think a fact is fatal to his cause and forego resort to counsel for advice 
in a fair claim.70 Despite drawing this level of scorn, Bentham was not alone in 
his criticism of abuses of justice and misinterpretations of the rules of law.  Lord 
Langdale MR, in Nias v Northern and Eastern Railway Co,  remarked on the 
importance of each side being able to ‘sift the conscience’ of the other, while in 
Flight v Robinson he admitted that he ‘found great difficulty in discovering any 
well-grounded principle upon which the exceptions to the general rule of 
discovery can be said to rest’.71 Rather, Lord Langdale MR noted that the 
privilege prevented parties getting to the truth and emphasised the need for all 
relevant material to be produced and all documents by which those facts may be 
manifested.72  
 
The arguments [justifying the privilege] … have assumed that 
concealment of the truth was, under the plausible names of 
protection or privilege, an object which it was particularly 
desirable to secure, forgetting ... that the principle upon which 
this Court has always acted, is to promote and compel the 
disclosure of the whole truth relevant to the matters in question.  
 
Phipson similarly affirmed that ‘it [is] an error to treat earlier authorities as if the 
words falling from judicial lips had the sanctity of statute’.73 The law remained a 
tangled mess of exceptions and distinctions interspersed with obscure 
technicalities developed in response to particular situations in different contexts.74 
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This may be owing to the fact that cases tended to rely almost entirely on 
authority for their results, with a single rationale employed to serve a number of 
different rules.75 Criminal procedure was a mass of technicalities which were little 
more than absurd and highly fragmented hangovers from the past.76 By the 1820s, 
judges interpreted the law in a legalistic fashion and had developed doctrines that, 
in Bentham’s view, protected the guilty even more than the innocent. By 1875, 
English litigation had become increasingly unprincipled. Failing to develop a 
clear alternative rationale, it lost sight of the original justification for its 
existence.77    
 
This was remedied to some extent in the common law of 1890, when Lord Esher 
MR in Marks v Beyfus recognised that  
 
if upon the trial of a prisoner the judge should be of the opinion 
that the disclosure … is necessary or right in order to show the 
prisoner’s innocence, then one public policy is in conflict with 
another public policy, and that which says that an innocent man is 
not to be condemned when his innocence can be proved is the 
policy that must prevail.78  
 
More recently, Lord Hailsham criticised the legal profession for its failure to cure 
this defect in the law.79 He recounted that, from early days until 1898, the 
applicable rule in criminal cases was that an accused person, however innocent, 
was invariably at increased risk of being wrongfully convicted of crimes because 
the truth was consistently withheld.80 This puts into practical effect the 
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observation of Lord Denning MR in Dallison v Caffery,81 where he cautioned that 
it would be reprehensible to conceal privileged communications from the court, 
rather than reveal material facts, statements and information which may show a 
prisoner to be innocent. A similarly cogent argument was advanced by Chafee:  
 
We can all agree that it is a misfortune when a lawsuit is won by 
the party who would lose it if all the facts were known, and that 
we increase the risk of such a miscarriage of justice whenever we 
allow an important witness to keep any helpful facts away from 
the judge and jury. Secrecy in court is prima facie calamitous, 
and it is permissible only when we are very sure that frankness 
will do more harm than good.82  
 
The ‘obligation to the public must dispense with the private obligation to the 
client’,83 for no private obligation to one’s client by virtue of legal professional 
privilege ‘can cancel that universal obligation of delivering justice to the public. 
Humanity is interested in discovery and the lawyer has an obligation to society in 
general, prior and superior to any obligation to the client to make it known’.84 
Frankel J concurred with this rhetoric when he asked whether criminal lawyers, 
who were specifically imbued with the duty of defending the rights of the 
accused, should habitually be able to thwart the search for truth.85 He declared 
that humanity was interested in discovery and the paramount objective of justice 
should be the disclosure of legally operative facts.86  
 
It is possible, therefore, to rebut the presumption that damage would arise from a 
limited exception to the rule. All arguments in favour of the privilege ceased to 
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operate at a certain point, namely, when innocence is on the line. No privilege is 
said to attach to documents in the control of a lawyer which, if produced, could 
establish the innocence or further the defence of an accused, with the public 
interest in preventing wrongful conviction so powerful as to necessitate the 
production of evidence in criminal prosecutions.  
 
Other commentators equally observed that no privilege could remain valid if it 
violated natural, human or international law; which is to say that a privilege 
granted to one person was unlawful if it ‘injured, destroyed, defeated or 
prejudiced the legal rights of another or condoned conduct that was contrary to 
fundamental laws’.87 Critics, including Ronald Goldfarb, contend that the 
privilege presents a dilemma, for ‘all confidentiality is questionable if the 
overriding goal is to get to the truth in an adversarial system’.88 
 
Even Lord Simon in Waugh could find no intrinsic justification as to why legal 
professional privilege should prevail if it was counter-indicated and declared that 
the rule was not absolute, but subject to many exceptions:89  
   
I can see no intrinsic reason why the one principle rather than the 
other should prevail in a situation where they are counter-
indicative. Neither is absolute: both' are subject to numerous 
exceptions. For example, if a document protected by legal 
professional privilege (or secondary evidence of it) has been 
obtained by the opposite party independently—even through the 
default of the legal adviser—even by " dishonesty—either will 
probably be admissible.  
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The numerous exceptions to the principle that all relevant 
evidence should be disclosed arise partly from historical reasons 
(the tensions between the courts of common law, where questions 
of fact were tried, and the Court of Chancery, where the remedy 
of discovery was developed), partly from considerations of 
justice, partly from wider social considerations…  
 
Lord Edmund-Davies added: ‘We should start from the basis that the public 
interest is, on balance, best served by rigidly confining within narrow limits the 
cases where material relevant to litigation may be lawfully withheld. Justice is 
better served by candour than by suppression’.90 
 
Ronald Desiatnik stated that ‘every communication or document may in some 
way affect a right of some [other] person’,91 particularly where the privilege 
weighs one wrongdoing against another. If fabrication is frowned upon by the 
law, why should concealment differ,92 particularly  
 
when a charge is so grave in its character and so fatal in its 
consequences that it most certainly ought to be proven by a clear 
preponderance of evidence? If the evidentiary bricks needed to 
build a defence are denied the accused, then … the defence has 
been abrogated as surely as it would be if a defence itself was held 
to be unavailable to him.93    
 
C Wigmore on Legal Professional Privilege and Criminal Justice 
 
Wigmore noted that, at first glance, the Benthamic philosophy seemed irresistible 
because it was premised on the notion that it was no harm to justice to deter a 
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guilty person from seeking legal advice.94 Wigmore defended legal professional 
privilege against the Benthamic attack by pointing out that, if it were abolished in 
the criminal context, the incidence of criminal defendants having recourse to legal 
advice would not reduce.95 Rather, one of two possible scenarios would come into 
play. In the first instance, guilty clients would be disinclined to confide 
incriminating admissions if these could later be elicited.96 Second, if one party 
was sufficiently cunning in the law to know what they may and may not safely 
reveal to their lawyer, it would give that party an advantage over their adversary 
and lead to an imbalance in representation.97   
 
Recognising that in much litigation there was often no clear means of delineating 
between guilt and innocence, moral right or wrong, Wigmore sympathised with 
the Benthamic premise that the main objective in adjudication was rectitude of 
decision.98 He pointed out, however, that no lawsuit was black and white.99  
Instead, decisions of contested rights were subject to abstract legal rules 
irrespective of the merits of the client’s personal conduct.100  He argued that, if 
Bentham’s ‘deterrence’ argument were applied in the civil context, it may 
culminate in a civil litigant with a good cause being dissuaded from consultation 
with his legal adviser by virtue of his own notions of good and bad, rather than 
the legal standpoint of right and wrong.101   
 
Wigmore noted that the concealment of client–counsel communications did not 
necessarily amount to abetting crime or encouraging moral delinquency.102 Even 
assuming a guilty client was unworthy of legal assistance or encouragement, the 
element of wrong is not always separated from an element of right. It did not 
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naturally follow that the actions of one party were wholly unlawful, while those 
of their adversary were wholly lawful.103    
 
Both parties in a significant proportion of cases experience an element of fear, 
irrespective of the legality of their actions, for ‘rarely is guilt and innocence a 
matter of black and white’.104 Although Wigmore contended that, in a certain 
percentage of cases, the privilege was accurate and well-founded in its 
application,105 he recognised the validity in Bentham’s argument and conceded 
that legal professional privilege was ‘misused by the clumsy and abused by the 
clever, [which] has, in practice, led to intolerable obstruction of truth’.106   
Wigmore decreed that, ‘when justice required the investigation of the truth, no 
person could declare they had any knowledge which was rightly private’.107  
 
While he contended that there was ‘no limit of time beyond which the disclosures 
might not be used to the detriment of the client’,108 Wigmore stated that ‘the 
judicial search for truth could not endure to be obstructed by a voluntary pledge 
of secrecy, nor was there any moral delinquency or public odium in breaking 
one’s pledge under force of law’.109 
 
Recognising that the disclosure of confidential communications could culminate 
in the revelation of information one would preferably keep quiet in consequence 
of enmity, disgrace or ridicule, Wigmore observed that such inconvenience was 
the contribution made in payment of one’s duties to society in its function of 
executing justice.110 He acknowledged that dangers lay in expanding the scope of 
the rule, which was designed, he stated, to secure the client’s confidence in the 
secrecy of his communications without fear that those conversations would ever 
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be exposed.111 Wigmore maintained that ‘very few clients [could] perceive 
wherein their strength lies. The weakness of the client was compensated by the 
lawyer’s strength; inaccuracy, confusion and looseness of thought balanced by 
precision and sound judgment’.112 Abiding by the conventional wisdom that 
absolute secrecy was necessary,113 the duty of confidentiality secured clients’ 
rights by enabling them to confidently gauge whether communications would 
later be protected from compelled judicial disclosure.114    
 
Wigmore noted that it was ‘difficult to see how any moral line [could] properly be 
drawn at that crude boundary, or how the law can protect a deliberate plan to defy 
the law and oust another person of his rights, whatever the precise nature of those 
rights may be’.115 He acknowledged the stigmatising effect of legal professional 
privilege, which, when invoked, entailed withholding important information from 
the court, which may do injustice to one or more of the litigants. Moreover, the 
tendency of human nature to mete out punishment, not necessarily because the 
defendant is, on this occasion, guilty, but because ‘their capture now makes them 
a deserving target for reprisal, flows like a deep-seated undercurrent which tugs at 
the jury, in or out of the courtroom’.116 
 
Wigmore postulated that no properly instructed and ethical lawyer would assist a 
guilty client to propound a false defence.117 Enabling the client to ‘make a clean 
breast of it’ is viewed as being in the public interest because it ensures complete 
disclosure and facilitates effective assistance by way of ensuring a proficient legal 
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underlying the duty of confidentiality sought to encourage full and frank disclosure. Ibid §2291, 
3204. 
112 John Wigmore, Treatise, above n 46, § 2291, 3199. 
113 Lloyd Snyder, ‘Is Attorney-Client Confidentiality Necessary?’ (2002) 15 Georgetown 
Journal of Legal Ethics 477, 484. 
114 Edward Imwinkelreid, ‘The New Wigmore: An Essay on Rethinking the Foundation of 
Evidentiary Privileges’ (2003) 83 Boston University Law Review 315, 320. 
115 John Wigmore, Treatise, above n 46, § 2298, 577. 
116 Ibid xviii. 
117 Max Radin, ‘The Privilege of Confidential Communication between Lawyer and Client’ 
(1928) 16 California Law Review 487, 487. 
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defence.118 This is a facile argument for it overlooks the fact that criminal law 
lawyers do not encourage clients to confide anything incriminatory, as knowledge 
of client guilt would give rise to ethical constraints in defending a guilty client 
who pleads ‘not guilty’.119      
 
The right to counsel in the criminal law context is linked to the notion of 
autonomy, client dignity120 and the presumption of innocence.121 No person 
‘should be required to defend a criminal charge, prosecuted by the State with its 
frightening power, without the assistance of an advocate trained in the law’.122 It 
is clear that the procedural limitations of the privilege are conducive to injustice 
through preventing full disclosure of all relevant facts.123 These inaccuracies 
‘make possible the conviction of persons whom the criminal law says are 
innocent’.124  
 
                                               
118 See Leslie Levin, ‘Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients 
Who Intend to Harm Others’ (1994) 47 Rutgers Law Review 81, 139. Proponents assert this to be 
a guarantee of the privilege because greater mischief may result from requiring or permitting 
disclosure than from rejecting evidence altogether. By contrast, several surveys undertaken in 
1962 (Yale Law Journal) 1977 (Tompkins County) and 1993 (Levin) established that lawyer 
apprehension surrounding the myth that clients would refrain from full and frank disclosure was 
unfounded. Out of twelve lawyers who actually had disclosed client information in order to 
prevent harm befalling an innocent victim, five reported that disclosure had resulted in a lesser 
degree of damage to their relationship with their clients than might be imagined, while one noted 
that their professional relationship with their client had been enhanced.  
119 Michael Proulx and David Layton, Ethics and Canadian Criminal Law (Irwin Law, 2001) 34. 
120 Ibid 171.  
121 Edward Greenspan and George Jonas, above n 32, 261–2. 
122 Gavin MacKenzie, Lawyers and Ethics: Professional Responsibility and Discipline (Thomson 
Carswell, 4th ed, 2006) 7. 
123 James Gardner, ‘A Re-evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege (Part I)’ (1963) 8 Villanova 
Law Review 279, 284. 




Ray Finkelstein stated that a lawyer should be imbued with a positive duty to 
assist the court to reach the truth.125  While the precise nature of this duty needs to 
be carefully defined, Finkelstein advocated for lawyers to disclose to the court the 
existence of material evidence, particularly if prejudicial, which would correct 
any misapprehension that may arise from witnesses’ testimony and to examine 
witnesses in a manner which aims to expose the truth.126 This argument was 
bolstered by support from contemporary courts and commentators including 
Caulfield and French JJ in the respective cases R v Barton127 and R v Ataou.128 
Both Barton and Ataou affirmed that legal professional privilege was designed to 
safeguard weighty and legitimate competing interests.   
 
1  Barton and Ataou: A Balancing Act 
 
In R v Barton,129 Justice Caulfield opined that he could not conceive that the law 
would permit a lawyer or other individual to screen from the jury information 
which, if disclosed, might enable a defendant to establish innocence or resist an 
allegation advanced by the Crown. The defendant was charged with offences 
committed during his employment as a legal executive with a law firm, 
specifically falsifying accounts and fraudulent conversion.130   Barton subpoenaed 
a lawyer of the firm to testify at his trial and furnish certain documents. The 
lawyer claimed the documents were protected by legal professional privilege.131    
 
Caulfield J’s reasoning is convincing and was central to Bentham’s own 
contention that the privilege should be abrogated altogether. Espousing a broad 
exception to the rule, Caulfield J held that a proportionality test applied in which 
                                               
125 Ray Finkelstein, ‘The Adversarial System and the Search for the Truth’ (2011) 37 Monash 
University Law Review 135, 143. 
126 Ibid. 
127 (1973) 1 WLR 115.  
128 [1988] QB 798. 





the privilege must yield if innocence is at stake and information might enable the 
defendant to prove innocence.132 This passage encapsulates this impression: 
  
I think the correct principle is this, and I think it must be restricted 
to these particular facts in a criminal trial, and the principle I am 
going to enunciate is not supported by any authority that has been 
cited to me, and I am just working on what I conceive to be the 
rules of natural justice. If there are documents in the possession or 
control of a solicitor, which, on production, help to further the 
defence of an accused man, then in my judgment, no privilege 
attaches. I cannot conceive that our law would permit a solicitor or 
other person to screen from a jury information which, if disclosed 
to the jury, would perhaps enable a man either to establish his 
innocence or to resist an allegation made by the Crown … If there 
are documents in the possession or control of a solicitor which, on 
production, help to further the defence of an accused man, then … 
no privilege attaches.133    
 
In making this distinction, Caulfield J championed a balancing approach to the 
privilege, rather than the exercise of judicial discretion. While failing to enunciate 
any authority for this proposition, Caulfield J derived the principle from the rules 
of natural justice.  He perceived that, if privileged communications could assist 
Barton to establish his innocence, this was sufficient grounds for destroying the 
rule, because it was a matter of public interest that no innocent person be 
convicted of a crime. Barton remained good authority for 22 years and was 
mirrored in R v Ataou,134 when French J endorsed the principle. He confirmed that 
legal professional privilege did not attach to documents in the control or 
possession of a lawyer if they could aid the defence of an accused man.135    
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In Ataou, the defendant made an inconsistent statement to his lawyer which was 
deemed admissible by the three-judge bench.136 Justice French expressed that 
legal professional privilege was an interest which ‘falls to be balanced against 
competing public interests’:137  
 
When a communication was originally privileged and in criminal 
proceedings privilege is claimed against the defendant by the client 
concerned or his solicitor, it should be for the defendant to show on 
the balance of probabilities that the claim cannot be sustained. That 
might be done by demonstrating that there is no ground on which 
the client could any longer reasonably be regarded as having a 
recognisable interest in asserting the privilege. The judge must then 
balance whether the legitimate interest of the defendant in seeking 
to breach the privilege outweighs that of the client in seeking to 
maintain it.138  
 
The decisions enunciated in both Barton and Ataou represent a departure from the 
16th-century principle of privilege which held that the rule was a status-based 
exception designed to safeguard the oath and honour of the lawyer.139 These 
judgments were in keeping with the ancient Roman justification for the rule, 
whereby it was merely customary, rather than mandatory, for a lawyer not to bear 
witness against his client. This view was reproduced in 19th-century English 
cases which deemed that ‘no privilege could be maintained with regards to facts 
known to a lawyer unprofessionally’,140 outside the scope of the cause in which 
they were engaged,141 or if they could prove their innocence.142    
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138 Ibid 807 (French J). 
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These passages explicitly employ Bentham’s rhetoric in an attempt to promote an 
independently existing opposition to the privilege. Caulfield J’s proposition was 
attractive because it assigned a priority to one fundamental right over another: the 
right that no one should be wrongfully convicted, with its ancillary right of access 
to evidence establishing innocence, prevailed over the right to invoke a claim of 
privilege.143 The expression of the principle in Barton and Ataou exemplified that 
the rule of non-disclosure was inferior to the interests of criminal defendants in 
securing access to confidential communications which may assist their defence.144   
 
Amongst the authorities considered by Derby, Lord Taylor CJ stated that Barton 
and Ataou had been wrongly decided. He opined that those cases ought to be 
overruled due to the overriding importance of the privilege.145 Substantially 
departing from precedent, Lord Taylor CJ stated that under the principle espoused 
by French J in Ataou, a judge would be required to first determine whether the 
client continued to have any recognisable interest in invoking the privilege and, if 
so, whether such interest outweighed the public interest that communications 
should be made available to the defence in criminal proceedings.146 Lord Taylor 
CJ argued that Barton contradicted the rule formulated in Calcraft v Guest,147 in 
which privileged communications continued to be protected so long as the client 
did not waive the privilege; for once privileged, always privileged.148 He added 
                                                                                                                                
142 In the 1854 case of United States v Quitman, Campbell J stated that innocence claimed the 
right of speaking, while guilt simultaneously invoked the security of silence and at once 
pronounced moral turpitude. See United States v Quitman, 27 F Cas 680 (CCED La, 1854) (No. 
16, 111); Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol XIII. (Butterworths, 4th ed, 1975) 124. 
143 Ian Dennis, The Law of Evidence (Sweet & Maxwell, 1999) 328.  
144 Colin Tapper, ‘Prosecution and Privilege’ (1996) 1 International Journal of Evidence & 
Proof 1, 20. 
145 [1996] AC 487, 501H (Lord Taylor). 
146 Ibid 493-494H (Lord Taylor). 
147 Calcraft v Guest [1898] QB 759. 
148 Calcraft v Guest [1898] QB 759, 761 (Lord Linley MR). 
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that the Ataou ruling was at odds with the view that legal professional privilege 
was the same in civil and criminal contexts.149  
 
The logical question is whether the justification for legal professional privilege 
had been undermined in the intervening years between Barton and Derby.150 It is 
critical to note that the respective judicial pronouncements of Caulfield and 
French JJ survived unchallenged for decades. Throughout this period, their 
respective rulings – in which each denied the privilege on the basis that natural 
justice dictated that communications in the possession or control of a lawyer were 
not privileged if they enabled an accused to establish his innocence or resist an 
allegation made by the Crown151 – caused no damage to the integrity of the justice 
system, nor did they undermine or impair the functioning of the broader legal 
system.152  
 
The principle was additionally defeated by other less compelling policies 
including ‘no recognisable interest’, which was considered by the Court of 
Appeal in R v Dunbar and Logan153 and R v Craig.154 Both of these cases were 
                                               
149 [1996] AC 487, 492F (Lord Taylor). 
150 ‘Privilege – Prosecution Witness Acquitted of Offence of Which Defendant Later Charged – 
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Offence’ (1996) 190 Criminal Law Review 193, 193. 
151 R v Barton (1973) 1 WLR 115, 118 (Caulfield J); R v Ataou [1988] QB 798, 807 (French J). 
Moreover, if the party claiming the privilege ceased to maintain an interest in it, the judge must 
balance whether the interest in breaching the privilege outweighs the interest in maintaining it. 
152 Aside from R. v Derby Magistrates' Court Ex parte B, the other cases to overrule R v Barton 
were:  R v Hewitt (Peter) (1992) 95 Cr App R 81, R v Clowes (Peter) (No.1) [1992] 3 Al ER 440, 
Re Barlow Clowes Gilt Managers Ltd [1992] Ch. 208, Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Criminal 
Proceedings) [1991] Fam 56, R v Central Criminal Court Ex parte  Randle [1991] 1 WLR 1087 
and R. v Governor of Brixton Prison Ex parte Osman [1991] 1 WLR. 281.   The cases which 
overruled R v Ataou included: R v Loizou [2006] EWCA Crim 1719, B v Auckland District Law 
Society [2003] UKPC 38, SCC v B [2000] Fam 76, General Mediterranean Holdings SA v Patel 
[2000] 1 WLR. 272, Saunders v Punch Ltd (t/a Liberty Publishing) [1998] 1 WLR 986, R v 
Clowes (Peter) (No.1) [1992] 3 All ER 440, Re Barlow Clowes Gilt Managers Ltd [1992] Ch 
208 and  Lui Mei Lin v R [1989] A.C. 288. 
153 (1982) 68 CCC (2d) 13. In this case, three defendants, L, D and Br, stood trial on three charges 
of first-degree murder. Prosecution witness G alleged that L admitted to her that he and D had 
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considered by Lord Taylor in Derby. In Dunbar, a distinction was drawn between 
the application of legal professional privilege in civil and criminal proceedings. 
The Dunbar Court observed that the adage applicable to civil cases of ‘once 
privileged, always privileged’155 presented a danger in criminal proceedings if it 
screened from the jury information which would benefit an accused.156  Martin, 
Lacourcière and Robins JJA observed that no rule of policy required the 
continued existence of legal professional privilege in criminal cases.157 
Furthermore, the privilege was not absolute if the client no longer had any ground 
on which to assert a recognisable interest in protecting the communications in 
question.158 The privilege had become spent.159 A balancing of interests fell in 
favour of admitting communications.  
 
The Dunbar Court applied Barton when it ruled that legal professional privilege 
must yield where maintaining it might shield from a jury information which 
would assist a defendant to establish their innocence.160 The court stated that the 
trial judge in Dunbar had erred in upholding legal professional privilege; for, the 
moment a relevant written document fell into the second defendant’s hands, the 
                                                                                                                                
carried out the murders as a favour to Br. Both testified in their defence and denied committing the 
crimes. L raised the defence of alibi. At the conclusion of their testimony, Br also decided to give 
evidence; however counsel for L had previously acted for Br prior to the preliminary hearing. 
Counsel for L stated that the canons of professional ethics precluded him from continuing to 
represent L. Although new counsel was to be appointed, the trial judge refused to allow L time to 
instruct him. The trial judge also advised counsel for D not to put questions to Br about matters to 
which legal professional privilege attached. In this regard, he ruled that two written statements 
made by Br and supplied to his former counsel, who went on to act for L, were privileged. A third 
statement written by Br was also deemed privileged despite it being found in Br’s prison cell and 
taken by his co-accused, D, without permission.  
154 [1975] 1 NZLR 597. 
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156 R v Dunbar and Logan (1982) 68 CCC (2d) 13, 104 (Martin JA). 
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158 Ibid. See also R v Craig [1975] 1 NZLR 597. 




privilege was waived and the first defendant no longer had any basis upon which 
to assert a recognisable interest.  
 
This position was adopted by Cooke J in the New Zealand case of R v Craig.161 
Cooke J commented that legal professional privilege could not survive if there 
was no ground on which the client could be regarded as having a recognisable 
interest in it.162 The phrase ‘a recognisable interest’ was not expressly defined in 
either case; however, an inference may be drawn that legal professional privilege 
did not persist indefinitely but weakened at the conclusion of proceedings.  
 
In regards to Dunbar and Logan, the Derby Court stated that the notion of 
weighing competing interests was unacceptable on the basis that a client may 
have an ongoing interest in non-disclosure which could be outweighed by another 
interest if the court, in its discretion, overrode the rule.163 Applying this reasoning 
to the present case, Lord Nicholls stated that no rational person, on finding 
themselves in the circumstances with which Brooks was confronted, would seek 
to maintain confidentiality. However, as A had been acquitted, A remained 
entitled to claim the privilege as a means of refusing to divulge communications 
which would infer guilt.164  
 
The Derby Count contended that Craig was similarly flawed and speculated that 
the ‘no recognisable interest’ argument must have been raised in numerous cases 
in which the privilege was upheld despite the client ceasing to have grounds for 
asserting a claim, yet it was never suggested that this might make a difference.165 
It has subsequently been stated that, ‘as long as the rule is based on its present 
premise and is accepted as being for its present purpose, the rule must be accepted 
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as absolute. There can be no half-way house (to accommodate, for example, the 
witness without a recognisable interest)’.166  
 
Demonstrating that competing interests incurred by the application of the 
privilege are most keenly felt in criminal law, Lord Hailsham announced in that 
same case: ‘Any attempt to withhold relevant evidence … must be justified and 
requires to be jealously scrutinised’.167  These judicial pronouncements highlight 
that other societal values of competing and compelling interest tip the scales in 
favour of disclosure; with the primary principle being to the effect that the 
presumption of innocence and the protection of the innocent should be paramount 
considerations.  
 
Any fixed rule devalues Lord Taylor’s proclamation that judicial discretion is a 
vital and realistic safeguard for an accused.168 Derby sought to frustrate and defeat 
the great principle of access to justice by effectively according protection to every 
client–counsel communication. The rhetoric of Lord Taylor in Derby is 
undermined by the creation of exceptions which would enable a defendant to 
establish their innocence or help further their defence.169  
 
2  Legal Professional Privilege and the Presumption of Innocence 
 
This ‘golden thread’ of English criminal law is directly tied to the fundamental 
presumption of innocence, yet ethical issues abound regarding the limits and 
application of the privilege and whether or not its existence hinged on a tenuous 
link, with a price to pay for the confidentiality of communications. Lord 
Brougham earlier expressed that lawyers had less interest in diminishing the 
amount of business in the courts because there were not many who gained more 
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by it, and to whom abuses were more profitable.170 James Jackson, the ‘cultivated 
classical legal scholar’171 and later Chief Justice, borrowed from Bentham when 
he claimed that the legal profession engaged in unsavoury practices that were 
incompatible with elevated integrity or even common honesty. The concealment 
of truth and perversion of evidence were supposed to be the great attainments of 
legal ambition.172 Francis Bacon added that some practitioners engaged in ‘nimble 
and sinister tricks and shifts, in which they prevented the plain and direct course 
of the courts and brought justice into obliques and lines and labyrinths’.173 
 
According to Fred Rodell, the law’s prestige lay in the ability of lawyers to ‘blend 
technical competence with plain and fancy hocus-pocus to make themselves 
masters of their fellow men … To guide us, incidentally, through a maze of 
confusing gestures and formalities that lawyers have created’.174  He added that 
‘laws’ practically invited lawyers to write their own ticket, and labelled the legal 
trade a high-class racket which actually believed in its own nonsense’.175  
Christine Corcos reached the same conclusion. She pointed out that the privilege 
provided additional incentive for clients with something to hide to hire lawyers so 
as retain control over communications and not to risk their secrets being 
compromised or divulged. ‘The legal system exists to protect those in power … 
[who] conspire to conceal the truth (which would lead to justice), and only the 
exposure of their scheme … can reveal the truth to society’.176 
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The integrity of the legal profession has been periodically questioned in public 
discourse. In Bleak House, Dickens described the absurdity of the 19th-century 
legal profession:  
 
The one great principle of the English law is to make business for 
itself. There is no other principle distinctly, certainly, and consistently 
maintained through all its narrow turnings. Viewed by this light it 
becomes a coherent scheme, and not the monstrous maze the laity are 
apt to think it. Let them but once clearly perceive that its grand 
principle is to make business for itself at their expense.177 
 
III  LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE: WEIGHING THE HARM TO INNOCENCE   
 
Wigmore conceded that the benefits availed by the privilege were doubtful178  and 
‘when the course of justice require[d] the investigation of truth, no man ha[d] any 
knowledge that [was] rightly private’.179 He did however reinforce the ‘winning at 
all costs’ argument when he commented that  
 
the right to use a rule of procedure or evidence as one plays a trump 
card, or draws to three aces, or holds back a good horse til the home 
stretch is a distinctive result of the common law moral attitude 
towards parties in litigation.180  
                                               
177 Charles Dickens, Bleak House, Vol II (Chapman & Hall, 1911) 128. 
178 John Wigmore, cited in Vincent Walkowiak, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Civil 
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that it defines this unmistakable axiom. When the course of justice requires investigation of the 
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Much to the chagrin of Frankfurter J, who pronounced that judges were not called 
to referee prize fights, but were functionaries of justice,181 Wigmore used the 
analogy of justice as ‘sport’182 and the concept of litigation as a game of skill – 
with legal professional privilege stationed as goalkeeper of client secrets – when 
he revealed that the principle was imperative for ‘winning the game of litigation 
irrespective of the ascertainment of truth’.183    
 
Conscious of the fact that innocent criminal defendants had legitimate rights,  
Wigmore later reversed his stance when he stated that ‘the privilege of secret 
consultation is intended only as an incidental means of defence, and not as an 
independent means of attack, and to use it in the latter character is to abandon it in 
the former’.184 Acknowledging that legal professional privilege may theoretically 
operate to protect lawyers against divulging the wrongs of deceitful clients,185 
Wigmore contended that, if the law could compel a lawyer to break his client’s 
confidence, it would create an unhealthy moral state and double-minded attitude, 
with the lawyer operating in ‘dual and inconsistent capacities as confidant and 
revealer of his client’s secrets’.186  
 
Wigmore believed that ‘The client must state all the facts to his lawyer and leave 
him to form his own judgment’.187 To accomplish this object, it was of great 
societal importance and a reflection of the public interest that anyone who desired 
to obtain sound legal advice should be able to do so under conditions which 
                                               
181 Johnson v United States, 333 US 46, 54 (1948) (Frankfurter J). 
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induced full and frank disclosure.188  While failing to discuss the mechanisms 
through which legal professional privilege benefitted or advanced justice, 
Wigmore observed that access to professional legal advice was as important for 
clients seeking to avoid litigation as it was for those pursuing it. He also noted 
that litigation often ensued when clients failed or refused to seek legal advice until 
they could no longer avoid having resort to the courts.189 This demonstrates that 
Wigmore attached specific importance to legal professional privilege in the realm 
of litigation.  
 
According to Stephen Saltzburg, the Wigmorean paradigm did not require 
evidence that a client’s need for confidential communications was essential; 
rather it favoured a narrow cost–benefit analysis which weighed the harm to 
litigation more heavily than the harm to other values.190 Through encouraging 
clients to communicate information they would otherwise withhold from their 
lawyers, confidentiality was deemed to enhance the quality of legal representation 
by building trust between lawyer and client. It ensured that no one was thrown on 
their own legal resources; for ‘the deprivation of legal counsel is illiberal and 
discounts the dignity of the individual and their ability to market and defend their 
autonomy’.191    
 
Wigmore confirmed that, if the privilege met a specified criteria, it must be 
classed as absolute.192 In this context, the term ‘absolute’ inferred that judges 
should be dissuaded from employing a balancing test to decide whether a party’s 
need for disclosure of confidential communications outweighed the public interest 
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in maintaining legal professional privilege.193  This is congruent with the 
approach taken by Lord Taylor in Derby, where his ruling resolved the clash of 
principles in favour of the paramountcy of legal professional privilege.194 The 
Derby Court did not view the privilege as a question of balancing the interests of 
Brooks against A, despite Brooks’ interest in not being wrongfully convicted 
outweighing A’s interest in not being convicted of a crime for which he had 
previously been acquitted. The consequence for A, while unfortunate, was not as 
unpalatable as the prospect of an innocent person being falsely imprisoned.  
 
Lord Taylor CJ declined to craft further exceptions to the privilege, even if doing 
so could establish innocence or aid in the defence of an accused individual. The 
House of Lords made no mention of this equally integral principle in English law. 
The prevailing interest is protecting innocent people from criminal conviction 
when their innocence can be proven.195 Broadening, without exception, the rule of 
legal professional privilege, the Derby Court invalidated Wigmore’s articulation 
and weakened the force of the doctrine. It now usurped the central truth-finding 
function of the courts and impaired the fairness and accuracy of the trial process. 
The balancing test was rendered obsolete and the nature of legal professional 
privilege placed beyond doubt.  
 
Despite his ‘absolutist’ stance, Lord Taylor CJ called for a review of legal 
professional privilege and acknowledged that the law was in an unsatisfactory 
state:196 ‘We have a system of justice, but it is marred as we all know. In both the 
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criminal and civil fields, we need changes to streamline our administration and 
modernise its procedures’.197  Lord Taylor CJ conceded that, at the conclusion of 
trials, judges may overpitch dicta when summing up.198 He cautioned that 
restraint should be exerted when making comment on cases over which they 
presided because it was in everyone’s interest that the administration of justice 
functioned well and enjoyed the respect and confidence of the public.199 Lord 
Taylor CJ admitted that, ‘unfortunately, a single remark from a judge can be 
picked up and is put into a litany of such remarks which is trotted every time a 
new one arises’.200 This has proven true of the sweeping, albeit fallible, 
pronouncement in Derby.  
 
While the Derby decision ‘may well be expected to lead to hard cases … and hard 
cases may cause injustice to individuals’,201 Coutts applauded Lord Taylor’s 
precise and succinct articulation that if but one exception were permitted to the 
privilege, it would destroy the rule itself and the basis of confidence, this being 
the purpose it served.202 By contrast, Lord Hobhouse criticised the dicta of Lord 
Taylor when he declared that ‘at the least some, and, more probably, all of these 
premises would benefit from further examination’:203  
 
 
The question to be decided falls within a very narrow compass and 
since this House is differing from unanimous decisions of the courts 
below I will shortly state in my own words my reasons … The 
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question is one of statutory construction. It is now accepted for the 
purposes of this litigation that the documents in respect of which the 
right to demand production remains in dispute contain or may 
contain information relevant to a tax liability to which Morgan 
Grenfell may be liable or its amount and that they are documents 
which are subject to legal professional privilege (advice privilege) 
which has not been waived. It is likewise accepted that the character 
of the privilege is that described in the speech of Lord Taylor of 
Gosforth in your Lordships' House in Reg v Derby Magistrates' 
Court, ex parte 'B' [1996] AC 487: its character is absolute and - 
        .... if a balancing exercise was ever required in the case of legal 
professional privilege, it was performed once and for all in the 16th 
century, and since then has applied across the board in every case, 
irrespective of the client's individual merits." 
At the least, some and, more probably, all of these premises would 
benefit from further examination but they have not been the subject 
of argument on the present appeal. The question of construction is 
therefore whether the statute empowers the Revenue to require the 
delivery up to them of documents notwithstanding that they are 
covered by legal professional privilege. 
There is no indication in the above-quoted material that Lord Hobhouse agreed 
with Lord Taylor. At no stage does His Honour say words to the effect of ‘I am of 
the view…’, ‘I agree…’ or ‘I concur…’.  He simply articulates that ‘At the least, 
some and, more probably, all of these premises would benefit from further 
examination’. Lord Hobhouse may have concurred with Lord Taylor overall, 
however on this particular point, he dissented.  
 
Steve Uglow condemned as ‘bizarre’ and ‘unnecessarily wide’ the suggestion that 
courts would not be justified in applying a balancing approach to compare the 
public interest in legal professional privilege with the public interest in the liberty 
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of an individual.204 Just outcomes result from performing the balancing exercise, 
not from dispensing with it.  
 
Winning, though, cannot be the only goal of a trial. Lord Taylor CJ forcefully 
remarked that, in criminal proceedings, ‘a trial should not be a game’.205 He 
added: ‘I do not myself care for analogies which liken our law and legal 
procedures to a game of any sort’.206 Criminal justice proceedings carry grave 
consequences, including, in some jurisdictions, death. In England, life 
imprisonment is the harshest sentence imposed on a convicted party. As the 
deprivation of life, liberty and dignity are implicated in criminal matters, the 
logical inference is that legal professional privilege somehow enhances the 
protection accorded to an accused.  
 
The operation of legal professional privilege in criminal law is a double-edged 
sword which can ‘be found to lend the benediction of the law to either side of any 
case’.207  The following example of Meehan v H M (Adv)208demonstrates that the 
law societies of England and Scotland did not regard the privilege as absolute 
where it had the potential to harm not only the parties to criminal proceedings, but 
the legal profession and public justice.  
 
A Meehan v H M (Adv) 
 
In Meehan v H M (Adv),209 Scottish lawyer Joseph Beltrami was confronted with 
a dilemma when his client, William McGuiness, confided that an innocent man, 
Patrick Meehan, was serving life imprisonment for the 1969 Ayr death of Rachel 
Ross, whom McGuiness had murdered in concert with another. While McGuiness 
remained free, Meehan was voracious in protest and exalted his innocence, 
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declaring that the trial judge, Lord Grand, had ‘made a terrible mistake’210 in 
convicting him for a crime he did not commit. The moral and ethical dilemma 
faced by Beltrami was whether to honour his professional code of conduct, 
‘knowing that confidences between lawyer and client were inviolable’211 or face 
the wrath of the inner sanctum of his profession by breaking a confidence and 
revealing what McGuiness had confided to him.  
 
The privilege effectively tied Beltrami’s hands and sealed his mouth. Beltrami 
remained ‘bound by a golden rule that could not be broken’.212 The consequence, 
if he spoke out, may have resulted in prejudice to his client and would have 
exposed Beltrami to possible disciplinary sanctions under Scotland’s Ethics 
Committee. Instead he was ‘well and truly saddled with the crushing burden’213 of 
keeping secret the true identity of Ross’s killer. With devotion to one’s client 
usurping a devotion to the truth, Beltrami, who represented both Meehan and 
McGuiness, was anguished during the year of 1973, and frequently in the next 
two years, when McGuiness would unexpectedly arrive at his office: 
 
A murderer would appear in my office, always unannounced, 
never by appointment, and he would see only me. He would sit 
across the desk from me, tormenting me – although, in fairness, 
this was not his purpose – with more and more of his dark and 
dramatic secret. He and another man had been responsible for the 
murder of an elderly Jewish woman during a robbery at her 
bungalow home some four years earlier. Neither of them had 
been caught, although the man in front of me had escaped capture 
by the proverbial whisker. Now here he was, sitting in my office 
as a client, slowly dripping more and more information that an 
innocent man, Patrick Meehan, had been jailed for that murder. 
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Indeed he was saying more than that ... he was virtually telling 
me that he was the murderer.214    
 
Entrusted with such a damaging truth, Beltrami found it to be ‘the most agonising 
part of the case, because I had all this information and detail given to me by 
McGuinness, but I could do nothing about it. It was very frustrating’.215 
Beltrami’s predicament was ‘theoretically challenging and, as a practical matter, 
agonisingly difficult’.216 To whom did he owe an overarching obligation and 
whose interests should he legitimately advance? He was essentially forced to play 
God, no matter what choice he made.217    
 
Particularly where the freedom of an accused is in jeopardy in a criminal 
proceeding, it may seem somewhat paradoxical that the administration of justice 
should accord priority to confidentiality of client–counsel communications over 
the interests of a fair trial. The extent to which Beltrami was prohibited from 
making disclosure meant that the interests of the victim were sacrificed in favour 
of preserving the client’s confidences even though the client’s purpose was 
wrongful. Helpless, and hampered by the strict rules of legal professional 
privilege,218 Beltrami could do little more than bide his time until 1976 when 
McGuiness died. Genuinely believing his duty to his client had terminated at 
death, the lawyer, with consent from the executor of the estate,219 spoke out in an 
attempt to clear Meehan’s name.  
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The law societies of England and Scotland220 found that Beltrami had not 
breached the rules pertaining to legal professional privilege on the grounds that he 
had obtained the executor’s consent prior to disclosing the revelation. It appeared 
that the privilege could, in certain instances, be eroded when permission had been 
obtained, or in defence of an accusation levelled against a lawyer.  Defence 
counsel Nicholas Fairbairn QC admitted:221   
 
If Meehan is innocent, I do not think it would be other than very 
harmful to the public interest if the wrong conviction of a 
notorious convict carried with it the conviction of a police officer 
or officers of long standing and devoted service.222    
 
Despite his endeavours to set an innocent man free, Beltrami was forbidden from 
revealing his client’s confidences during his client’s lifetime, with his duty 
turning on both legal professional privilege and the duty of client confidentiality 
owed to McGuinness. The miscarriage of justice in Meehan was entirely 
attributable to the suppression of confidential communications, yet ‘there can be 
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no crueller tyranny than that exercised under cover of law and with the colours of 
justice’.223 Exemplifying that justice can be distorted; legal professional privilege 
tolerates a ‘probability of error’ for the sake of procedural convenience and 
presupposes what Bentham so drastically censured.224 On one hand, it fulfils the 
Benthamic caution that deceitful clients with something to hide can confide in 
their lawyers, while also obstructing wrongfully accused defendants from 
accessing information which could help prove their innocence.  
 
This argument is reminiscent of another case considered by the Derby Court; 
namely D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children.225 In that 
case, Lord Simon remarked on the putative moral worth of the privilege when he 
stated that the public interest in ensuring no innocent person was wrongfully 
convicted was so powerful that it prevailed over the general public interest, 
resulting in the need for evidence to be produced upon request to establish 
innocence in a criminal prosecution.  
 
The public interest that no innocent man should be convicted of 
crime is so powerful that it outweighs the general public interest 
that sources of police information should not be divulged: so that, 
exceptionally, such evidence must be forthcoming when required to 
establish innocence in a criminal trial.226  
 
The presumption of innocence dictated the formulation of a permanent exception, 
with the onus falling to the accused to show that the privileged communications 
came within the exemption and could be put to forensic use and that the conduct 
of the defence would be impeded if the information was withheld. Commentators 
like Deborah Rhode, Patrick O’Hagan, Zuckerman, Dodek and Fischel question 
why confidentiality is placed on a pedestal at all, particularly when greater 
emphasis should rightfully be placed on encouraging disclosure to exonerate the 
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falsely accused.227  Zuckerman observed that, in the last few years, courts have 
expanded the privilege to the point of a break with the needs of the administration 
of justice.228 He added the no further change would be seen until all levels of the 
judiciary were persuaded to embrace the overriding objective that combines the 
requirements of proportionality and expedition with the need to do justice on the 
merits.229    
 
Rhode expressed that the privilege failed to take adequate account of the harms 
produced as a result of non-disclosure, including wrongful convictions to ordinary 
citizens,230 while O’Hagan pointed out that clients facing the unpleasant prospect 
of litigation would be greatly assisted if courts could compel the lawyer 
representing the other side to divulge communications in the event proceedings 
arose.231    
 
Dodek proffered the notion that clients engaged in criminal proceedings should be 
entitled to a ‘status-quo-plus’ privilege.232 This would have the widest possible 
scope and be subject to exceptions in only the most compelling circumstances.233 
Dodek recommended that, once a defendant demonstrated that non-disclosure of 
privileged communications jeopardised his innocence,234 the court would be 
required to implement a threshold in which it revealed only as much information 
as was necessary to show proof of innocence.235    
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It is reasonable to question whether such damage would in fact result from a 
limited exception to the rule. Given that justice is equally about ‘dedication to the 
public good’,236 Fischel argued that society would benefit far greater if legal 
processes facilitated, rather than hindered, disclosure.237 To phrase it another way: 
‘Justice may be blind, but the public is not’.238 Abella asks whether the legal 
profession can, in good conscience, ‘resist experimenting with old systems of 
justice in order to find better ways to deliver it’.239  She suggests the need for 
reform, whereby outmoded practices are repealed and the public good is put 
before money and prestige.240 Abella adds that the legal profession’s monopoly 
places them in a fiduciary relationship with the general public, whereby they are 
gatekeepers and groundskeepers of the law: ‘Process is the map, lawyers are the 
drivers, law is the highway, and justice is the destination’.241  
 
‘Reclaiming justice sometimes requires speaking truth to power’242 and, 
depending on the set of facts, a purportedly absolute privilege may have to yield 
in either civil or criminal matters.243 According to Imwinkelried, the public 
interest in trying and solving crimes outweighs the right to privacy underpinning 
legal professional privilege.244 Michael Asimow summed up his and other 
lawyers’ views that ‘justice is process’ when he wrote: ‘[The] general public and 
lawyers differ about whether justice means truth or justice means process.’245  
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‘0.2% per cent of the community believe that justice is process’.246 This section 
has highlighted that, ultimately, when the legal system does not reflect 
community values and limits the ability of wrongfully accused criminal 
defendants to access justice, it loses its legitimacy.247    
 
Sectors of both the legal profession and the general public248 have come to believe 
that process is justice; yet, in truth, ‘process’ may be the biggest obstacle to 
justice.249 Parkhurst v Lowten250 held that, in regard to facts known to a lawyer 
unprofessionally, ‘refusal to answer was in itself a breach of trust’. These 
methods of avoiding or ignoring knowledge of client guilt pose problems.251 The 
doctrine of legal professional privilege suffers from an inherent instability 
wherein ‘it straddles a fault line in the surface of the law, where two opposing 
tectonic themes in its basic structure meet’.252    
 
Presenting a conflict between two desirable policy goals, legal professional 
privilege operates at the expense of substantial justice both as a defence and an 
exception to the rule that relevant evidence must be admitted. Some justices have 
declared that, even if the House of Lords found a previous decision wrong, ‘the 
fact that they no longer had to regard previous decisions as absolutely binding did 
not mean that whenever they thought a previous decision wrong, it should be 
reversed’.253 It was deemed to be in the general interest of certainty that the 
decision, however erroneous or anomalous, must stand unless there were very 
good grounds to overturn it.254  
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Tapper argued that ‘it remained to be considered whether or not some derogation 
in favour of one accused of a serious crime who requires access to the evidence in 
order to develop his defence is justifiable, and, if so, upon what terms’.255 
McCormick stated that ‘the solution worked out by the courts in England … [was] 
to allow discovery’,256 although the court may, in its discretion, rule against 
divulging information even if it tends to prove an accused’s evidence.257 As a 
result, the doctrine provides no discernible benefit to the wrongfully accused; 
however its application turns critical when the probative strength of exculpatory 
evidence remains out of reach. Phipson noted that the privilege in criminal cases 
had long been confusing due to the inconsistent application of principles ‘which 
should logically be no different as between civil and criminal cases’.258   
 
B Legal Professional Privilege in Civil Litigation 
 
Distinguishing certain aspects of civil and criminal litigation, Lord Taylor CJ 
noted that it was ‘quite wrong to assume that all disputes which came before the 
civil courts were commercial enterprises with deep pockets’.  While the interests 
at stake in civil law may overlap with those in criminal law, particularly where 
child welfare or political asylum are concerned, civil proceedings are interested in 
resolving a range of interests between private parties, organisations and 
corporations.  The public interest is served by ‘ensuring fairness in the discovery 
process’ and encouraging the settlement of disputes.259 
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Whether in regard to corporate or commercial transactions, legal professional 
privilege is said to hold a deep significance, with its existence justified through its 
ability to enable clients to obtain effective legal advice and ascertain their rights 
and responsibilities.260 It also ensures that the rule of law is accessible to those it 
governs; for ‘the law must be capable of being obeyed and guiding the behaviour 
of its subjects’.261 Gavin Mackenzie commented that ‘stirring proclivities for 
competition and rivalry’ was ‘of dubious social value’.262 Neil Williams QC 
remarked that civil litigation, like its criminal counterpart, is conducted in the 
spirit of a game; governed by rules known to the parties in advance which are no 
less important than the outcome of the contest.263 Just as players in a game can 
decide when to reveal their hand, litigants are free to select the most opportune 
time to present their evidence and it would hardly be expected that the system 
would aid them to obtain evidence from an adversary.264   
 
C  R v Inland Revenue Commissioners; Ex parte Taylor (No 1) 
 
In The Queen v The Commissioners of Inland Revenue Ex parte Thomas Patrick 
Denton Taylor, that Lord Taylor concurred with Nicholls LJ that it would be 
unwise to ‘say anything which might be thought to tie the hands of the judge’.265 
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This case evidenced that the boundaries of legal professional privilege were not 
always clearly drawn and the court went so far as to admit that the correct answer 
eluded them. The court conceded that, in future cases, a different outcome may 
commend itself to the judiciary when examining legal professional privilege in a 
clearer light.266 Leaving the door open to the extent mentioned, he concluded that 
the applicant should not be proscribed from renewing his application for 
disclosure if such an eventuality arose.267 This was at odds with the Derby 
judgment which effectively bound and gagged the judiciary from engaging in any 
form of balancing exercise. 
 
In Inland Revenue, the solicitor applicant, Thomas Patrick Taylor, specialised in 
tax avoidance and tax mitigation schemes for corporate and private clients. Taylor 
appealed a judicial review decision in which Farquharson J refused to grant 
inspection of two documents appended to an affidavit sworn by Mr Roberts, 
Under-Secretary in the Inland Revenue Office.268 These documents, dated 8 
September 1986, detailed investigations into Taylor’s personal and professional 
tax affairs pursuant to s 20(2) of the Taxes Management Act 1970 (UK).  
 
The notice sent from the Revenue Office to Taylor required him to deliver a large 
class of documents including books of account, business correspondence and all 
other records relating to his practice as a solicitor for the period 1979 to 1985.269   
Taylor contended that if he were to comply with the s 20 notice to furnish 
correspondence, it would enable the Revenue Office to conduct a ‘fishing 
expedition’ in hopes of gaining information on the affairs of his corporate clients 
and the schemes on which he had advised them.270 Calling on 16th-century case 
law, Thomas Taylor submitted that a claim of legal professional privilege could 
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not be sustained by virtue of the fact that litigation was not anticipated at the time 
of the report coming into existence.271    
 
While this justification was bolstered by the early English authorities of Lee v 
Markham,272 Breame v Breame,273 Windsor v Umberville274 and Berd v 
Lovelace,275 it will be recalled that Pearse v Pearse,276 Minet v Morgan277 and 
Calcraft v Guest278 subsequently established that ‘a connection with litigation was 
not a prerequisite for legal professional privilege to attach to confidential 
communications’.279    
 
The House of Lords, constituted by Taylor LJ, together with O’Connor and 
Nicholls LJJ, determined that the Revenue Office was entitled to seek legal 
advice, including any legal consequences which may foreseeably arise from 
issuing the s 20 notice.280 In presenting the first judgment, O’Connor LJ stated 
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that it was pertinent to consider the question posed by Rule 13 of Order 24; 
specifically, whether, in the circumstances, disclosure of the 8 September 1986 
report was necessary for disposing fairly of the matter. According to O’Connor 
LJ, the right answer to that is: ‘I don’t know’.281    
 
The uncertainty of O’Connor LJ led him to review the judgments of Lord Diplock 
in O’Reilly v Mackman,282 Lord Wilberforce in Inland Revenue Commissions v 
National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd.283 and Glidewell 
LJ in the unreported case of R v Secretary of State for Home Affairs; Ex parte 
Joseph Harrison.284 Where Lord Wilberforce stated that, in a proceeding brought 
against the Revenue Office, no court would consider ordering discovery in the 
hope of eliciting some impropriety,285 Lord Diplock confirmed that Order 24, 
Rule 8 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1894 contained express provision for 
discovery of documents.286 Although it was not an automatic process, discovery 
was obtainable whenever, and to the extent that, the tenets of justice dictated.287    
 
Glidewell LJ similarly stated that the question in issue concerned whether a duty 
of fairness was owed, in that case by the Home Secretary to Harrison, which 
would oblige disclosure to Harrison of any material containing comment adverse 
to him. Referring to Order 24 of the Supreme Court Rules, Glidewell LJ 
concluded that, in the circumstances, it may be right to order discovery. However, 
if no basis existed for suggesting that an affidavit was deficient in some respect, it 
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would be improper to permit discovery except to challenge the accuracy of the 
document.288    
 
O’Connor LJ accepted that if, in judicial review proceedings, an affidavit 
referenced documents, it then followed that production should be granted upon 
request.289 He applied the judgment of Glidewell LJ and noted that, in this 
instance, Taylor had failed to establish that disclosure was necessary for the fair 
disposal of the case.290 He ruled that the correspondence in question remained 
protected by legal professional privilege because the affidavit had not been 
impugned.  
 
Lord Taylor, in concurring with the Court’s decision, therefore supported the 
findings that a degree of doubt existed with respect to the application of legal 
professional privilege, such that no ruling should be absolute or fixed so as to tie 
the hands of the judge.291 Moreover, he advocated judicial discretion as a vital and 
realistic safeguard for the accused292 and recognised the possibility that 
subsequent proceedings may necessitate a contradictory finding based on the 
individual merits of the case. Lord Taylor accepted that no applicant should be 
precluded from pursuing discovery of confidential communications even if 
previous attempts were denied. 
 
Despite the findings of the Court in Inland Revenue, Daniel Fischel argued that, in 
civil law, legal professional privilege has little to nil application293 because the 
incentive it offered to clients was not advocacy for its own sake.294 Rather, 
Fischel pinpointed the probability of winning as being a highly motivating 
                                               
288 R v Secretary of State for Home Affairs; Ex parte Joseph Harrison [1988] 3 All ER 86.  
289 The Queen v The Commissioners of Inland Revenue Ex parte Thomas Patrick Denton Taylor 
[1988] WL 624291, 916a (O’Connor LJ). 
290 Ibid. 
291 Ibid. Lord Taylor agreed with each of the judgments delivered. 
292 United Kingdom, above n 19, 520. 
293 Daniel Fischel, above n 227, 4.  
294 Ibid 18–19. 
Chapter Five 
168 
factor.295 If this is correct, the role of the rule in ensuring equitable civil justice is 
marginal at best296 and it cannot be considered integral to ensuring fairness of 
outcome. In fact, clients as a class gain nothing, for access to the privilege 
benefits only those who can afford the high cost.   
 
In what can be seen as a counterbalance to the supremacy of legal professional 
privilege over other interests promoted by the law, legal scholarship has shown 
that full disclosure is the more fundamental principle worthy of being upheld.297 
Lord Brougham, in an 1828 parliamentary debate, indicated support for disclosure 
when he stated that the disingenuousness of conflicting parties was an 
embarrassment to justice which left judges to ‘guess at the truth in the trick’.298 
Declaring that the law should never lend itself to concealments, he noted that the 
courts of England were interested in compelling both sides to reveal the whole of 
their case as early as possible, rather than divulging only as much as would 
further their cause and frustrate their adversary.299    
 
Halsbury stated that the privilege was not irreversible in criminal proceedings and 
any document which may aid in establishing the innocence of an accused was not 
privileged from disclosure.300 Using the analogy of a sealed book, the Law 
Magazine declared in 1937 that, if client–counsel communications were 
privileged to the extent that they were invulnerable to judicial investigation as if 
they never had been uttered, the moral justification for the rule ‘would work very 
grievous injury’.301    
 
                                               
295 Ibid 19. 
296 Adam Dodek, above n 232, 526. 
297 This legal scholarship includes Bentham, Halsbury, Appleton CJ, Lord Brougham, Edmund 
Morgan, Frankel J, Fred Rodell and James Fitzjames Stephen.  
298 United Kingdom, above n 170, 188.  
299 Ibid.  
300 Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol XIII. (Butterworths, 4th ed, 1975) 124.  
301 John Wigmore, quoted in ‘Production of Cases Prepared for the Opinion of Counsel’ (1837) 
17 Law Magazine 68. See also John Wigmore, Treatise, above n 46, § 2291, 3199. 
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Appleton CJ similarly believed proceedings would be better served by admitting 
more evidence, even if its veracity was in question,302 and observed that, if 
‘criminals [framed] a code for their own special protection, their first provision 
would be to protect themselves from all inquiry into their conduct’.303 Edmund 
Morgan posited the question why the law felt it had any need to protect clients 
who were uncooperative or deceitful304 given that the cost to a guilty client is not 
of grave social concern.  
 
James Fitzjames Stephen postulated that the law was ‘ever-changing because 
judges rightly interpreted its principles in accordance with the spirit of the age in 
which they had their being and an essentially fluctuating thing like the law cannot 
be stabilised’.305 Rodell concurred, stating that, by merely varying judges, the 
highest law of the land could be changed and when these laws were altered, ‘even 
the most ignorant of laypeople begin to wonder a little about the absoluteness of 
the law’.306   
 
IV  CONCLUSION 
 
The rule of legal professional privilege has formed the subject of judicial 
uncertainty, whereby judges concede that doubt and inconsistency plague its 
application. Even Bentham and Wigmore admitted that, contrary to the views of 
justice, the privilege was misused and abused, leading to intolerable obstruction 
of truth. They agreed insofar as ‘the man is more important than the rule’ and 
where the law lends itself to concealment at the expense of truth and justice, it 
cannot prevail. They disagreed as to whether the law should have protections 
                                               
302 William Appleton, ‘Admission of Parties in Criminal Procedure’ (1835) 13 American Jurist 
& Law Magazine 50, 62.  
303 Ibid 71.  
304 Edmund Morgan, ‘Foreword’ to Model Code of Evidence (American Law Institute, 1942) 1, 
26–7. 
305 James Fitzjames Stephen, cited in Lloyd Duhaime, England’s Great Failed Codification 
Experiment <http://www.duhaime.org/LawMuseum/LawArticle-1595/1873--Englands-Great-
Failed-Criminal-Code-Experiment.aspx>. 
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surrounding client-counsel communications. Where Wigmore propounded that 
the privilege was necessary for the purpose of encouraging full and frank 
disclosure, Bentham posited that, by virtue of the privilege’s existence, it could be 
invoked to shield all manner of underhanded conduct.  This renders doubtful any 
suggestion that the privilege is perfectly adapted to its ultimate aim; being the 
execution of the law and the administration of justice. 
 
Demonstrating that legal professional privilege should not be considered absolute 
where conduct contrary to the interests of justice arise, Chapter V resolved that 
legal professional privilege presents a collision of epic disproportion in which the 
values of life, liberty and dignity cede to the notion that client–counsel 
communications should be preserved at the expense of justice. The aim should be 
to weigh the competing interests of privacy and disclosure so that a compromise 
can be reached that brings about the greatest overall good. ‘The fundamental 
condition of legal professional privilege [should be evaluated] against the 
fundamental condition of an efficient and honest legal profession’.307 
 
The problem, though, is not merely theoretical. Within the remit of the criminal 
justice system, there is manifestly a need to protect innocent criminal defendants 
from conviction. If the scales of justice are to tilt one way or the other, it must be 
in favour of disclosure, for non-disclosure jeopardises the position of the innocent 
who are falsely accused.308  
 
Despite arguments made in favour of disclosure in circumstances where 
innocence is on the line, the criminal defendant in Derby was denied access to 
potentially exculpatory material because it was shielded by legal professional 
privilege. It is logical that legal professional privilege should be applied according 
to the exercise of judicial discretion. Given the inability to assess the extent to 
which legal professional privilege advances the public interest it is supposed to 
                                               
307 Gary Meggit, ‘Privilege: A Hong Kong Perspective’ (2011) 30 Civil Justice Quarterly 429, 
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serve, it may well be that the rule is defeated by the need for litigation to be 
determined in the light of the entirety of the relevant materials.309   
 
There is no single remedy appropriate to both civil and criminal contexts, because 
the rule ‘visibly impedes the realisation of a central objective of the legal 
system’,310 namely, the advancement of justice. The individual interests in 
allowing an accused access to evidence to avoid possible wrongful conviction 
outweighs the public interest in maintaining the privilege.311 
 
This thinking produced two distinct ideas about the way in which legal 
professional privilege should operate. The scholars who have contributed to this 
debate include Zuckerman and Fischer, who stated that a trade-off between 
maintaining client–counsel communications and divulging relevant exculpatory 
material had reached the point of a break with the needs of the administration of 
justice. Greater emphasis should be placed on encouraging disclosure to exonerate 
the falsely accused. Imwinkelried maintained that the public interest in solving 
crimes outweighs the right to privacy underpinning the privilege. Uglow similarly 
contended that courts should be imbued with a substantial margin of discretion to 
apply a balancing approach to compare the public interest in legal professional 
privilege with the public interest in the liberty of an individual. These 
recommendations have the potential to offer concrete solutions to an age-old 
dilemma; however, for Lord Taylor, the privilege could not be sacrificed for the 
sake of determining ‘truth’ in a criminal trial. 
 
The principle is diametrically opposed in critical respects, specifically the 
contradiction between advancing the truth, while keeping client communications 
confidential. The case-specific analyses applied in Barton and Ataou may be 
entirely appropriate.312 There is a difference between ‘moral truth’313 and ‘legal 
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truth’, with the fundamental point being that the effect of invoking a claim of 
privilege entails withholding important information from the court. Given that the 
current parameters of the privilege have been shaped by the criminal justice 
system, the integrity of criminal trials depends upon the admission of all the 
relevant evidence to the trial jury. This concept will form the basis of discussion 
in Chapter VI, which details the Derby defendant’s petition for production of 
confidential communications relevant to his plea of innocence.
                                                                                                                                
313 Morality cannot be pitted against a practising certificate, nor can a piece of paper or a 
lawyerly oath usurp ethical and moral conduct.  
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CHAPTER VI: ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE: A LEGAL FICTION 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter identified issues relating to the application of legal 
professional privilege in criminal and civil contexts. It noted the need to reach not 
only a legally correct outcome between the parties, but a morally correct outcome. 
Chapter VI focuses on the profound impact of Lord Taylor’s aphorism in R v 
Derby Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte B.1 In that case, Lord Taylor affirmed that 
legal professional privilege was absolute. This contradicted his earlier judgments 
in which he advocated a narrow approach as to when the rule applied.2 Lord 
Taylor went against the weight of authority espoused by other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions which overwhelmingly supported the proposition that the rule was 
not unqualified. 
  
Section II explains the formulation used by the House of Lords in making its 
determination. Lord Taylor’s key judicial development ushered in a new era by 
virtue of the fact that it could no longer determine the scope of the rule. Instead, 
the privilege had primacy over other compelling interests of equal or greater 
significance. This result left no opportunity to balance competing interests against 
the interest in preserving the confidentiality of privileged communications and 
culminated in subsequent House of Lords’ judgments placing some limit on the 
absoluteness of that decision.  
 
Section III critiques the factors which influenced, so should have influenced, the 
dicta of Lord Taylor to reveal that neither Bentham nor Wigmore would have 
endorsed a blanket application of the rule. Forming a recurrent theme in legal 
opinion, Bentham’s philosophy was reproduced in the writings of his peers who 
                                               
1 R v Derby Magistrates’ Court; ex parte B [1996] AC 487. 
2 As opposed to it being absolute all the time. 
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equally decreed that ‘nothing imbued with the character of permanence could 
long retain popular respect’.3  
 
Section IV considers the European Court of Justice ruling in AM & S Europe v 
Commission of the European Communities.4 The correlation between that case 
and Derby is that AM & S promulgated legal professional privilege to be a 
fundamental human right, deserving of protection for that reason. The Derby 
Court, in turn, utilised the ‘fundamental human right’ rationale as partial 
justification for rendering the privilege absolute. The common denominator 
linking the two cases was that community law was binding on both decisions and 
the courts of England could not nullify its effect.  
 
Chapter VI concludes that in the 20th century the principle has evolved into a rigid 
rule carrying a far greater certainty than history or Wigmore ever intended. 
Chapter VII reveals that the absolutist stance adopted by Lord Taylor was fatally 
flawed and exposes as a legal fiction the notion that the doctrine of legal 
professional privilege is absolute. Illuminating what courts are prepared to put 
into, or read into, the concept of legal professional privilege, Derby attempted to 
freeze the law of privilege at this particular point in history by proscribing courts 
from continuing the evolutionary development of the rule according to common 
law principles or in light of reason and experience.  
 
II  DERBY: A FALLIBLE PRONOUNCEMENT 
 
A  The ‘Absoluteness’ Justification  
 
R v Derby Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte B5 involved two consolidated appeals 
from the Queen’s Bench division to the appellate court.6 The same justices who 
                                               
3 Henry Brougham, ‘Present State of the Law – The Speech of Henry Brougham, Esq., M. P., in 
the House of Commons, on Thursday, February 7, 1828’ (1828) 38 Quarterly Review 75, 242.  
4 [1983] QB 878. 
5 [1996] AC 487. 
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decided Derby sat on these appeals.7 This case raised significant questions 
concerning the scope of legal professional privilege and s 97 of the Magistrates’ 
Courts Act 1980 (UK), in particular whether it empowered the court to demand 
production of evidence8 involving the murder, by A, of a teenage girl.9  
 
‘A’ had confessed to and was charged with her murder. He later recanted his 
statement and claimed that his stepfather, Brooks, was the killer.10 A was 
acquitted and his stepfather charged. During Brooks’ committal hearing, the 
prosecution called ‘A’ as a witness, at which time he was examined about 
confidential client–counsel communications regarding his original 1978 
confession and subsequent inconsistent accounts. ‘A’ asserted legal professional 
privilege to excuse himself from giving evidence. Stipendiary magistrate, 
Rougier, however adopted the test formulated in R v Barton11 and R v Ataou12 
when he ruled that the documents in question were not subject to legal 
professional privilege on the basis they were relevant to the plea of innocence 
asserted by Brooks, who, if convicted, faced life imprisonment.  
                                                                                                                                
6 [1996] AC 487 states at 490C-D: ‘These were consolidated appeals, by leave of the House of 
Lords (Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Mustill and Lord Lloyd of Berwick) … from the judgment of 
the Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division (McCowan LJ and Gage J) on 21 October 
1994 refusing applications for judicial review of decisions dated 21 June 1994 and August 1994 in 
committal proceedings against the applicant's stepfather’. 
7 Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Mustill and Lord Lloyd of Berwick sat on these appeals. 
8 Ibid 487F (Lord Taylor). 
9 The judgment incorrectly states (at 385), that the victim was murdered in 1987, but (at 388), 
states she was killed on 3 April 1978; the latter being the correct date.  
10 [1996] AC 487, 487E (Lord Taylor CJ). The Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 (UK) s 97 states that 
‘Where a Justice of the Peace ... is satisfied that any person in England or Wales is likely to be 
able to give material evidence, or produce any document or thing likely to be material evidence, 
at an inquiry into an indictable offence by a Magistrates’ Court ... or at [a] summary trial of an 
information or hearing of a complaint by such a court and that that person will not voluntarily 
attend as a witness or will not voluntarily produce the document or thing, the Justice shall issue a 
summons directed to that person requiring him to attend before the court … to give evidence or 
to produce the document or thing’. Failure to comply may result in the person being committed 
into custody until evidence is given or produced.  
11 (1973) 1 WLR 115. 




Rougier granted a summons directing the lawyer who had represented ‘A’ to 
produce certain privileged communications which pertained to the murder charge, 
namely, all notes of attendances, proofs of evidence and factual instructions 
conveyed prior to 8 October 1978. Advice given by the lawyer to ‘A’ was 
excluded.13 Lord Justice McCowan sitting in the Divisional Court, subsequently 
upheld Rougier J’s holding.  
 
‘A’, who was represented by Mr Francis QC, appealed to the House of Lords 
which was required to determine whether Barton and Ataou had been correctly 
decided and if the balancing test enunciated in those cases should be performed 
when a claim for privilege arose in respect of confidential client–counsel 
communications.14 Francis QC took the position that confidence in the 
administration of justice would erode if judges themselves could decide that the 
privilege was spent.15 Contrary to the dicta of Lord Esher MR in Marks v Beyfus16 
and Lord Denning MR in Dallison v Caffery,17 Francis argued that, in the long 
history of legal professional privilege, there was no hint of any balancing test 
having been performed prior to the decision of Caulfield J.18  
 
B  The House of Lords’ Formulation  
 
The Derby Court explicated that legal professional privilege was absolute, having 
been settled once and for all in the 16th century.19 The Court announced that, upon 
the privilege being effected, the lawyer’s mouth was shut forever.20  
                                               
13 [1996] AC 487, 487F (Lord Taylor CJ). Legal advice imparted by the lawyer to his client was 
excluded.  
14 Ibid 34. 
15 [1996] AC 487, 513B (Lord Nicholls). A century earlier, R v Cox & Railton (1884) 14 QBD 
153 held that secrets ‘must be told in order to see whether [they] ought to be kept’. 
16 (1890) 25 QBD 494. 
17 [1965] 1 QB 348. 
18 Ibid. 
19 [1996] AC 487, 508E (Lord Taylor). 




[I]f a balancing exercise was ever required in the case of legal 
professional privilege, it was performed once and for all in the 16th 
century, and since then has applied across the board in every case, 
irrespective of the client’s individual merits.21  
 
There are three problems with this reasoning, the first of which was canvassed in 
Chapter II which exposed the erroneous Wigmorean notion that the privilege 
manifested itself in Elizabethan England. Instead, the first incarnation of the rule 
was characterised by an ancient Roman underpinning which was informed by 
servitude and loyalty rather than professionalism and honour. Moreover, the 16th-
century privity of communication was justified not as a professional privilege, but 
on the tenets of oath and honour.  
 
Chapter II argued that none of the 16th-century authorities, from Lee v Markham22 
and Breame v Breame23 to Windsor v Umberville24 and Berd v Lovelace,25 
articulated the right of a lawyer to avoid testimony as a result of invoking legal 
professional privilege.26 It was merely their ‘oath and honour’ that excused 
lawyers from testifying.27 The most significant aspect of cases decided in this era 
was that the rule fluctuated between being a preserve of the lawyer in Berd v 
Lovelace28 and Dennis v Codrington29 – both of which exempted lawyers from 
                                               
21 Ibid 508E (Lord Taylor). 
22 (1569) Monro 375, Tothill 48. 
23 (1571) Tothill 48. See also Ronald Bridgman, A Digest of the Reported Cases on Points of 
Practice and Pleading in the Courts of Equity in England and Ireland and of the Rules and 
Orders of the Same Courts; from the Earliest Period to the Present Time (Edward B Gould, 
1829) 178. 
24 (1574) Monro 411. 
25 [1577] Cary 62. 
26 Justin Gleeson, James Watson and Elisabeth Peden, Historical Foundations of Australian 
Law: Volume II – Commercial Common Law (Federation Press, 2013) 132. 
27 The House of Lords failed to note the fundamental differences between these Court of 
Chancery cases and the common law, whereby parties could be deposed to answer 
interrogatories. 
28 [1577] Cary 62. 
Chapter Six 
178 
being examined in relation to communications passing between themselves and 
clients – and, as confirmed in the Duchess of Kingston’s Case,30 belonging to the 
client. This additionally contradicted a statement made by Lord Taylor CJ in the 
1994 case of R v Keane, when he announced that trial judges should ‘carry out a 
balancing exercise, having regard to the weight of the public interest in non-
disclosure and to the importance of the documents to the defence’.31  
 
The second problem with the House of Lords’ formulation lies in the refrain that 
the lawyer’s mouth is shut forever. This edict was not a 16th-century 
manifestation. Rather, it was an 18th-century pronouncement made by Buller J in 
Wilson v Rastall,32 in which he stated: 
 
The privilege never ceased at any period of time. In such a case 
it is not sufficient to say that the cause is at an end; the mouth of 
such a person is shut forever. I take the distinction to be now 
well settled to the three enumerated cases.33   
 
As discussed in Chapter III, Wilson declared the privilege to be absolute in very 
specific circumstances, with only three classes of legal professionals entitled to 
invoke a claim of privilege. These were counsel, solicitors and attorneys. The 
antecedents of Wilson can be traced back to the medieval Bailiffs of Sheriff’s etc. 
Act34 which was passed in 1413. This statute precluded sheriffs and under-sheriffs 
from acting as attornati on behalf of clients.  
 
The third problem with the Court’s contention was that it acted in reliance on the 
weight of authority stemming from Wilson when asserting the absoluteness of the 
rule. The House of Lords overlooked many decisions, including but not limited to 
                                                                                                                                
29 (1579) Cary 100. 
30 (1776) 20 Howell’s State Trials 355.  
31 [1994] 1 WLR 746, 751. See also R v Turner [1995] 1 WLR 264, 268.  
32 See Wilson v Rastall (1792) 4 TR 753.  
33 Ibid 759 (Buller J).  
34 Bailiff of Sheriff’s etc. Act. 1413, 4 Hen 5, c 3–6. 
Chapter Six 
179 
Annesley v Earl of Anglesea.35 In that 1743 matter, Lord Baron Bowes stated that, 
upon a cause ending, only then was the lawyer to be considered, with respect to 
his former employer, as one person to another; ‘in which case a breach of trust did 
not fall within the jurisdiction of the Court; for the Court cannot determine what 
is honour, only what is law’.36  
 
In 1753, Sir John Strange MR, in Winchester v Fournier, commented that, while 
it was ‘a very right rule that an attorney ought not to betray the secrets of his 
clients, if he himself did not object to it, the Court had nothing to do with it’.37 
Turquand v Knight38 succeeded Wilson and predicated the application of the 
doctrine on certain qualifications in a vein similar to Winchester. Proving 
historically significant for the fact that it overruled the Wilson v Rastall39 
pronouncement that a lawyer’s lips were forever sealed, the Turquand Court 
observed that, if a lawyer were employed in a cause unrelated to their professional 
character, the Court would not enforce them to obey the rule of legal professional 
privilege.40 In refusing to uphold the rule enunciated in Wilson, Turquand 
signified that, although Wilson might be amongst the most frequently cited cases 
on the subject, it was not the final word with respect to legal professional 
privilege.  
 
Where Lord Taylor CJ erroneously claimed that legal professional privilege was 
settled in the 16th century, he subsequently contradicted himself by admitting that 
it was not until the 18th century that ‘the rule was on the way to being established 
on its present basis’.41 Prior to this era, the laws of England often consisted of 
                                               
35 (1743) 17 How St Trials 1139.  
36 Ibid 1229 (Lord Baron Bowes).  
37 (1753) 2 Ves Sr 445, 447 (Sir John Strange MR). 
38 2 Mees & W 98, 100 (1836). 
39 (1792) 4 TR 753. 
40 Conversely, if his employment directly correlated with his professional character, the Court 
would exercise its discretion to uphold the tenets of truth, confidence and trust reposed in him by 
his client. 
41 [1996] AC 487, 504F (Lord Taylor). 
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disconnected and scattered precedents.42 Even Wigmore observed that ‘the period 
from 1790 to 1830 was the full spring tide of the system of rules of evidence’,43 
where the principles of English law ‘began to be developed into rules and 
precedents of minutiae relatively innumerable in comparison with what had gone 
before’.44 He emphasised that the changes to legal professional privilege ‘brought 
a residuum of trouble and confusion into the precedents of the 1800s … and the 
shackles of the earlier precedents were not finally thrown off until the decade of 
1870’.45  
 
This view was reproduced in the writings of William Twining. He argued that in 
the 19th century, the laws of England had little regard for principle or consistency 
and hardly deserved to be called a system; for it was the confused and confusing 
product of largely ad hoc and often arbitrary growth devised by lawyers and 
judges46 who perceived the law as little more than a few general maxims that 
could be subsumed under a single principle known as ‘the best evidence rule’.47 
Hazard similarly remarked that the privilege was ‘applied with hesitation’ and 
‘recognition of the [the rule] was slow and halting until after 1800’.48  
 
During this era, the doctrine was influenced by the radical overhaul of criminal 
procedure which witnessed both the changing judicial role and the evolution of 
‘lawyerisation’.49  Lawyerisation culminated in an increasingly diminished role for 
                                               
42 William Twining, Theories of Evidence: Bentham and Wigmore (Stanford University Press, 
1985) 1–2. 
43 John Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law: Including the 
Statutes and Judicial Decisions of All Jurisdiction of the United States, Vol IV (Little, Brown & 
Co., 1905) § 8, 60g. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid § 2290, 3196. 
46 William Twining, above n 42, 21. 
47 Ibid 1–2. 
48 Geoffrey Hazard, ‘An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege’ (1978) 66 
California Law Review 1061, 1070. 




the defendant, as legal advocates dominated adversarial trials.50 John Langbein writes 
that in the 19th and 20th-centuries, privileges were overwhelmingly employed to 
protect the accused.51 Despite the adversarial system harbouring truth-defeating 
tendencies,52 the procedures for criminal adjudication were decided at a moment in 
history when English courts did not want too much truth.53  With lawyers 
permitted to represent clients, it evened up the scales.54  
 
III  BENTHAM AND WIGMORE ON ABSOLUTISM 
 
Having attracted its share of criticism over the course of its lifetime, legal 
professional privilege has faced opposition in all quarters, with a number of 
commentators and courts questioning whether the privilege necessitated a 
permanent status. This thesis has shown that Bentham was its most prominent 
detractor, attacking both the rule and the efficacy of the common law. Viewing 
the common law as a living organism capable of adjusting and adapting to the 
needs of society as they unfolded over time, Bentham contended that the common 
law was not an absolutely fixed, inflexible system55 and precedents were not of 
absolute authority; judicial decisions in one age are disregarded in another.56 It 
naturally follows that legal professional privilege, as a bastion of the common 
law, could not be of a permanently fixed character either. 
 
This Benthamic pronouncement has been a recurrent theme in legal opinion and 
was adopted by his admirers, including Oliver Wendell Holmes who was equally 
dismissive of outworn procedures and their contribution to the law.57 Disparaging 
                                               
50 John Jackson, ‘Reviewed Work: The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Trial by John H. 
Langbein’ (2004) 44 The British Journal of Criminology 2, 286.  
51 John Langbein, above n 49, 284. 
52 Ibid 334. 
53 Ibid 336. 
54 John Jackson, above n 50, 287.  
55 Jeremy Bentham, Codification of the Common Law: Letter of Jeremy Bentham, and Report of 
Judges Story, Metcalf and Others (John Polbemus,1882) 29. 
56 Ibid 48. 
57 Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457, 469. 
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rules which persisted through blind imitation of the past,58 Holmes would not 
have advocated the absoluteness of any judicial doctrine. Holmes announced that 
‘general propositions do not decide concrete cases’.59 Members of the judiciary 
have argued60 that when a precedent was the only argument made to support a 
court-fashioned rule, it was time for the rule’s creator to destroy it.61  
 
According to Rodell: ‘It is the legend of the law that every legal dispute can, and 
must be settled by hauling an abstract principle down to earth and pinning it to the 
dispute in question’.62 It was doubtful that the privilege did ‘very much to 
promote candour on the part of the client to his’ lawyer.63 Lord Brougham notably 
declared that the efficacy of laws depended on the sanction of public opinion and 
opined that: 
 
By long use and custom … men especially that are aged, and 
have been long educated to the profession and practice of the 
law, contract a kind of superstitious veneration of it beyond 
what is just and reasonable. They tenaciously and rigorously 
maintain those very forms and proceedings, and practices, 
which, though possibly at first they were seasonable and useful, 
yet by the very change of matters they become not only useless 
and impertinent, but burthensome and inconvenient, and 
prejudicial to the common justice and the common good of 
mankind; not considering the forms and prescripts of laws were 
not introduced for their own sakes, but for the use of public 
                                               
58 Ibid. 
59 Lochner v New York, 198 US 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes J).  
60 Black J was in the minority in the 1948 case Francis v Southern Pacific Co, 333 US 445, 471, 
68 S Ct 611, 623 (1948), where he stated that precedents should be destroyed when there was no 
justification for adhering to them, aside from the fact they were court-made rules. Mason J was 
in the majority in O’Reilly v Commissioners of the State Bank of Victoria (1983) 153 CLR 1, 
when he stated, at 26, that the benefits of the privilege were doubtful. Lord Brougham also stated 
that nothing imbued with the character of permanence could retain public respect.  
61 Francis v Southern Pacific Co, 333 US 445, 471, 68 S Ct 611, 623, (1948). 
62 Fred Rodell, Woe Unto You, Lawyers! (Pageant-Poseidon, 1939) 48. 
63 O’Reilly v Commissioners of the State Bank of Victoria (1983) 153 CLR 1, 26 (Mason J). 
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justice; and therefore, when they become insipid, useless, 
impertinent, and possibly derogatory to the end, they may and 
must be removed.64  
 
He went so far as to proclaim that ‘the administration of the law is more 
wretchedly defective than the law itself. Justice is sold at an enormous price.’65 
Edmund Morgan and Frankel J were two other notable authorities who postulated 
that all relevant evidence should be admissible and that clients should not be 
insulated from that minimum duty by invoking the veil of privilege.66 Even Lord 
Diplock pronounced that discovery was obtainable whenever and to the extent 
that the justice of the case dictated.67 Thorpe J wished to see it plainly stated in 
case law that lawyers cannot rely on legal professional privilege to resist 
disclosure when they are in possession of material relevant to determination of the 
case but contrary to their clients’ interests.68 He affirmed that lawyers had a 
positive obligation to divulge information to the other parties and the court.69 
 
Lord Taylor’s reasoning differed from Bentham. Despite Lord Taylor cautioning 
that rules should be created to ‘protect against wrongful conviction and safeguard 
the possibly innocent’,70 his ‘absolutist’ stance in Derby prevented an accused 
from proving his innocence or advancing a defence. Having documented the 
limitations imposed on the rule in the form of waiver and the crime-fraud 
exception, this thesis has revealed that numerous authorities argued in favour of a 
third exception to the rule. These authorities contended that legal professional 
                                               
64 Henry Brougham, ‘Present State of the Law – The Speech of Henry Brougham, Esq., M. P., in 
the House of Commons, on Thursday, February 7, 1828’ (1828) 38 Quarterly Review 75, 243.  
65 University of Northern Iowa, ‘Review: Life and Character of Henry Brougham’ (1831) 33(72) 
North American Review 227, 247. 
66 Edmund Morgan, ‘Some Observations Concerning a Model Code of Evidence’ (1940) 89(2) 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 145, 153; Marvin Frankel, ‘The Search for Truth 
Continued: More Disclosure, Less Privilege’ (1982–83) 54 University of Colorado Law Review 
51, 65–6.  
67 O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237, 282 (Diplock LJ). 
68 Essex County Council v R [1994] Fam 167, 168 (Thorpe J). 
69 Ibid. 
70 Geoffrey Robertson, ‘Justice in All Fairness’, The Guardian, 30 April 1997, 19. 
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privilege could not be absolute in criminal proceedings where innocence was on 
the line.  
 
Despite Lord Taylor’s preference to accord the rule a narrow scope in accord with 
its 19th-century roots and confine the privilege to the legal profession, this thesis 
has demonstrated that he misunderstood both the origin and justification for legal 
professional privilege. Lord Taylor stated that a balancing act had been conducted 
in the 16th century, with the standard justification for the existence of the rule 
being initially grounded in gentlemanly honour, and later, to ensure clients could 
consult lawyers in confidence without fear of those communications being 
divulged.71  
 
Wigmore, by his own measure, would never have endorsed a blanket application 
of the rule. Instead, he affirmed that the privilege should be abrogated where it 
served a higher public interest, for in the end, the needs of ‘man’ were more 
important than adherence to a rule.72 In his estimation, the privilege was ‘worth 
preserving for the sake of a general policy’; although it was ‘nonetheless an 
obstacle to the investigation of the truth’.73  
 
While Wigmore expressed the opinion that legal professional privilege should be 
strictly construed ‘within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of 
its principle’,74 the judgment of Lord Taylor CJ in Derby conveyed the message 
that, if but one exception were permitted to the privilege, it would destroy the rule 
itself. With reference to Stevenson J in the 1960 case of Hobbs v Hobbs and 
Cousens,75 Lord Taylor CJ remarked that legal professional privilege had a sound 
basis in common sense and, once it attached to client–counsel communications, it 
                                               
71 [1996] AC 487, 507D. 
72 John Wigmore, Treatise, cited in William Twining, above n 42, 161. 
73 John Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law: Including the 
Statutes and Judicial Decisions of All Jurisdiction of the United States, Vol IV (Little, Brown & 
Co, 1905) § 2291, 3204. 
74 Ibid. 
75 [1960] P 112. 
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remained for all time and in all circumstances.76 This sentiment was at odds with 
the principles enunciated in Barton, Ataou, Dunbar and Craig.  
 
A Derby and the Commonwealth Authorities 
 
In addition to recognising the rule from its early English origins, the House of 
Lords adverted to modern precedents set in the Commonwealth jurisdictions of 
Australia,77 South Africa,78 Canada79 and New Zealand.80 Where the latter two 
have been discussed throughout the body of this work — for present purposes — 
Australia and South Africa, together with the International Court of Justice case, 
Timor-Leste v Australia,81 have been selected as comparators to Derby, owing to 
the fact that these seminal cases contributed to the modern-day approach to legal 
professional privilege. In particular, these Commonwealth authorities 
overwhelmingly support the proposition that the privilege is not unqualified. 
Rather, each provides a strongly consistent view of the nature and scope of the 
privilege as it evolved in each of the said jurisdictions. Timor-Leste is equally 
significant for raising previously untested, albeit novel, questions which require 
new legal reasoning about the limitations of the rule in an international setting.   
 
1  Australia 
 
The first of these to be examined is the 1976 Australian case, Grant v Downs,82 in 
which the High Court was required ‘to determine and state the relevant legal 
                                               
76 Ibid 116–17 (Stevenson J).  
77 Grant v Downs [1976] HCA 63; Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52. 
78 S v Safatsa 1988 (1) S.A. 868. 
79 Regina v Dunbar and Logan (1982) 68 C.C.C. (2d) 13. 
80 R v Craig [1975] 1 N.Z.L.R. 597.   
81 Questions relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-Leste v 
Australia), Order of 28 January 2014, I.C.J. Reports 2014. 
82 [1976] HCA 63. In Grant, the question before the Court centred on whether certain medical 
records, relating to the type and nature of injuries sustained by patients in mental hospitals, were 
exempt from discovery on the basis that they attracted the privilege. The deceased, Neville 
William John Grant, had been an inpatient at North Ryde Psychiatric Centre when, during an 
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professional privilege principle to operate in Australia’.83 Barwick CJ commented 
that no such statement of authority presently bound the courts in this country.84 
Although the Grant Court noted the necessity of the privilege, with the majority 
stating that its existence was so firmly entrenched in the law that it could not be 
exorcised by judicial decision, they cautioned that powerful considerations 
suggested that the privilege should be strictly contained.85 The Court labelled it 
more of ‘an impediment, not an inducement, to frank testimony [which] detracted 
from the fairness of the trial by denying a party access to relevant documents or at 
least subjecting him to surprise’.86  
 
In a 3:2 decision, the Court formulated the ‘sole purpose’ test as the applicable 
criterion for legal professional privilege: the rule applied to documents brought 
into existence for the single indivisible purpose of legal advice or for use in legal 
proceedings.87 Through confining the application of the privilege to documents 
solely created for the purpose of legal advice or use in litigation, the High Court 
restrained the privilege from ‘travel[ling] beyond the underlying rationale to 
which it is intended to give expression’.88 In simple terms, if the privilege’s sweep 
was too broad, the search for the truth would be compromised because a greater 
number of justifications would exist to shield communications from discovery.  
 
                                                                                                                                
unsupervised period, he escaped from his room overnight and died from exposure to cold. 
Outlining the material purposes for which the documents were brought into existence, Wilfred 
James Maundrell, an officer of the Health Commission of New South Wales, cited several 
reasons as necessitating exclusion from inspection, namely: disciplinary action against staff, 
coronial proceedings and the possibility of a civil suit for damages. 
83 Grant v Downs [1976] HCA 63, 66 (Barwick CJ).  
84 Ibid.  
85 Ibid 685 (Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ).  
86 Ibid 686. 
87 Ibid 688 (Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ).  
88 Ibid.  
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Although the adoption of the ‘sole purpose’ test would seem a permanent fixture 
of the modern rationale89 and it outwardly appeared an easy test to satisfy given 
that it was easily understood and provided a bright-line for determining when the 
protection began and ended,90 it was deemed less than workable for swinging the 
balance in favour of disclosure.91  
 
The second Australian case considered by the House of Lords was Baker v 
Campbell,92 in which Mason J indicated that it was by no means self-evident that 
legal professional privilege was superior to the public interest in facilitating the 
availability of all relevant materials for production in litigious disputes. Due to the 
complexity of this case, detailed analysis is warranted. Reminiscent of The Queen 
v The Commissioners of Inland Revenue Ex parte Thomas Patrick Denton 
Taylor93 as discussed in Chapter V, the facts in Baker centred on the privity of 
documents retained by a lawyer94 pertaining to a sales tax minimisation scheme. 
The documents included legal opinions and other communications, the scope of 
which fell outside the ambit of the ‘sole purpose’ test as settled in Grant v 
Downs.95 Specifically relevant were ‘things being the original or copies of: 
                                               
89 National Employers Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd v Waind (1979) 24 ALR 86, 
91–2 (Mason J). See also G L Peiris, ‘Legal Professional Privilege in Commonwealth Law’ 
(1982) 31 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 609, 622.  
90 Elizabeth Turnbull, ‘Case Note: Sole Purpose Test vs. Dominant Purpose Test: Esso Australia 
Resources Limited v The Commissioner of Taxation’ (2000) 21(1) University of Queensland Law 
Journal 120, 123 <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UQLJ/2000/12.pdf>. 
91 The ‘sole purpose’ test framed in Grant v Downs was condemned in Esso Australia Resources 
Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49. By a ratio of 4:2, the majorityof the 
High Court, comprising Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ (with Kirby and McHugh 
JJ dissenting) determined that the appropriate test for determining the existence of legal 
professional privilege was the ‘dominant purpose’ test: ‘The correct test is the dominant purpose 
test, which is the common law test for claiming legal professional privilege’. In Commissioner of 
Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501, Kirby J announced: 
‘A brake on the application of legal professional privilege is needed to prevent its operation 
bringing the law into disrepute’.   
92 (1983) 153 CLR 52, 75 (Mason J). 
93 [1988] WL 624291. 
94 The lawyer was O’Connor of Stone, James & Co. 
95 [1976] HCA 63 
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correspondence, prospectuses, notes, opinions of Counsel, contracts, agreements, 
and other documents and instruments’.96 It was for the High Court to decide 
whether, if legal professional privilege were taken to attach to such documents, 
they could form the basis of an administrative proceeding in the form of a search 
warrant issued under the relevant Act.97 
 
In a 4:3 judgment, the majority, comprising Murphy, Wilson, Deane and Dawson 
JJ (Gibbs CJ, Mason and Brennan JJ dissenting) overruled Grant, holding that the 
documents were exempt from search and seizure, thereby subjecting them to a 
claim of privilege. The view articulated by Wilson J was particularly significant 
because, he distinguished his judgment in Baker from an earlier privilege case on 
which he ruled98 and acknowledged that he had finally ‘arrived at the only result 
which afford[ed him] lasting satisfaction’.99  
 
Wilson J accepted that a heavy reliance upon English authority influenced his 
narrow interpretation of the privilege in which the public interest was confined to 
the context in which the common law had evolved.100 Wilson J conceded that he 
had been plagued by ‘much anxious thought, in the course of which [his] opinion 
fluctuated from one conclusion to another’.101 It must be borne in mind though, 
that ‘the power to disturb settled authority is … to be exercised with restraint and 
only after careful scrutiny of the earlier course of decisions and full consideration 
of the consequences’.102 Finally, though, he resolved that the perfect 
administration of justice was not limited to legal proceedings and cited, as an 
example, the public interest in fostering a professional client–counsel relationship 
as a means of mitigating the need for litigation.103 
                                               
96 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 111. 
97 Ibid. 
98 O’Reilly v State Bank of Victoria Commissioners (1983) 153 CLR 1. 
99 Caron Beaton-Wells, ‘Case Note: Commissioner, Australian Federal Police v Propend’ (1998) 
24 Monash University Law Review 210, 212. 
100 (1983) 153 CLR 52, 93 (Wilson J). 
101 Ibid. 
102 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49, 55.  




Wilson J also deferred to Wigmore when he opined that the lineage of the 16th- 
and 17th-century privilege was crafted out of a respect for professional 
confidences as a matter of honour for lawyers until such time as the status-based 
justification for special treatment gave way to the realisation that that the 
privilege induced clients to hire lawyers.104 Wilson J embraced the century-old 
rationale espoused by Lord Selborne LC in Minet v Morgan105 that the privilege 
extended beyond the curial setting. He emphasised that the public interest now 
extended beyond legal proceedings when he commented that the privilege was an 
essential mark of a free society which attached to the relationship between lawyer 
and client and could only be abrogated or abridged by statute.106 
 
Wilson J was not alone in exploring the rationale of the privilege, with Murphy J 
branding the concept of the client’s legal privilege ‘ancient’, having existed in 
English jurisprudence for over 400 years.107 Murphy J restated that ‘the important 
public policy which justifie[d] the privilege would often be defeated if the 
privilege were not generally available’.108 Deane J similarly reiterated Wigmore’s 
analysis of the origins of the privilege when he pronounced that the doctrine was 
recognised during the reign of Elizabeth I as being the professional obligation of 
the lawyer to guard the secrecy of their client’s communications.109  
 
                                               
104 Daniel Fischel, ‘Lawyers & Confidentiality’ (1998) 65 University of Chicago Law Review 1, 
3–4. 
105 (1873) LR 8 Ch App 361. 
106 (1983) 153 CLR 52, 95 (Wilson J). 
107 Ibid 84 (Murphy J). Murphy J declared that the term ascribed to the privilege was unfortunate 
and opined that legal professional privilege suggested that the privilege belonged to the legal 
fraternity, which misconstrued its ownership as it rightfully belonged to the client and could be 
waived at the clients’s discretion. As a result of this single remark, the Australian Law Reform 
Commission recommended the adoption of the term ‘client legal privilege’. In fact, this phrase 
was eventually written into the Uniform Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and accorded a ‘dominant 
purpose’ in statute, while legal professional privilege was reserved for the common law.  
108 (1983) 153 CLR 52, 88 (Murphy J). 
109 John Wigmore, above n 73, § 2290. 
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Deane J was persuaded that the principle underlying the privilege was 
fundamentally important to the protection and preservation of the rights, dignity 
and equality of citizens and labelled it a precondition of full and unreserved 
communication.110 He promulgated Wigmore’s belief when he articulated that the 
general principle accorded protection to the client against the modern state and 
assured those requiring independent legal advice that they could obtain it without 
the risk of prejudice by compulsory disclosure.111  
 
The pronouncement of Deane J highlighted that the privilege was one of 
fundamental importance which transcended the rules of evidence and had higher 
status than communications arising out of other confidential relationships such as 
doctor–patient or priest–penitent.112 According to Deane J, the established 
justification for the rule lay in the fact that the proper functioning of the legal 
system was predicated on freedom of communication between lawyer and client 
which would erode if either could be compelled to disclose what passed between 
them for the purpose of giving or receiving legal advice.113  
 
Although Dawson J observed that the ability to compel disclosure of professional 
confidences carried significant consequences and was likely to destroy freedom of 
communication, he pronounced that the rule curtailed the judicial search for truth 
and attracted critics from the outset, including Bentham.114 Dawson J opined that 
recent case law had placed the traditional doctrine on a new plane.115 The 
privilege was no longer regarded merely as a rule of evidence which shielded 
communications from discovery,116 for, ‘the Courts, unwilling to so restrict the 
concept, have extended its application well beyond those limits’.117   
 
                                               
110 (1983) 153 CLR 52, 118 (Deane J). 
111 Ibid 120 (Deane J). 
112 Ibid 685 (Dawson J). 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid 131 (Dawson J). 
115 Ibid, citing Solosky v The Queen (1979) 105 DLR (3d) 745, 757 (Dickson J). 




With respect to the Australian authorities, the House of Lords concentrated on a 
singular quote in Grant, specifically that legal professional privilege promoted the 
public interest by facilitating the representation of clients by legal advisers and 
was so firmly entrenched that it could not be exorcised by judicial decision. The 
Derby Court disregarded all references to the sole purpose test in which Grant 
adopted a narrow scope of the rule so as not to compromise the search for truth by 
shielding from discovery a greater number of communications. The Grant Court 
cautioned that the privilege should be strictly construed on the basis that it 
impeded frank testimony and diminished fairness by denying a party access to 
relevant documents.118  
 
The House of Lords appears to have been persuaded by the reasoning in Baker, 
which led Lord Taylor CJ to describe legal professional privilege as ‘a 
fundamental condition on which the administration of justice as a whole rests’.119 
Lord Taylor conceded, however, that it was difficult to justify why 
communications between client and lawyer should be privileged if litigation was 
not anticipated. In seeking to apply his ‘absoluteness’ justification to legal 
professional privilege only in the context of litigation, Lord Taylor saw no value 
in extending it to legal advice privilege:120 ‘ … To extend privilege without limit 
to all solicitor and client communication upon matters within the ordinary 
business of a solicitor and referable to that relationship [would be] too wide’. 
 
 This view accords with the Wigmorean presumption in which the latter favoured 
litigation values over the harm to other values. Advice that was not sought in 
anticipation of litigation was not privileged. Lord Taylor reasoned there would be 
little to fear if the privilege was not available under these circumstances, for 
client–counsel communications would not be inhibited.121  
 
2 South Africa 
                                               
118 (1983) 153 CLR 52, 685. 
119 [1996] AC 487, 507D (Taylor LJ). 





In the South African appeal case of S v Safatsa,122 Botha JA, on delivering the 
judgment of the court, criticised the Baker ruling when he cautioned that any 
claim to relax the privilege should be approached with great circumspection. 
While he did not doubt that, as a matter of principle, the rule could be relaxed, 
Botha JA elucidated that this could occur only through the exercise of judicial 
discretion, based on a consideration of all relevant information.123 He could not 
fathom how judges could otherwise be called upon to carry out any form of 
balancing exercise with respect to the privilege, weighing the conflicting 
principles of public policy, without being supplied information relevant to the 
issue in question.124  
 
He also departed from the general principle laid down by Caulfield J in Barton 
that a mere allegation of innocence would suffice to destroy the privilege and 
compel production of client–counsel communications. In his view, disclosure 
could be compelled only through the exercise of discretion by the trial judge.125 
Botha JA had regard to Wigmore when he affirmed that the public policy 
underlying legal professional privilege was to promote freedom of consultation 
and remove apprehension of compelled disclosure.126 This protected clients who 
consulted lawyers for the purpose of obtaining professional legal advice of any 
kind, by ensuring that confidential communications relevant to that purpose were 
permanently protected except where the client waived the protection.127  
 
                                               
122 1988 (1) SA 868, 886 (Botha J). The Court was constituted by Botha JA, Hefer JA, 




126 John Wigmore, above n 73, §2292, 3204–5. Botha JA expressly referred to Wigmore on 
Evidence, Vol VIII, § 2291 and § 2292. Botha JA also considered Wheeler v Le Marchant and 
Burnell v British Transport Commission, which confined legal professional privilege to 
communications which passed for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, with any 
communications used during cross-examination waiving the privilege over the whole of the 
communication. 
127 S v Safatsa 1988 (1) SA 868, 886 (Botha JA). See also Wigmore, above n 73, §2291, 3204. 
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The Derby Court touched briefly on Safatsa when recognising the need to exert 
caution over any claim to relax the privilege. Lord Taylor CJ formed the opinion 
that no exception should be allowed to the absolute nature of the rule once it had 
been established.128 Lord Taylor borrowed from Lord Brougham in Greenough v 
Gaskell129 when he concluded: ‘It is not for the sake of the applicant alone that the 
privilege must be upheld. It is in the wider interests of all those who might 
otherwise be deterred from telling the whole truth to their solicitors.’130  
 
3 International Court of Justice 
 
Timor-Leste v Australia131 provides an international perspective on legal 
professional privilege and is noteworthy for discerning whether a national 
security exception exists to legal professional privilege.   Stirring debate that ‘the 
bedrock principle of [the doctrine] is being eroded under the national security 
rubric’,132 this International Court of Justice case was presided over by Keith, 
Cançado Trindade, Greenwood, Donoghue and Callinan JJ.     
 
The proceeding centred on the seizure of materials pursuant to a warrant issued 
under s 25 of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth).133 
The documentation confiscated by Australian officials related to a pending Timor 
Sea Treaty arbitration between Timor-Leste and Australia, including 
correspondence between the Timorese government and its legal advisers with 
respect to mounting a legal strategy.134   
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Timor-Leste contended that ‘as a general principle of law, the materials were 
subject to legal professional privilege135 and it enjoyed the sovereign right under 
international law to protect communications between itself and its legal advisers. 
It sought an ICJ ruling that provisional measures be implemented to prevent 
Australia being able to inform itself of the nature of these communications, 
including but not limited to advice relating to the Timor Sea.136 Australia 
responded that any claim to privilege was forfeited because communications were 
made in pursuance of a criminal offence.137  
 
Callinan J suggested that the entitlement to inviolability of communications in the 
possession of a lawyer in another country was a novel claim.138 Further, the extent 
to which the principle was immune to any limitation in an international context 
was unsettled and necessitated careful consideration.139  He observed that the 
evidence relied on was untested and involved double hearsay, leading to doubt 
surrounding which party was entitled to claim legal professional privilege in 
respect of the seized communications’.140 
 
While acknowledging that the privilege was important and extensive in 
application, Callinan J recognised that national security was an exception to the 
rule and expressed concern about the absoluteness of the privilege if it 
jeopardised a nation’s security. Where questions arose as to whether access by 
one nation to the privileged communications of another during ongoing 
arbitration would compromise peaceful dispute resolution in a manner consistent 
                                               
135 Ronald Bettauer, ‘Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and 
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with justice,141 Callinan J affirmed that ‘any court, [including the ICJ] would be 
conscious of the unlikelihood that any nation … would regard [itself] as bound to 
treat national security as inferior, or subject to, legal professional privilege’.142  
 
In a separate opinion, Cançado Trindade J remarked that it could not ‘be denied 
with certainty that, with the seizure of documents and data containing privileged 
information, Timor-Leste [had] already suffered irreparable harm’.143 In order to 
mitigate the detrimental effect on Timor-Leste’s position, he recommended that 
the ICJ order the documents be sealed and delivered into the court’s custody.144 
Greenwood J concurred that Timor-Leste should enjoy the right to conduct 
arbitration proceedings without Australian officials interfering in its 
communications with its legal advisers.145  
 
Donoghue J, in a separate opinion, concluded that Australia should be prohibited 
‘from interfering in any way in communications between Timor-Leste and its 
legal advisers in connection with the pending arbitration’.146  Donoghue J was 
prompted to adopt this stance on the basis that Australia saw ‘no legal 
impediment to interfering with communications between Timor-Leste and its 
counsel in the future, so long as such actions complied with [domestic] law’.147 
She did, however, form a different conclusion about whether the legal position of 
Timor-Leste was irreversibly weakened or exposed to any remaining element of 
risk given that Australia had given an undertaking not to divulge the 
communications. 
 
Timor-Leste v Australia highlighted that at an international level, legal 
professional privilege was not absolute. Rather, it must cede to the interests of 
national security.  
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B  The Weight of Authority 
 
 
By attaching equal importance to any prejudice suffered by clients as a result of 
disclosure and prejudices faced by the accused through non-disclosure, Goldberg 
QC, for the respondent, advocated a balancing test whereby the privilege could be 
breached only in truly exceptional circumstances.148 He submitted that the balance 
between competing interests should not be snuffed out and prevailed upon the 
Derby Court to weigh each case individually rather than apply a crude ‘all or 
nothing’ approach.149 The phrase ‘truly exceptional circumstances’ was not 
defined. Asserting that times had changed, he argued that greater emphasis was 
now being placed on putting courts in possession of all relevant material in order 
to arrive at the truth.150  
 
Although Lord Taylor CJ observed that the privilege was integral to the 
administration of justice, the rule should not be understood as being the sole 
ingredient in the whole recipe for justice or the cornerstone upon which the legal 
profession was built. A number of other pillars are equally integral to the 
administration of justice. These include trust, competence, ethical and 
professional conduct, integrity and the efficacy of the legal profession.151 Lords 
Keith and Mustill concurred with the Chief Justice and added nothing further to 
his pronouncement. However, Lord Nicholls noted the tension between the 
doctrine of legal professional privilege and the public interest, when he 
countenanced that  
 
All relevant material should be available to courts when deciding 
cases. Courts should not have to reach decisions in ignorance of the 
                                               
148 Ibid. 
149 [1996] AC 487, 511E (Lord Nicholls). 
150 Ibid 509F (Lord Lloyd). 
151 Vance v McCormack (2004) 184 FLR 62, 42 (Crispin J). 
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contents of documents or other material which, if disclosed, might 
well affect the outcome.152  
 
It becomes evident that he rejected the idea of a balancing test because it would 
present the courts with an impossible task.153 He concluded that, in the absence of 
any measure by which judges could ascribe an appropriate weight to civil and 
criminal actions of differing severity, the prospect of such an exercise was 
illusory.154  
 
Derby represented a change from treating legal professional privilege as a rule of 
admissibility. This was the view a generation before, per Lord Denning and other 
members of the judiciary.155 The modern view, initially taken in Australia in 
Baker, holds that the principle constituted a fundamental right. A fundamental 
human right is defined as ‘the freedom accorded equally, and without distinction, 
to each and every human being’.156 In the context of legal professional privilege, 
the important principle underpinning this ‘fundamental right’ is the public interest 
in enabling clients to speak to their lawyers in confidence without fear of ever 
having those conversations exposed.  
 
Despite the prevalence of doubt that the privilege did ‘very much to promote 
candour on the part of the client to his’ lawyer,157 the Derby Court proved that the 
common law now classed the privilege as a fundamental asset which had 
morphed into an important common law immunity.158 Favouring a more 
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expansive approach to legal professional privilege, Derby resolved the clash of 
principles in favour of the paramountcy of the doctrine and placed its status 
beyond doubt when it assigned it an absoluteness from which there was no 
derogation.  Despite being at odds with the principles enunciated in several 
Commonwealth decisions, the House of Lords couched the rule in the rhetoric of 
rights when it determined that no balancing act was required when applying the 
rule in litigation; with client-counsel communications permanently privileged 
from disclosure.   
 
While recognising that the refusal of A to reveal secrets wrought grave harm upon 
Brooks, the decision not to compel A’s confidential communications went against 
Lord Taylor’s earlier efforts to satisfy the judicial conscience. Contrary to his 
desire to leave no pebble unturned, Lord Taylor’s Derby pronouncement was 
inconsistent with his previous judicial opinions.  
 
Cautioning the need to re-examine the scope of the rule to keep it within 
justifiable bounds, Lord Taylor’s ruling in Balabel v Air India159 introduced a 
rigid requirement and restored the scope of the rule to its 19th-century roots. This 
aligned with the Wigmorean paradigm in which client–counsel communications 
attracted legal professional privilege only if they directly correlated to legal 
advice of a professional character.  
 
This clearly signified that, if a client sought advice which was not by nature 
professional legal advice, the resultant communication was not protected by legal 
professional privilege. Criticising cases which extended the doctrine without limit 
to all communications, the Balabel Court remarked that the privilege was not as 
clear as it might have been prior to Lord Taylor’s ruling. This evidences that, in 
limiting the breadth of the principle, Balabel succeeded in developing a firm rule.  
 
Lord Taylor’s judgment in R v Umoh Mfongbong160 also aligned with Benthamic 
and Wigmorean pronouncements in confirming that legal professional privilege 
                                               
159 [1988] Ch 317. 
160 (1987) 84 Cr App R 138. 
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should remain a preserve of the legal profession. Rejecting ever-multiplying 
privileges for other professional relationships in which at least equal confidence 
was reposed, Lord Taylor denied protection to communications passing between 
prisoner and prison officer where the latter was acting in the capacity of a legal 
aid officer.  
 
With respect to the waiver of privileged communications, Lord Taylor passed two 
conflicting rulings. In Tanap v Tozer,161 he remained faithful to Wigmore’s 
philosophy that the dictates of fairness required full disclosure on the basis that a 
party to a proceeding should not be permitted to ‘cherry pick’ which portions of a 
privileged communication they wished to divulge and those they wished to guard 
from disclosure. Conversely, in Goldman v Hesper,162 he again recognised that 
the privilege was not absolute and emphasised the need to weigh competing 
interests through ‘striking an appropriate balance’ with respect to privileged 
communications. In a deviation from Wigmore, he resolved that a voluntary 
disclosure of privileged information would not prevent the owner of a document 
from reasserting a claim of privilege in any subsequent context.  
 
Balabel signalled a trend towards narrowing the application of the rule and 
returned to the position which upheld the right to a fair trial. Derby reformulated 
the standard of this protection to encompass within its ambit all client–counsel 
communications. Tanap and Goldman were decided on the particular merits of 
each case owing to fairness and the need to strike an appropriate balance, 
however Derby applied a rigid rule of nondisclosure. In Inland Revenue, Lord 
Taylor concurred with Nicholls LJ that it would be unwise to say anything which 
might bind the hands of the judge, yet the Derby judgment effectively bound and 
gagged the judiciary from engaging in any form of balancing exercise.  
 
According paramountcy to the rule is to create an unwarranted extension to the 
privilege. Lord Lloyd in Derby was the sole justice to acknowledge that legal 
professional privilege may bring hardship to those seeking to assert their 
                                               
161 Tanap Investments (UK) v Tozer [1991] WL 839041. 
162 [1988] 1 WLR 1238.  
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innocence; however, he concluded that it was better to preserve the principle 
intact for the sake of the administration of justice.163 This contradicted his ruling 
in Francis & Francis as discussed in Chapter IV, where Lloyd LJ observed that, 
while courts were reluctant to depart from their previous rulings, if persuaded that 
a prior judgment was clearly wrong, they were bound to say so.  
 
The Derby Court resolved that client–counsel communications were  
 
absolutely and permanently privileged from disclosure even though, 
in consequence, the communications will not be available in court 
proceedings in which they might be important evidence.164 
 
After looking at the authorities, Lord Taylor continued with these words: 
 
Nobody doubts that legal professional privilege could be modified, or 
even abrogated, by statute, subject always to the objection that legal 
professional privilege is a fundamental human right protected by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (1953) … as to which we did not hear any 
argument … difficulty is this: whatever inroads may have been made 
by Parliament in other areas, legal professional privilege is a field 
which Parliament has so far left untouched.165 
 
Neither of these arguments is sufficient to explain why the privilege warrants an 
absolute status. The Derby decision was overruled three years later, with the 
absolutist rationale undermined in Re L.166 This decision produced cracks in the 
intellectual armour of the original Derby decision and represented the principal 
occasion in which the House of Lords was confronted with the unenviable task of 
considering the correctness of Derby.  
 
                                               
163 [1996] AC 487, 510A (Lord Lloyd). 
164 Ibid 510G (Lord Nicholls). 
165 Ibid 507H (Lord Taylor). 
166 Re L (A Minor) (Police Investigation: Privilege) [1997] AC 16. 
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Proving that Derby was incorrectly decided, a differently constituted House of 
Lords in Re L167 was left to mop up the overeager ‘spill’ by placing some limit on 
the absoluteness of that earlier decision.  
 
1  Re L (A Minor) 
 
The Derby Court’s ruling that privileged communications could not be overridden 
in deference to a more compelling interest does not detract from the power of the 
House of Lords to depart from a previous decision where there are cogent reasons 
to do so. There are strong indications that Derby may not be good law on this 
point. Derby, if correct, would have the effect of enabling all communications, 
even those with dubious causal nexus, to be shielded. This proposition was 
contested in Re L.168  
 
In that case, Lord Nicholls opined that the privilege may be curtailed if the 
interests of a minor were at stake, with the court ultimately resolving that this 
constituted a legitimate public interest,169 and that legal professional privilege 
could be forced to cede to competing interests of higher value. In order to eschew 
the stranglehold of Derby, the Court in Re L170 held that expert reports obtained 
with a view to litigation were not privileged.171 They were discoverable in the 
same way as any other material.172 Re L indicated that the broad principle stated 
in Derby was incorrect.173 Referring to the privilege as ‘essentially a creature of 
                                               
167 [1997] AC 16. The Court comprised Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, 
Lord Mustill and Lord Steyn. In Re L, a child ingested methadone. 
168 Ibid. 
169 [1997] AC 16. In spite of his pronouncement in Re L, Lord Nicholls nevertheless affirmed his 
absolutist stance when he maintained that legal professional privilege was so integral to the 
administration of justice that only express statutory wording could abrogate its scope or absolute 
application. 
170 Ibid.  
171 Adrian Zuckerman, ‘Legal Professional Privilege: The Cost of Absolutism’ (1996) 112 Law 
Quarterly Review 535, 538–9.  
172 Ibid.  
173 See Patrick O’Hagan, ‘Legal Professional Privilege: Some Developments’ (1997) 2 Private 
Client Business 131. Patrick O’Hagan, writing about developments in legal professional 
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adversarial proceedings’,174 Jauncey LJ held that the rule could not be invoked to 
protect confidential communications that were investigative or inquisitorial in 
nature.  
 
Demonstrating a willingness to discard traditional views of the inviolable nature 
of legal professional privilege when it conflicted with the interests of children,175 
the majority justices distinguished communications passing between lawyer and 
client from reports prepared by third parties on a client's instructions for the 
purposes of litigation:176   
 
In these proceedings, which are primarily non-adversarial and 
investigative as opposed to adversarial, the notion of a fair trial 
between opposing parties assumes far less importance. In the 
latter case, the judge must decide the case in favour of one or the 
other party upon such evidence as they choose to adduce … In 
the former case, the judge is concerned to make a decision which 
is in the best interest of the child in question.177 
 
In dissent, Lord Nicholls reaffirmed his stance in Derby when he stated in Re L 
that ‘the public interest in a party being able to obtain informed legal advice in 
confidence prevails over the public interest in all relevant material being made 
available to courts when deciding cases’.178  In spite of his pronouncement in Re 
L, Lord Nicholls nevertheless affirmed his absolutist stance when he maintained 
that legal professional privilege was so integral to the administration of justice 
that only express statutory wording could abrogate its scope or absolute 
application. Derby denied the defendant access to confidential third-party 
                                                                                                                                
privilege, observed that Re L demonstrated the ability to balance competing public interests, with 
the House of Lords indicating that each case turned on its facts.  
174 [1997] AC 16, 26 (Jauncey LJ). 
175 Mary Hayes, ‘Protecting Children in England and New Zealand’ (1999) 7 Canterbury Law 
Review 297 <http://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/CanterLawRw/1999/4.html>.  
176 [1997] AC 16. 
177 [1997] AC 16 (Nicholls LJ). 
178 [1997] AC 16, 32 (Nicholls LJ). 
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communications which could have assisted the preparation of his defence during 
committal proceedings. Lord Taylor’s decision to regard the privilege as 
‘absolute’ prevented disclosure of material relevant to the defendant’s claim of 
innocence.   
 
Zuckerman states that, ‘in Derby, Lord Nicholls…warned against adopting any 
discretionary power to override LPP. In Speaking in Re L, Lord Jauncey seemed 
to defer to this advice’.179 Zuckerman adds, ‘there is no escaping the need for 
balancing interests’. He continues:  
 
The refusal to deal with the entire question is doubly unfortunate 
because of the approach of the house of Lords adopted in this very 
case… The House of Lords seems to have adopted an all-or-nothing 
policy; either LPP obtains in whole or it does not obtain at all’. Mr 
Zuckerman surmises that ‘this approach was dictated, one cannot help 
but feeling, not so much by the all-or-nothing approach as by the need 
to escape the shackles of Derby. 180    
 
Patrick Hagan, in writing about developments in legal professional privilege, 
observes that Re L demonstrated the ability to balance competing public interests, 
with the House of Lords indicating that each case turned on its facts.181  Mary 
Hayes, in ‘Protecting Children in England and New Zealand’ comments in two 
separate passages that ‘in Re L, their Lordships demonstrated that they were 
willing to adopt a robust approach and discard long held views of the sacrosanct 
nature of legal professional privilege where these views appeared to conflict with 
the interests of children’.182  Ms Hayes adds that  
 
The House of Lords was deeply divided on whether the special 
attributes of children cases justified the Court of Appeal's approach, 
and only approved it by a 3:2 majority. Lord Jauncey, speaking for the 
                                               
179 Adrian Zuckerman, above n 171, 536. 
180 Ibid  538-39. 
181 Patrick Hagan, above n  173. 
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majority, said that, in his opinion, a distinction should be drawn 
between a communication between solicitor and client, to which 
absolute legal professional privilege applies, and the privilege 
attaching to reports by third parties prepared on the instructions of a 
client for the purposes of litigation … His Lordship was of the opinion 
that if a party was able to conceal, or withhold from the court, 
important matters relevant to the future of the child, there would be a 
risk that the welfare of the child would not be promoted…183 
 
2  Three Rivers 
 
Derby was again overruled in a later English case colloquially known as Three 
Rivers.184 In that long-running dispute, the correctness of Lord Taylor’s decision 
was again called into question during litigation between the Bank of England and 
liquidators and creditors of the collapsed Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International SA (BCCI).185 That proceeding turned on whether the bank was 
compelled to furnish to the court communications disclosed during an earlier 
inquiry into the collapse.186 At trial, Tomlinson J dismissed the claimants’ request 
for specific disclosure against the bank. 
 
On appeal in Three Rivers (No 1),187 Lord Justice Chadwick MR and Lord Justice 
Keene upheld the judgment of Tomlinson J because the circumstances of the case 
                                               
183 Mary Hayes, above n 175. 
184 Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 1) [2003] 
CP Rep 9; Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 
2) [2002] EWHC 2309; Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of 
England (No 3) [2003] EWCA Civ 474; Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company 
of the Bank of England (No 4) [2004] 3 WLR 1274; Three Rivers District Council v Governor 
and Company of the Bank of England (No 5) [2003] EWCA Civ 474; Three Rivers District 
Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6) [2004] UKHL 48. 
185 Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 6) [2004] UKHL 48 was presided over by Lord 
Scott, Lord Rodger, Baroness Hale, Lord Carswell and Lord Brown.  
186 Chaired by Bingham LJ, the inquiry was known as the ‘Bingham Inquiry’. 
187 Three Rivers (No 1) was heard before Lord Justice Chadwick MR and Keene LJ. Three Rivers 
DC v Bank of England (No 1) [2003] CP Rep 9. 
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were so highly unusual since the documents were never in the physical possession 
of the bank, nor did the bank have a right to possession. No obligation of 
disclosure existed. Conversely, Three Rivers (No 2) held that a breach of privacy 
‘was necessary for the protection of the rights and freedoms of the parties to the 
litigation’.188 Appeals (No 3 and No 4) cited, with approval, the authority of 
Derby when confirming that legal assistance and advice could be effectively 
rendered only if clients were candid and forthcoming, this being the very 
consideration which justified the absolute character of the privilege in the first 
place.189 
 
In Three Rivers (No 5), the House of Lords restricted the definition of ‘client’ 
when it ruled that, for the purpose of legal professional privilege, information 
tendered by an employee was akin to information received from an independent 
agent and was not subject to protection.190 Three Rivers (No 6) reined in the 
privilege and reduced its ambit to those communications pertaining to the giving 
or receiving of legal advice in a professional capacity.191  
 
Declaring that legal professional privilege should be accorded a scope which 
reflected the policy reasons that justified its presence in our law,192 Scott and 
Carswell LJJ were conscious of the need to discern the bounds of the privilege. 
Lord Scott proposed a test for discerning the relevant legal context in which 
advice attracted legal professional privilege. He specifically stated that, if a 
communication pertained to the rights, liabilities, obligations or remedies of the 
                                               
188 The Court stated that, for this reason, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
1950 did not apply to the parties. Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 2) [2002] EWHC 
2309. 
189 Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 4) [2004] 3 WLR 1274. 
190 Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 5) [2003] EWCA Civ 474 (Longmore LJ). 
191 Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 6) [2004] UKHL 48 (Lord Scott). This statement 
was borrowed from Lord Taylor in Balabel v Air India [1988] Ch 317.  
192 Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 6) [2004] UKHL 48, 35. 
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client under private or public law, it would be privileged.193 This was premised on 
the purpose and occasion for which the communication was made.194  
 
The House of Lords cited Wigmore, who emphasised that ‘the privilege should be 
strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of 
its principle’.195 The Court concluded that it would continue to adhere to the 
historical practice of English courts in limiting the ambit of the privilege to 
communications made in confidence between lawyer and client for the purpose of 
obtaining legal advice or assistance.196  
 
Section III highlighted the manner in which Derby distinguished itself from 
judgments in specific Commonwealth jurisdictions. The standard, though, was 
changing. In curing the uncertainty and complexity of the law by restating the 
principles of the privilege, Re L and Three Rivers opened a modest crack in the 
doctrinal wall.197 Section IV now examines the second stream of thought which 
informed the reasoning of Lord Taylor CJ.198 
 
IV   PRIVILEGE: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT AND A MATTER OF SUBSTANCE 
 
Where the House of Lords misunderstood the older English authorities and failed 
to adequately survey the cases that advocated a balancing approach, the Court was 
instead persuaded by a ruling stemming from AM & S Europe Ltd v 
Commissioner of the European Communities.199 The correlation between the ECJ 
                                               
193 Ibid 1277 (Lord Scott). 
194 Ibid. 
195 Ibid 86. 
196 Ibid. 
197 James Moliterno, ‘Rectifying Wrongful Convictions: May a Lawyer Reveal Her Client's 
Confidences to Rectify the Wrongful Conviction of Another?’ (2011) 38 Hastings Constitutional  
Law Quarterly 4, 812.  
198 The first being Lord Taylor CJ’s adherence to Wigmore’s fallible pronouncement that legal 
professional privilege was settled in the 16th century.  
199 AM & S Europe Ltd v Commission of the European Communities [1983] QB 878. AM & S is 
an abbreviation for ‘Australian Mining and Smeltering’.  In the Derby transcript, it is stated: ‘The 
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case and Derby lies in the fact that AM & S promulgated legal professional 
privilege to be a fundamental human right, deserving of protection for that reason.  
 
The rationale expounded in AM & S held that, irrespective of whether it was 
described as a fundamental human right of the client or the duty of the lawyer, the 
principle of legal professional privilege had nothing to do with the protection or 
privilege of the latter.200 It was founded in the need for clients to turn to lawyers 
for advice, aid and legal representation.201 The Derby Court utilised the 
‘fundamental human right’ rationale as partial justification for rendering the 
privilege absolute.  
 
A  AM & S Europe: A Global Community 
 
In AM & S Europe Ltd v Commission of the European Communities,202 the 
European Court of Justice203 ruled for the first time on whether client–counsel 
                                                                                                                                
appeal was argued on June 12, 13, 14 and 15, 1995, when the following additional cases were 
cited: A M  & S  Europe Ltd v Commission of the European Communities (Case 155/79), [1983] 
QB. 878; Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52; Bullock & Co v Corry & Co (1878) 3 QBD. 356; 
Clowes (1992) 95 Cr App R 440;  Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No. 7) [1990] 1 WLR 1156; Evans v 
Chief Constable of Surrey [1988] QB 588; Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex p. Bennett (No. 
2) (1994) 99 Cr App R 123; Knight v Marquess of Waterford (1835) 2 Y & C Ex 22;  Lonrho Ltd 
v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No. 2) [1980] 1 WLR 627; Minet v Morgan (1873) LR 8 Ch App 361; 
Nederlandse Reassurantie Groep Holding NV  v Bacon & Woodrow (a firm) [1995] 1 All ER 976; 
Nias v Northern and Eastern Rly Co (1838) 3 M & C 355; Oxfordshire County Council v M 
[1994] Fam LR 151;  Reece v Trye (1846) 9 Beav 316; R v Blastland (1985) 81 Cr App R 266; 
Chief Constable of West Midlands Police, ex p. Wiley [1995] 1 AC 274; R v Lewes Justices, ex p. 
Secretary of State for Home Department [1973] AC 388; R v Ward (Judith Theresa) [1993] 96 Cr 
App R 1;  Riley (1866) 4 F & F 964; Sphere Drake Insurance Plc v Denby, The Times, December 
20, 1991; Tompkins (1978) 67 Cr App R 181; Wright (1866) 4 F & F 967 .  
200 Ibid 913 (A G Slynn). 
201 Ibid. 
202 Ibid.  
203 Hereafter referred to as the ECJ. The European Court of Justice comprised Menens de 
Wilmars, President, G Bosco, A Touffait and O Due (Presidents of Chambers), P Pescatore, Lord 
Mackenzie Stuan, A O’Keeffe, T Koopmans, U Everling, A Chloros and F Grévisse, JJ, with 
Advocate General, Sir Gordon Slynn and Registrar, A Van Houtte. 
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communications were privileged from disclosure under community law.204 The 
ECJ pronounced the principle to be a fundamental human right which was 
‘deserving of special protection for that reason’.205 AM & S Europe Ltd had a 
subsidiary-owned zinc smelter which distributed zinc metals, alloys and 
concentrates.206 Concerned about AM & S adhering to competitive conditions, 
three inspectors from the Commission of the European Communities were tasked 
with investigating the subsidiary’s production and distribution to ensure they were 
not in violation of Articles 85 and 86 of the European Economic Community 
Treaty.207 The inspectors, in concluding their investigation, took with them copies 
of documents and requested access to further specified correspondence.208 
 
AM & S furnished certain documents, but refused to avail the commission with 
communications which its lawyers deemed privileged and directed the 
commission to contact its lawyers should further clarification be required 
regarding the character and nature of the documents.209 AM & S emphasised that 
under community law, which was defined as part of a wider area of international 
law or the law of international organisations,210 the confidential relationship 
between lawyer and client was entitled to protection from disclosure.211 In a 
subsequent meeting212 between the appellant’s lawyers and the commission, AM 
& S expressed a desire to reach a consensus that the documents were privileged 
                                               
204 Lloyd Duhaime, Duhaime’s Law Dictionary  
<http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/C/CommunityLaw.aspx>. Community law is 
defined, in Duhaime’s Law Dictionary as: ‘The law of the European Union as established by 
treaties and cases of the European Union courts’.  
205 AM & S Europe Ltd v Commission of the European Communities [1983] QB 878. 
206 Ibid 1579. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid 1614. 
209 Ibid 1579. 
210 Rene Barents, The Autonomy of Community Law (Kluwer Law International, 2004) 2. 
211 AM & S Europe Ltd v Commission of the European Communities [1983] QB 878, 1581. 
212 The meeting between the lawyers representing AM & S and the commission took place in 
Brussels on 18 September 1979. 
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due to the necessity of upholding the secrecy of client–counsel 
communications.213  
 
AM & S relinquished certain documents to the inspectors in order to satisfy them 
that the materials were indeed privileged.214 The commission inferred from this 
that their inspectors could exercise their right to access and read documents in 
their entirety215 and argued that the extent to which documents were accorded 
protection was predicated on the purpose for which discovery was sought.216 The 
greater the importance of having available all of the evidence, the weaker the 
protection.217  
 
Had the ECJ ruled in favour of the respondent, there would be no possibility of 
maintaining privilege even over documents of which the protected nature was 
wholly undisputed.218 Noting that individual circumstances informed the question 
of whether compliance with community law was more effectively obtained by 
disclosure than protection,219 the ECJ sustained the appellant’s claim of legal 
professional privilege on the ground that the circumstances justified the 
communications as ‘falling within the context of rights and the lawyer’s specific 
duties in that connection’.220  
 
The ECJ held that such a privilege did exist in community law, and that 
communications were protected and were beyond the commission’s powers of 
investigation provided they emanated from an independent practising lawyer in a 
member state.221 Advocate-General Gordon Slynn stated: ‘If one considers the 
real purpose of the protection … I can for my part see no justifiable distinction 
                                               
213 AM & S Europe Ltd v Commission of the European Communities [1983] QB 878, 1580. 
214 Ibid. 
215 Ibid. 
216 Ibid 1584. 
217 Ibid. 
218 Ibid 1582. 
219 Ibid 1584. 




between such documents in the hands of the lawyer and in the hands of the 
client’.222 Furthermore, for the purpose of invoking the privilege, and provided 
that the lawyer was bound by a code of professional ethics, Slynn made no 
distinction between a salaried lawyer and one engaged in private practice.223  
 
This is an important point, owing to the fact that the test laid down in AM & S 
resolved the privilege in favour of client–counsel communications when the client 
had employed the services of an ‘independent practising lawyer’. By enunciating 
the requirement of independence, the ECJ mandated that only external lawyers 
representing clients in community law proceedings had the right to assert a claim 
of legal professional privilege.  
 
Commenting that AM & S left open several issues concerning its scope, Arianna 
Andreangeli, in EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights,224 speculated 
that the non-existence of a common code of ethics to bind the legal profession 
may have contributed ‘to the exclusion from the scope of the privilege of 
communications emanating from lawyers authorised to practise in a non-Member 
state’.225 The European Court of Justice, she stated, justified the absence of a 
professional relationship between lawyer and client on the basis that legal 
assistance was an overriding interest which necessitated full autonomy of the 
legal profession.226  
 
B  Derby & AM & S: The Common Denominator 
 
Although the Derby Court stated that ‘little assistance is to be gained from 
European decisions touching on legal professional privilege such as AM & S 
Europe Ltd. V Commission of the European Communities … with [respect to] the 
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scope of the domestic system’,227 the common denominator linking Derby and 
AM & S was that community law was binding on both decisions and the courts of 
England could not nullify its effect. Community law encompassed the common 
elements of the member states’ domestic laws in respect of legal professional 
privilege.228 In order to appreciate why the ECJ imbued legal professional 
privilege with the status of a ‘fundamental, constitutional or human right’,229 as 
reiterated by Lord Taylor CJ in Derby,230 it is first necessary to revert to the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1953,231 
which decreed the privilege to be part of the right to privacy guaranteed under 
Articles 8232 and 10.233 This convention, which opened for signatures in 1950,234 
                                               
227 (Case 155/79) [1983] QB 878. See [1996] AC 487, 493G. 
228 Jeffrey Makoff, ‘Attorney-Client Privilege in the European Communities after A.M. & S. v. 
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229 AM & S Europe Ltd v Commission of the European Communities [1983] QB 878, 1600. 
230 It will be recalled that Lord Taylor CJ stated that ‘legal professional privilege was a 
fundamental human right protected by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953)’. 
231 Hereafter referred to as the ECHR.  
232 The provisions contained in Article 8(1) of the convention stipulate that ‘Everyone has the 
right to respect for … his correspondence’; and 8(2) ‘There shall be no interference by a public 
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’.  
233 The provision contained in Article 10(1) states: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression … [which] shall include freedom to receive and impart information … without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers’; and 10(2) ‘The exercise of these 
freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, 
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law … for the prevention of … crime, 
for the protection of … morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority 
and impartiality of the judiciary’. 
234 Explanatory Memorandum: Recommendation No R (97) 18 of the Committee of Ministers to 
Member States concerning the protection of personal data collected and processed for statistical 




was created through the efforts of the Council of Europe235 and enabled 
democratic European governments to safeguard their joint ideals. As England was 
a signatory to this convention, its courts were bound by it and were required to 
accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court of Human Rights.236 According to 
Lord Taylor CJ, judges applied European law without special difficulty just as 
they would apply English law.237  
 
Lord Taylor CJ enunciated that English judges were ‘not bound by the 
Convention and in the event of any conflict, English law prevailed’,238 except if 
an aggrieved party appealed to the ECJ. In that instance, several possible 
scenarios may result. If the ECJ ruled in favour of the appellant, the domestic law 
must be amended per the tenets of the treaty, to accord with the ECJ judgment. 
Other English cases decided along similar lines may, in light of the ECJ ruling, be 
incorrectly decided, thereby bringing the English justice system into disrepute. As 
Lord Taylor expressed: ‘We have the worst of both options. Our ratification of the 
Convention obliges us … to accept it, but our refusal to incorporate it means 
acceptance only occurs after … much delay and humiliation.’239  
 
                                               
235 The Council of Europe was created in 1949. 
236 See also Peter Taylor, ‘Richard Dimbleby Lecture: The Judiciary in the Nineties’ (1993) 19 
Commonwealth Law Bulletin 323, 329. See also Peter Taylor, ‘Richard Dimbleby Lecture: The 
Judiciary in the Nineties’ (Lecture, BBC Education, London, 30 November 1992). Lord Taylor 
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by the 1957 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (TEEC), which was 
absorbed into English law through statute, whereafter European Community law became binding 
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237 See ibid 329. Article 189 confirmed the precedence of community law over domestic legal 
provisions. This regulation stipulated that community law, as an independent source of law 
imbued with a special and original nature, was binding and directly applicable to all member 
states and carried with it a permanent restriction on their sovereign rights, against which any act 
incompatible with the concept of community law could not prevail.  
238 Ibid.  
239 Ibid.  
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In its explanatory memorandum, the European Court of Human Rights stipulated 
that the freedoms contained in Article 8, namely, the privacy of correspondence, 
could be curtailed by a public authority for the defence of a number of legitimate 
aims.240 Article 10 acts as an adjunct to Article 8 by laying down the freedom to 
receive and impart information without interference.241 This provision is 
understood to imply the freedom to seek information,242 including the exchange 
of communication between lawyer and client. Any interference with client–
counsel communications is therefore said to contravene the treaty, except in 
defence of a number of legitimate aims. An inference may be made that the types 
of communications passing between clients and lawyers, whatever their purpose, 
were of a private and confidential nature. Nevertheless, the European Court of 
Human Rights was prepared to balance competing interests and did not declare 
legal professional privilege to be an absolute right. Contrary to the conclusion 
reached in Derby, the European Court of Human Rights implied that a balancing 
test should apply such that the privilege could be derogated from with reasonable 
cause where ‘such interference is proportionate and in furtherance of other 
legitimate aims’.243  
 
C  Lord Taylor’s Absolutism: A Rebuttable Presumption 
 
The previous section documented two planks where Derby fell short; specifically 
in misconstruing the historical authorities and later, AM & S, as a means of fusing 
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‘fundamental human rights’ with an ‘absoluteness rationale’. This section 
examines the third plank where Derby failed; being its correlation of legal 
professional privilege with express statutory authority.  
 
The premise that legal professional privilege is absolute and cannot be breached 
by any court for any reason is premised on faulty logic and overlooks the 
common law decision of Re L244 in which the rule yielded, in exceptional 
circumstances, to the interests of a minor. This thesis has demonstrated that the 
privilege is a creature of common law and does not derive its authority from 
statute. Bentham illustrated that the common law was not an absolutely fixed, 
inflexible system245 and precedents were not of absolute authority; judicial 
decisions in one age were disregarded in another.246 It naturally follows that legal 
professional privilege, as a bastion of the common law, could not be of a 
permanently fixed character either. 
 
This view was borne out in the decisions of the Commonwealth authorities 
discussed throughout this thesis. Those cases variously described the privilege as 
‘an impediment, not an inducement, to frank testimony’247 which ‘curtailed the 
judicial search for truth’.248  Further; ‘…the correct principle [is that] if there are 
documents in the possession or control of a solicitor, which … help to further the 
defence of an accused man, no privilege attaches’.249  ‘The judge must then balance 
whether the legitimate interest of the defendant in seeking to breach the privilege 
outweighs that of the client in seeking to maintain it.’250   
 
‘The basic principle of legal professional privilege [is that it is] not absolute’.251 
Legal professional privilege must yield where there is no recognisable interest in 
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maintaining it, when to do so would otherwise shield information which would 
assist a defendant to establish their innocence.252 
 
Owing to the fact that the privilege is now understood to represent a fundamental 
human right253 and is underpinned by the public interest in availing clients of the 
right to access legal representation, Lord Taylor CJ announced that it was not 
presumed that parliament intends to intrude on the common law, generally, but 
will adopt a statutory construction which preserves rather than interferes with its 
operation  
 
Lord Taylor subsequently resolved that parliament had left the realm of legal 
professional privilege untouched.254 In fact, by the time Derby came before the 
House of Lords in 1995, a number of English statutes expressly overrode the rule. 
One of these, the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (UK), provided at ss 93A and 93B255 
that the privilege could not be maintained in instances where a party had assisted 
another to make or retain benefits through criminal conduct256 or the proceeds of 
crime.257 Given that a judge, in upholding this legislation, would be required to 
satisfy him or herself as to whether the privilege had been made out or was 
vitiated by virtue of a crime, a balancing exercise would have to occur to 
determine which interest should prevail.  
 
This was at the heart of the Benthamic and Wigmorean philosophies. Bentham 
argued against the privilege on the basis that it was conducive to defeating justice. 
He claimed that it immunised clients who consulted their lawyers with a view to 
committing illicit conduct, suppressing evidence or advancing a false claim. 
Wigmore equally questioned how any moral line could be drawn regarding 
‘absolutism’ of the rule. According to his four-tiered paradigm for assessing 
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whether communications met his threshold, the privilege warranted a balancing 
exercise. Wigmore emphasised that when justice required the investigation of the 
truth, no one could declare they had any knowledge which was rightly private.258   
 
In spite of the ‘absolutist’ stance taken by the House of Lords, Lord Taylor CJ 
called for a review of legal professional privilege and acknowledged that the law 
was in an unsatisfactory state.259 Although the ECJ in AM & S formally accorded 
legal professional privilege a place in community law, it failed to resolve legal 
professional privilege in the context of litigation privilege or third party 
communications. While the Derby decision was supported by AM & S, this ECJ 
judgment actually limited the breadth of protection for client–counsel 
communications to independent lawyers of member states. In-house counsel were 
proscribed from asserting a claim. There is no evidence prior to AM & S which 
suggests that legal professional privilege was expressly read into human rights’ 
discourse, nor did it have an impact on national laws with respect to legal 
professional privilege except to the extent of any inconsistency with domestic 
law. In addition, the ECHR was not incorporated into domestic laws until three 
years post-Derby.260  
 
An argument may therefore be made that legal professional privilege is not 
absolute in relation to litigation privilege or third party communications.261 In 
limiting Derby to client–counsel communications about past conduct, Lord Taylor 
CJ also left the door open for a ‘future harm’ exception. The judgments in AM & 
S and Derby that viewed legal professional privilege as a vital principle have been 
sharply criticised. Edward Imwinkelried stated that some commentators had 
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called for parliament to overrule the judgment, declaring that even a purportedly 
absolute privilege must cede in exceptional circumstances.262 Imwinkelried 
himself hoped that ‘the absolutist approach to legal professional privilege would 
be short-lived; [with a] discretionary jurisdiction offer[ing] a better solution’.263 
 
Instead of relying on authority and precedent, the policy considerations for and 
against the rule should be thoroughly analysed to address conflicting policy goals 
which cannot be simultaneously achieved.264 A balancing of conflicting interests 
to straighten out ‘confused areas of the law which give rise to constant litigation, 
inconsistent decisions and perhaps even plain wrong decisions’265 would prevent 
interference with the administration of justice.266 As the public interest in the 
proper administration of justice should prevail over all else, judges should be 
accorded a discretionary power to examine the privileged communications, 
together with a statement supporting the reasons for non-disclosure and decide, on 
that basis, whether or not the material should be produced.267  
 
Thorpe J supported a departure from the current concept of privilege and the 
development of a rationale which promotes judicial discretion, when he advocated 
an alternate rationale and confirmed his desire to see the common law plainly 
stipulate that lawyers in possession of confidential communications relevant to 
determining a case, but adverse to the interests of their client, should be unable to 
resist disclosure by relying on legal professional privilege, but have a positive 
duty of disclosure to the other side and the court.268  
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This view is reinforced by commentary from academics including Charles 
Hollander QC. In Documentary Evidence, he claimed that ‘in truth, absolutism 
may be subject to challenge under relevant human rights guarantees’269 because 
the right to a fair trial is an obvious right which is hampered when information 
that can prove innocence or aid in a defence of an accused is omitted from 
evidence. The right of every accused to a fair trial is a basic and fundamental 
right. He added: ‘The law of legal professional privilege is an area which has to 
adapt’.270  
 
Harry Street denied that there was any justification for the assumption that legal 
professional privilege overrode all other considerations and petitioned for judges 
to be empowered to decide whether disclosure of communications would be 
injurious to the public interest.271 Colin Passmore similarly commented that the 
Derby decision raised a few questions about whether the defendant, Brooks, ought 
now be given recourse to the Human Rights Act 1998;272 particularly with respect 
to invoking  Article 6 of the Convention in order to challenge the House of Lords’ 
ruling on grounds that the unavailability of A’s communications deprived him of 
due process and the right to a fair trial.273  
 
When determining a question arising in connection with a Convention right, the 
court or tribunal is obliged, pursuant to s 2 of the Human Rights Act, to consider 
the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg institutions to the extent of their relevance to 
proceedings. This duty fixes notwithstanding the date on which judgment was 
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pronounced.274 While it is inevitable that divergences between British and 
European jurisprudence may arise under British legislation, ‘the British judiciary 
has indicated that Convention rights will be construed in a manner consistent with 
the approach of the Strasbourg organs’.275  
 
Intrinsic to the Convention is a desire to foster a fair balance between the general 
interest of the community and the protection of an individual’s inherent human 
rights. In this spirit, Soering v United Kingdom276 held that:    
 
The right to a fair trial in criminal proceedings, as embodied in 
Article 6 holds a prominent place in a democratic society. The 
Court does not exclude that an issue might exceptionally be 
raised under Article 6 … in circumstances where the 
[defendant] has suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of a 
fair trial …277 
 
Beloff states that Convention rights are to be ‘a compelling, if not, overriding aid, 
to interpretation’ in acting as a guide to judges when interpreting Human Rights 
legislation.278 He opines that ‘there will be a rebuttable presumption in favour of 
an interpretation consistent with Convention rights’.279 In acknowledging the 
absorption of the European Convention into domestic law, the English Court of 
Appeal in R v Togher Doran and Parsons,280 remarked that it would be 
unfortunate if the approaches adopted of the European Court of Human Rights 
and the British courts diverged.  
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In R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene and Others,281 Lord 
Hope of Craighead observed that the incorporation of the Convention into English 
law would ‘subject the entire legal system to a fundamental process of review 
and, where necessary, reform by the judiciary’.282 Furthermore, under the 
Convention, not every right is inalienable. Qualified rights, such as the right of 
non-disclosure is guaranteed subject to enumerated criteria and competing 
interests.283 As the Convention is concerned with the party’s actual and not 
merely legal predicament, Courts are encouraged to pierce the veil to examine 
‘the realities of the procedure in question … in light of the object and purpose of 
Article 6; specifically the protection of the rights of the [defendant]’.284  
 
This position formed the central contention of Bowes’ argument, in which he 
offered comment on Derby from a legal practitioner’s viewpoint. Observing that 
many practitioners, and possibly justices, would prefer to follow the reasoning of 
Caulfield J in Barton and French J in Ataou, Bowes claimed that the supremacy of 
legal professional privilege clashed with the principle that the overriding 
consideration in the administration of justice was the need to avail the defendant 
of the right to a fair trial.285 He accepted that clients must be able to speak freely 
to their lawyers and a practical limit should be imposed on communications 
sought from third parties; however the end result must never foist injustice on a 
defendant or produce a miscarriage of justice.286  
 
This accorded with the view adopted by Dodek that the legal system should not 
regard the privilege as absolute, but apply it more as a matter of case-by-case 
                                               
281 R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene and Others [1999] 3 WLR 972. 
282 Ibid 993-994. 
283 Julie Debeljak, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 (UK): The Preservation of Parliamentary 
Supremacy in the Context of Rights Protection’ [2003] Australian Journal of Human Rights, 9, 
187-8. 
284 Adolf v Austria (1982) 4 EHRR 315, 323-24. 
285 Michael Bowes, ‘The Supremacy of Legal Professional Privilege: The Derby Magistrates 




balancing.287 Christopher de Courcy Ryder proposed that, if dual rationales 
existed for legal professional privilege in judicial decision making, the process of 
that decision making would be significantly improved.288 Zuckerman stated that, 
while all courts recognised that a balancing test was necessary in order to 
determine whether or not to order disclosure of protected communications,289 the 
House of Lords proceeded from the notion that clients, in order to disclose the 
entire truth to their lawyer, should be availed of uninhibited access to legal 
representation.290 In order to facilitate this, their communications must remain 
immune from disclosure.291  
 
Johannes Chan tackled the issue from a different perspective when he contended 
that Lord Taylor’s reference to legal professional privilege as an absolute right 
simply inferred that, as a matter of common law, it could not be overridden by a 
greater public interest.292 As a result, it was not open to the court to conduct any 
further balancing exercise between legal professional privilege and other public 
interests and it was in this isolated sense that legal professional privilege was 
absolute.293 This argument overlooks the common law decision of Re L294 in 
which the rule yielded, in exceptional circumstances, to the interests of a minor.  
 
The irony inherent in these remarks is that litigation cannot be correctly 
concluded without a fair trial, yet a fair trial cannot be guaranteed when 
potentially spurious claims to legal professional privilege are freely asserted. By 
permitting exculpatory or decisive evidence relevant to the establishment of a 
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party’s defence or claim of innocence to be withheld from the court, it is 
foreseeable that grave injustices may result. 
 
This view accorded with developments in the Commonwealth jurisdictions of 
Canada and Australia. Contrasting the Derby approach with the approach taken 
earlier by the Canadian Supreme Court in Descoteaux v Mierzwinski,295 Chan 
observed that the Canadian court rejected the approach adopted by the House of 
Lords and instead subjected legal professional privilege to the same balancing test 
as any other fundamental constitutional right.296 Gavin Murphy added that the 
House of Lords’ inflexibility was out of sync with the right to a fair trial.297 
Similarly, in the Australian case of Carter v Managing Partner, Northmore, Hale, 
Davey & Leake,298 the High Court of Australia specifically referenced Barton,299 
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children300 and Ataou.301 That 
court ruled that there was a legitimate argument to be made that, as a matter of 
policy, legal professional privilege should be relinquished in any case, but 
particularly a criminal one, when the considerations favouring disclosure of 
confidential communications outweighed those favouring the preservation of 
confidentiality.302  
 
The cases in which legal professional privilege significantly impede the 
ascertainment of the truth are so exceptional that they do not justify its 
curtailment. In the hands of a skilled legal practitioner, the refusal of access to 
privileged communications is likely to be a more potent weapon than would the 
communication or document itself and that, if there ever were a case where it 
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became apparent that refusal of access precluded a fair trial, it would be possible 
to invoke the inherent power of the courts to stay proceedings. The compelling 
answer to the argument in this Court is, however, that which has already been 
indicated, namely, that the argument was considered and firmly rejected in the 
course of the development of the common law when it was established, as a 
fundamental principle, that the confidentiality which should be afforded to 
communications and documents protected by legal professional privilege.  
 
V  CONCLUSION 
 
Judicial rulings surrounding the application of legal professional privilege have 
been fraught with anxiety, fluctuating from one conclusion to another as judges in 
Commonwealth jurisdictions seek to reconcile this tension. Lord Taylor CJ in his 
rulings preceding Derby did not recognise the supremacy of legal professional 
privilege. Only when the House of Lords distinguished Derby from cases which 
had previously stood for decades as good authority was the rule overbalanced and 
resolved in favour of non-disclosure. Reversing the priorities of ‘innocence at 
stake’ when it overruled both Barton and Ataou, the House of Lords confirmed 
that the substantive dimension of legal professional privilege was absolute in 
nature such that no exception should be allowed to it.303  
 
This was clearly a change from treating legal professional privilege as a rule of 
admissibility, which was the view a generation ago, to the modern view, initially 
taken in Australia, in Baker, and subsequently in England. The Lords’ sole 
justification for elevating legal professional privilege into something resembling a 
constitutional principle,304 was a questionable belief that the courts of England 
remained bound by public policy considerations that had prevailed centuries 
earlier.305 Representing a paradigm shift from the fundamental concepts that had 
historically guided legal professional privilege, it was extraordinary that the 
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Derby Court should abolish an exception to the privilege that was recognised by 
Caulfield and French JJ as a matter of natural justice.306  
 
Derby now conferred an absolute immunity from disclosure, with the major 
consideration behind the House of Lords’ formulation laying, first and foremost, 
in the erroneous Wigmorean pronouncement on the origins of legal professional 
privilege and, second, in a ruling stemming from AM & S Europe Ltd v 
Commissioner of the European Communities.307 This facilitates the making of an 
important distinction, as neither the European Court of Justice in AM & S nor the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1953 
pronounced legal professional privilege to be above reproach. The reliance on, or 
misinterpretation of, Wigmore and AM &S led Lord Taylor CJ into error, whereby 
he overlooked or disregarded the fact that these authorities were prepared to 
balance competing interests, such that the privilege could be derogated from with 
reasonable cause and in defence of legitimate aims. This indicates that the 
privilege was not unqualified. No decisive answer exists as to why Lord Taylor 
CJ refrained from applying AM & S in his earlier judgments, all of which 
occurred after the European Court of Justice ruling. He did not provide clear 
reasoning as to why he elected to follow it only in Derby. 
 
As a general principle which contributed to respect for fundamental rights, legal 
professional privilege, in the modern English context, was elevated to the realm 
of ‘fundamental human right’ when the European Court of Human Rights 
affirmed that it could be departed from only in exceptional circumstances. The 
legal basis for this assertion is framed in two such cases; namely, Michaud v 
France308 and Versini-Campinchi and Crasnianski v France.309 The Court in 
Michaud held that the right to professional confidentiality was a fundamental 
entitlement, with interference permitted only when necessary in the interests of 
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public safety [and] for the prevention of disorder or crime’.310  In Versini-
Campinchi,311 the interception and transcription of a telephone conversation 
between French attorneys and their client was deemed  ‘valid under the 
circumstances’ and while it constituted a breach of the right to privacy, such a 
right was not absolute. The European Court ruled that legal professional privilege 
did not ‘preclude the transcription of exchanges that contain evidence that the 
attorney participated in a crime, as long as the exchanges are not used against the 
attorney’s client’.   
 
The House of Lords endorsed this expansive approach when it favoured the 
paramountcy of the doctrine and placed its status beyond doubt. Assigning it an 
absoluteness from which there was no derogation, it extended the rule further than 
necessary to enable clients to obtain legal advice. The notion of ‘absolutism’ 
placed clients in the novel position of being beyond the reach of the law.  
 
This thesis concludes that Lord Taylor’s rigid and unyielding application fell out 
of step with the historical interpretation of the privilege and ceased to avail any 
degree of flexibility or judicial discretion. An ‘absoluteness’ rationale does not 
accord with the historical justification for the rule, as discussed in Chapter II, nor 
the fact that the privilege has been held to be subject to some legitimate 
restrictions by virtue of waiver and the crime-fraud exception as canvassed in 
Chapter IV. As the result of a misplaced preoccupation with process and 
procedure, Lord Taylor’s ruling removed any margin of judicial discretion and 
witnessed a change from the fundamental concepts that had guided legal 
professional privilege.  
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CONCLUSION: A REFLECTION ON LORD TAYLOR AND ABSOLUTISM  
 
The authoritative historical and contemporary statements surrounding the absolute 
nature of legal professional privilege demonstrate that Derby was an anomaly in 
the wheel of judicial machinery. Producing a radical break with the predominant 
tradition, the harsh and uncompromising stance taken by Lord Taylor eliminated 
the possibility for an objective analysis to be carried out to assess what a party 
had done. Restraining itself from inquiring into a party’s affairs, the Derby Court 
placed the client in the novel position of being beyond the reach of the law. To 
borrow a Benthamism, the court effectively excused itself from rendering service 
to justice by virtue of the fact that it could no longer determine the scope of the 
rule.  
 
I  LORD TAYLOR OF GOSFORTH: A JUDICIAL LEGACY 
 
Derby’s rigid and unyielding application of legal professional privilege is out of 
step with the general interpretation of the privilege and strips the ideals of the 
privilege of much of its meaning by ceasing to avail any degree of flexibility or 
judicial discretion. Derby illuminates what courts are prepared to put into, or read 
into, the concept of legal professional privilege. Freezing the law of privilege at 
this particular point in history, Derby prevented legal professional privilege from 
evolving and adapting according to judicial discretion.  
 
Depicted as a standard by which to measure lawyerly conduct in a given situation, 
the absoluteness of privilege is antithetical to a system which purports to have, as 
its end, rational decision making.1 Justice does not exist merely in the microcosm 
of a courtroom. The keystone of legal reasoning and the life of the law ‘has not 
been logic; it has been experience’.2 Derby clarified a number of important points 
concerning criminal procedure. It ruled that the right of a witness, ‘A’, to claim 
privilege could not be weighed against the public interest in ensuring that all 
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relevant evidence was made available to Brooks in defending his innocence. Lord 
Taylor decreed the privilege to outweigh all other public interests, including the 
safety of the realm and of the public.3 Declaring that no exception should be 
permitted to the absolute nature of legal professional privilege, Lord Taylor 
articulated that it ‘was in the wider interests of all those hereafter who might 
otherwise be deterred from telling the whole truth to their solicitors’4 that the rule 
should be maintained.  
 
The prevailing orthodoxy holds that legal professional privilege is absolute. Lord 
Taylor’s conception of legal professional privilege is, however, fundamentally 
flawed, for no matter how it is framed, the doctrine cannot be absolute if cases 
such as Re L5 and Three Rivers6 continue to apply a balancing test with respect to 
the rule. To label the doctrine ‘absolute’ is misleading. Despite acquiring 
precedential authority, legal professional privilege was not enshrined in a 
monolithic body of precedent; rather only presumed to be so. A misplaced 
preoccupation with process and procedure created ‘turbulence in the profession’s 
quest to narrow the gap between professional ideals and competing realities’.7  
 
Legal professional privilege appears to have broadened in scope, it has remained a 
contentious topic in England for the last few years and there has been something 
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of a backlash against it.8 Irrespective of the responsibilities of a lawyer to their 
client or the need to protect the confidence between them, the public will not 
readily accept silence when it comes to deciding serious cases.9 By demarcating 
the privilege in criminal and civil proceedings, heightened protection could be 
accorded defendants in the criminal paradigm.10 
 
In elevating the doctrine to a position of reverence, Derby sought to frustrate and 
defeat the great principle of access to justice by effectively according protection 
to every client–counsel communication. This theoretically enabled clients to 
entrust information and materials to the custody of lawyers in order to avoid 
detection or disclosure. While ‘the boundaries of the privilege have not always 
been clear’,11 an ‘absoluteness’ rationale does not accord with the historical 
justification for the rule, nor the fact that the privilege has been held to be subject 
to some legitimate restrictions such as waiver and the crime-fraud exception. 
 
Far from clear and consistent, a consideration of the history of legal professional 
privilege reveals a constantly shifting scope, its proportions narrowing and 
expanding in line with the judicial fashion of the day. The formulation adopted by 
Lord Taylor CJ in Derby subverted the purpose for which legal professional 
privilege was historically created12 and muddied the waters for decades. This 
thesis challenges the historical and theoretical accuracy of Lord Taylor CJ’s basic 
premise that the privilege was settled in the 16th century. Having initially asserted 
that legal professional privilege was formed in Elizabethan England, Lord Taylor 
CJ proceeded to quote 19th-century case law to bolster his Derby dicta; however, 
neither era supported an ‘absolutist’ rationale. 
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The evolution of the principle reveals that the ancient Roman justification, as 
endorsed by Bentham, was based on servitude. In the 16th and 17th centuries, the 
rationale was rooted in an esteem for the legal profession. By the 18th century, the 
parameters surrounding legal professional privilege were narrowed to facts stated 
to lawyers for the purpose of enabling them to conduct a cause. Anything said or 
learned outside that realm was not subject to inviolability13 and the lawyer was 
bound to communicate it.14 The legitimacy of legal professional privilege was still 
under consideration until its 19th-century incarnation heralded that the basic 
purpose of a trial was the determination of truth.  
 
It is apparent that ‘absoluteness’ is not a legitimate end for which legal 
professional privilege was created. Indeed, the notion of ‘absoluteness’ only 
makes sense when viewed through the lens of the politics of the legal profession 
and the ‘exclusivity rationale’ propounded by Wigmore and, more recently, Lord 
Taylor CJ in Balabel and Mfongbong. Confining legal professional privilege to 
lawyer–client communications, an absoluteness justification reinforces the 
already advantaged standing of the profession and underpins the services that 
lawyers are uniquely placed to offer. 
 
Lord Taylor CJ believed the privilege to be so irrefutably established in law that it 
was a necessary measure rather than an intellectual artifice. Such was its foothold 
that the principle  pierced the laws of evidence and ethics to become not merely a 
rule of evidence, but a substantial body of evidentiary law in a judicial system 
which is founded on the presumption of innocence. Having analysed the earlier 
cases over which Lord Taylor CJ presided, this thesis has exposed the manner in 
which his articulation of the rule gradually evolved. One explanation for his 
paradigm shift lays in the fact that he was acutely aware that ‘accountability’ had 
become the ‘in’ phrase:  
 
The days have gone when a judge’s pronouncements were accepted 
as the product of an arcane process of reasoning supposedly beyond 
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the comprehension of lesser mortals. Judgments or sentences of the 
Court are matters of public interest and should be subject to comment. 
It is salutary for judges to have some feedback as to the impact of 
their decisions and as to public opinion.15 
 
II      BENTHAM, WIGMORE AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON LORD TAYLOR OF GOSFORTH 
 
The perspectives of Bentham and Wigmore present many contrasts, there is little 
practical difference between the two. Both viewed themselves as legal reformers, 
with Bentham espousing radical thinking and Wigmore proposing a limited 
strategy that would not unnecessarily obstruct the ‘investigation of truth’ and ‘the 
administration of justice’.16 The notion of ‘accountability’ resonates with a 
Benthamic logic, whereby Bentham argued in favour of public scrutiny. Although 
the pronouncements of Bentham and Wigmore sufficiently enunciated the ethical 
responsibility on members of the legal profession, Lord Taylor CJ’s 
pronouncement in Derby departed from the Benthamic and Wigmorean 
contentions, both of which abhorred the notion of an absolutely fixed rule of 
privilege. By extending the reach of legal professional privilege beyond the 
Benthamic and Wigmorean limitations, Lord Taylor permitted the rule to become 
entrenched as an immovable, inviolable cornerstone of the legal profession; firmly 
and unshakably enshrined at its core.17  
 
Bentham said legal doctrines or legal propositions are not inflexible or absolutely 
fixed.18 If one accepts the contention of Bentham, namely that the common law is 
not an absolutely fixed, inflexible system, it naturally follows that the privilege, as 
a bastion of the common law, could not be of a permanently fixed character 
either. It is apparent that the Derby Court dismissed the Benthamic remark that 
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precedents were not of absolute authority, with judicial decisions in one age 
disregarded in another.19  
 
Wigmore would have endorsed the rule from the perspective of reinforcing the 
fundamental right that clients should be able to speak candidly to their lawyers, he 
would not have advocated an ‘absoluteness’ rationale. Having evidenced that 
legal professional privilege bore the undeniable stamp of Bentham and 
Wigmore’s influences, this thesis demonstrates that Derby witnessed a dramatic 
and unwarranted departure from their jurisprudential teachings.  
 
Judicial opinion has varied as to whether the legal profession should permit 
disclosure of client information in a variety of different contexts. The judiciary 
has predominantly deferred to Wigmore, and to a lesser extent Bentham, when 
seeking to resolve any uncertainty with respect to the rule. This came to an abrupt 
halt in Derby, whereafter few contemporary academics or judges have accorded 
detailed consideration to their philosophies and nomenclature.20 Far too little 
attention is now paid to Wigmore’s treatise, which is often used as ‘no more than 
a rich repository of materials, rather than as an elaboration of a complex concept 
of the subject’.21 
 
The fourth element of the Wigmorean paradigm involved a balancing test in terms 
of weighing the injury22 wrought by disclosure against the correct disposal of 
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litigation,23 the irony inherent in Derby was that litigation could not be correctly 
concluded without a fair trial, yet a fair trial could not be guaranteed when 
potentially spurious claims of privilege were freely asserted. The importance of 
legal professional privilege must not be overemphasised and arguments in favour 
of absolutism that accord it heightened protection are unconvincing. Wigmore 
propounded that, in furtherance of justice, no one could refrain from divulging 
relevant information.24 Legal professional privilege could not be inviolable.   
 
III  LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE IN THE POST-DERBY ERA 
 
Post-Derby developments including Re L25 and England’s now-leading case on 
the subject, Three Rivers DC v Bank of England,26 represent a concerted effort by 
the House of Lords to reduce the scope of the rule.27 Reinstating the principle in a 
form befitting its original justification, Three Rivers clarified that neither the 
privilege, confidentiality or the adversary system was absolute;28 with each 
justified pragmatically according to their ability to serve the public interest.  
 
Derby represents a change from the fundamental concepts that have guided legal 
professional privilege. By proving that the absolutist stance adopted by Lord 
Taylor CJ was fatally flawed, this thesis has exposed, as a legal fiction, the notion 
that the doctrine of legal professional privilege is absolute. The courts of England 
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formulated rules that did not adhere to either the Benthamic or Wigmorean 
philosophies and Lord Taylor CJ arguably was therefore led into error. This 
proves that the contemporary interpretation adopted by the 20th-century legal 
fraternity misapprehended the Wigmorean theory.  
 
The rule evolved into a rigid principle carrying a far greater certainty than 
Wigmore, or history, intended. It is arguable that subtle traces of Wigmore’s 
influence may be found in Lord Taylor’s judgment, for the Chief Justice only 
sought to apply his ‘absoluteness’ rationale to legal professional privilege in the 
context of litigation and could see no value in extending it to legal advice 
privilege. This may be said to accord with Wigmore’s own interpretation in which 
the latter favoured litigation values over the harm to other values. As only 
minimal analysis has been accorded to the exploration of this theme, other 
academics have failed to make this connection.  
 
‘While it is not necessary for all lawyers to know what the history of a rule is, it is 
a wonderful accomplishment to know how it now stands resolved and, without it, 
a lawyer cannot be accounted learned in the law’.29 Having traced the judicial 
evolution of the rule in Lord Taylor’s jurisprudence and how he came to 
erroneously pronounce the rule of legal professional privilege absolute, this thesis 
exposes the falsity of his ruling. Lord Taylor’s conception of legal professional 
privilege is inherently flawed and his judgment in Derby had the effect of eroding 
the primacy of the rule. 
 
VI  LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 
 
The solutions that address this dilemma are neither simple nor straightforward. 
Although legal professional privilege might be ‘one of the marks of a civilised 
society’,30 the application of the principle ‘is a question more easily asked than 
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answered, despite all that is to be found in the decided cases and all that has been 
said in the learned articles’.31 Despite ‘truth’ being the end goal of every trial, 
Derby and the accompanying case studies canvassed throughout this thesis 
exemplify that justice is not what comes out of a courtroom in every instance,32  
nor does the law uncover the truth at every turn in each trial. This feeds back into 
the notions espoused by Knight-Bruce VC and Lord Denning. Where Knight-
Bruce VC countenanced that ‘truth, like all other good things, may be loved 
unwisely, pursued too keenly and cost too much’,33 Lord Denning pronounced 
that it was better to have a few innocent men suffer in prison than bring the 
integrity of the legal system into disrepute.34  
 
Justice, though, cannot exist in the microcosm of courtrooms. There can be no 
doubt that the law is in an unsatisfactory state, with legal professional privilege 
impeding the truth-finding objective. Indeed, truth might be a matter of degree, 
but freedom, life and liberty — the core considerations of justice — are absolutes.  
 
The need for reform is also demonstrated by what happens in practice: the 
complexities are ignored, oversimplified versions of the law are applied and 
judges try to discourage use of its technicalities.35 
 
Although legal professional privilege may be overcome by the exceptions of 
national security, future harm and crime-fraud, due process was denied in Derby, 
when Brooks was unable to access potentially exculpatory evidence. Legal 
professional privilege must adapt to the changing needs of an informed, 
intelligent and progressive global community. If ‘the will of the people shall be 
the basis of the authority of government’,36 then public opinion surely holds sway 
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over the need to amend the inconsistent application of legal professional privilege 
that has to-date, caused far greater harm than good.  
 
Decisions about ethical dilemmas should not hinge on a code. Honesty and 
honour should be prized above all, as these govern the legal practitioner in his or 
her dealings with the Court and throughout their representation of clients. Where 
honour is inextricably linked to the practitioner’s conscience, Derby demonstrates 
that privilege — the oldest evidentiary principle known to common law37 — 
causes severe adversarial tension. 
 
We must never forget that ‘the record on which we judge these defendants today 
is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow’.38  Legal practitioners are 
foundational to the function of law – so it becomes their duty and obligation to 
make sure ‘law’ works,39 yet the moral and ethical underpinnings of the 
profession are considerably weakened, and integrity compromised, when the 
judicial system, whose primary aim is to search out justice, commands officers of 
the court to remain silent as innocent individuals are unjustly jailed when 
exculpatory information is supressed. The concealment of secrets does not engender 
the respect of the contemporary community, nor does it promote public 
confidence in the administration of justice. After all, justice delayed is still justice 
denied. 
 
‘The difficult problem is where to draw the boundaries — how to define the kinds 
of secrets that a lawyer may not keep … the problem has been difficult from the 
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beginning’.40 Issues that afflict the doctrine today have been present since its 
inception. If justice moves at a glacial pace, then legal professional privilege, 
whose sixteenth century beginnings were marred by defects, has made little 
progress. As cracks continue to appear in the principle, thereby weakening and 
reducing its scope,41 it will inevitably take on a fragility as attested to by 
numerous discarded doctrines superseding it. A discretionary or mandatory 
disclosure rule ‘cannot help but advance the debate about the rules that should 
govern legal practitioners confronted with clients who intend to harm others’,42 
including by way of wrongful imprisonment and denial of exculpatory 
information protected by the privilege.  
 
A positive change in the application of, and exception to, legal professional 
privilege has the potential to produce a recognised and lasting effect. 
Accordingly, an innocence exception should be favoured because ‘freeing 
the innocent ought to be a paramount goal of any fair system of criminal 
justice’.43 Such an exception should be enacted in recognition of the adverse 
impact on defendants like Brooks in Derby who have little or no opportunity of 
redressing the balance. Any changes to the rules of ethics and codes of conduct to 
create further exceptions to prevent wrongful incarceration need to be 
supplemented by changes in the law to prevent repercussions for the legal 
profession if confidential communications are disclosed in legal proceedings. 
Without doubt there has been, and will continue to be, debate surrounding the 
erosion and potential abolition of legal professional privilege in contemporary 
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